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Over the past several years, a worldwide consensus has 
emerged on the need for a more socially-inclusive approach 
to generating economic growth. However, inclusive growth 
and development remain primarily an aspiration. No systemic 
framework has emerged to guide policy and practice. 
The World Economic Forum’s System Initiative on Economic 
Growth and Social Inclusion has taken on this challenge with 
the release of the “Inclusive Growth and Development Report 
2017.” Building on a beta version of a policy framework 
released in 2015, this Report provides a practical guide for 
policymakers and stakeholders seeking to build a strategy to 
capture greater synergy between economic growth and more 
broadly-based progress in living standards in their countries.
In addition to the Report’s policy framework and metrics – 
which provide a comparative illustration of institutional 
strength and enabling environment conditions in 15 of the 
most relevant policy domains for inclusive growth – a new set 
of national key performance indicators are presented to help 
countries track progress. These have been compiled into a 
composite global index, the Inclusive Development Index, 
measuring the accumulated level as well as the most recent 
five-year trend of performance for the 109 countries for which 
such data is available. The former offers a more integrated 
and holistic picture of the state of economic development of 
countries than Gross Domestic Product per capita alone.  
The latter is useful for governments and stakeholders seeking 
to assess the effect of changes in policy and conditions  
within a typical political cycle. 
Together, the policy framework and benchmarking data are 
intended to provide countries with the practical tools needed 
to help turn the ambition of inclusive growth into a practical 
and measurable plan of action. At the same time, they  
yield several important conclusions for national policy and 
international economic cooperation, which the Report  
articulates in considerable depth. These provide the basis 
for a new global growth agenda at a time when the world 
economy sorely needs new impetus.
This Report, and the System Initiative on Economic Growth 
and Social Inclusion of which it is part, exemplify the World 
Economic Forum’s ambition to serve as a platform to enable 
closer cooperation between multiple institutions and  
stakeholders sharing a common aim. We wish to thank the 
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contributions to this volume. We also wish to express  
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Around the globe, leaders of governments and other 
stakeholder institutions enter 2017 facing a set of difficult  
and increasingly urgent questions:
• With fiscal space limited, interest rates near zero, and
demographic trends unfavorable in many countries,
does the world economy face a protracted period of
relatively low growth? Will macroeconomics and
demography determine the world economy’s destiny
for the foreseeable future?
• Can rising in-country inequality be satisfactorily
redressed within the prevailing liberal international
economic order? Can those who argue that modern
capitalist economies face inherent limitations in this
regard – that their internal “income distribution system”
is broken and likely beyond repair – be proven wrong?
• As technological disruption accelerates in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution, how can societies organize
themselves better to respond to the potential employment
and other distributional effects? Are expanded transfer
payments the only or primary solution, or can market
mechanisms be developed to widen social participation
in new forms of economic value-creation?
These questions beg the more fundamental one of whether  
a secular correction is required in the existing economic 
growth model in order to counteract secular stagnation and 
dispersion (chronic low growth and rising inequality). Does the 
mental map of how policymakers conceptualize and enable 
national economic performance need to be redrawn? Is there 
a structural way, beyond the temporary monetary and fiscal 
measures of recent years, to cut the Gordian knot of slow 
growth and rising inequality, to turn the current vicious cycle 
of stagnation and dispersion into a virtuous one in which 
greater social inclusion and stronger and more sustainable 
growth reinforce each other?
This is precisely what government, business, and other leaders 
from every region have been calling for. Over the past several 
years, a worldwide consensus has emerged on the need  
for a more inclusive growth and development model;  
however, this consensus is mainly directional. Inclusive growth 
remains more a discussion topic than an action agenda.  
This Report seeks to help countries and the wider international 
community practice inclusive growth and development by 
offering a new policy framework and corresponding set of 
policy and performance indicators for this purpose.
Policy Framework and Metrics
The ultimate objective of national economic performance 
is broad-based and sustained progress in living standards, 
a concept that encompasses wage and non-wage income 
(e.g., pension benefits) as well as economic opportunity,  
security and quality of life. This is the bottom-line basis on 
which a society evaluates the economic dimension of its 
country’s leadership. Many countries have had difficulty  
in satisfying social expectations in this regard. For example,  
in the last five years, annual median incomes declined by 
2.4% in advanced economies, while GDP per capita growth 
averaged less than 1%.
To borrow from a business concept, growth can be thought 
of as the top-line measure of national economic performance, 
with broad-based or median progress in living standards  
representing the bottom-line. Inclusive growth can be thought 
of as a strategy to increase the extent to which the economy’s 
top-line performance is translated into the bottom-line result 
society is seeking, i.e., broad-based expansion of economic 
opportunity and prosperity. 
However, inclusive growth is more than that. An economy is 
not a business, and history and scholarship have shown that 
there is a feedback loop between the bottom- and top-lines 
(growth and equity) in a national economy. This feedback 
loop can run in either a positive or a negative direction. The 
extent to which it is a virtuous circle is influenced by a diverse 
mix of structural and institutional aspects of economic policy, 
going well beyond the two areas most commonly featured in 
discussions about inequality: education and redistribution.
This Report presents a policy framework encompassing 
seven principal domains (pillars) and 15 sub-domains  
(sub-pillars) which describe the spectrum of structural factors 
that particularly influence the breadth of social participation 
in the process and benefits of economic growth. Societies 
that have had success in building a robust middle class and 
reducing poverty and social marginalization have tended to 
create effective economic institutions and policy incentives  
in many of these areas, while also pursuing sound 
macroeconomic policies and efficiency-enhancing reforms 
over time.
Executive Summary
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The results are presented in four groups of countries based  
on their level of economic development as measured by 
national income.
The following patterns emerge from this data:
• Given the breadth and complexity of this policy
ecosystem as well as the important role each country’s
particular political economy plays in shaping it, there is
no single ideal policy mix for the pursuit of inclusive
growth. It is most important to view the entire
spectrum of the Framework as an integrated system
that merits deliberate cultivation as an integral part
of the growth and development process with periodic
upgrading to address weaknesses revealed in one
part or another.
• Larger fiscal transfers are not necessarily incompatible
with long-term growth and competitiveness, but
neither are they always the primary or most effective
available option for broadening socioeconomic
inclusion. Many of the world’s most competitive
economies have high levels of social protection and
the significant tax burdens these imply. However, other
countries achieve moderate or low Gini ratios mainly
because their pre-transfer levels of inequality are
comparatively modest to begin with rather than due to
the significance of their transfers.
• Policies and institutions supporting social inclusion
are not solely a luxury of high-income countries.
There is extensive overlap in absolute scores across at
least three of the four income groups of countries in the
sub-pillars of Business and Political Ethics, Tax Code, 
Financial System Inclusion, Intermediation of Business 
Investment, Productive Employment, Concentration of 
Rents, and Educational Quality and Equity.
• A robust inclusive-growth strategy is both pro-labor
and pro-business, an agenda to boost both social
inclusion and economic efficiency through a stronger
focus on institutions. The inequality debate focuses
almost exclusively on up-skilling of labor and redistribution –
when it moves beyond problem identification. For many
countries, these may be among the most appropriate
responses to widening dispersion of incomes. But
the enabling environment for real-economy business
investment and entrepreneurship can be just as critical
to a country’s success in expanding employment,
boosting wages, and widening asset ownership, which
are central drivers of progress in broad living standards.
Performance Metrics
In addition to the Policy and Institutional Indicators (PIIs) 
described above, a set of performance metrics, or National 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), is presented below  
in the form of a dashboard for each country. This set of KPIs 
provides a more complete picture of national economic  
performance than that provided by GDP alone, particularly  
if the ultimate objective of development is understood to  
be sustained, broad-based advancement of living standards 
rather than increased production of goods and services,  
per se.
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Framework: The Policy and Institutional Ecosystem  
Underpinning Inclusive Growth
The policy and institutional domains portrayed in this  
Framework represent the ecosystem of structural policy 
incentives and institutions that together and as part of the 
growth process help to diffuse widely the benefits of an 
expanding national economy in terms of household income, 
opportunity, economic security, and quality of life. This  
ecosystem constitutes the implicit income distribution system 
– or, more precisely, living-standards diffusion mechanism –
underpinning modern market economies. When functioning
properly, it operates in a self-reinforcing cycle in which
economic growth and social inclusion feed each other.
However, in many advanced countries, this policy and  
institutional ecosystem has deteriorated or has been inert 
over the past two decades as the forces propelling secular 
dispersion – technological change, global integration,  
domestic deregulation, and increased immigration – have  
intensified. Many developing countries, meanwhile, have 
lagged in creating the basic elements of such an ecosystem 
as they have industrialized and integrated into the global 
economy, missing an opportunity to include more of their 
populations in their development process and rendering 
their economies more vulnerable to fluctuations in exports 
and commodity prices.
The Framework represents an alternative way of thinking 
about structural economic reform and its role in the development 
process. Structural reform usually refers to measures aimed 
at boosting economic efficiency and macroeconomic  
stability by sharpening market signals and improving the 
health of public finances, often in response to a recent 
or looming fiscal or balance-of-payments crisis. In such 
circumstances, it tends to have the effect of squeezing living 
standards in the short term. But a systematic, sustained 
effort to strengthen institutions and policy incentives across 
the Framework’s 15 sub-domains – or within the weakest 
areas – also constitutes an exercise in structural reform, albeit 
one that mixes demand- and supply-side measures for the 
express purpose of boosting broad living standards while 
reinforcing the rate and resilience of growth. 
To help governments and stakeholders assess their countries’ 
relative strengths and weaknesses within this ecosystem,  
this Report contains a cross-country database of 140  
statistical indicators that enables comparison at the pillar, 
sub-pillar, and individual indicator level for each of the  
109 countries for which the relevant data is available. These 
Policy and Institutional Indicators (PIIs) yield a distinct 
profile of each country’s relative institutional strength and  
utilization of policy space. They are like diagnostic scans of 
the structural underpinnings of an economy’s capacity to  
capture the synergies between growth and social inclusion. 
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much of the economic policy establishment, including key 
international organizations.
For many countries, a reimagined process of structural reform 
aimed at broadening the base and benefits of growth may 
also be the best hope for accelerating its rate in the current 
context. For example, in advanced countries experiencing 
diminishing returns from extraordinary monetary policy 
measures, limited fiscal space, and unfavorable demographic 
trends (e.g., Japan, the United States, and the European 
Union, to various degrees), a mixture of demand- and  
supply-side structural reforms could boost consumption and 
job creation in the short term while raising the economy’s 
longer-term growth potential through lasting improvements  
in labor productivity, household finances, real-economy  
investment, and innovation. In middle-income countries 
experiencing weak exports and commodity prices, monetary 
policy constrained by the risk of currency depreciation and 
capital flight, and limited fiscal space (e.g., most of the BRICS – 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), a structural  
reform agenda of this nature is precisely what could rebalance 
their growth model toward more robust domestic consumption. 
Similarly, for lower-income countries with extensive social 
marginalization due to poor resourcing of and inequitable  
access to basic services, education, and infrastructure as  
well as weak legal, tax, and investment climate institutions,  
a reform strategy with a sharper focus on these basic  
building blocks could help boost growth and social equity 
simultaneously. 
Countries seeking to keep pace with the labor-market 
challenges accompanying the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
should set a discrete national investment target and 
public-private implementation strategy across the  
following five areas of human capital formation:
1) Active labor-market policies
2) Equity of access to quality basic education
3) Gender parity
4) Non-standard work benefits and protections
5) Effective school-to-work transition
PII data indicate that few, if any, of even the most advanced 
economies are well positioned for the change that is coming. 
A universal basic income is no substitute for these five crucial 
institutional underpinnings of a well-functioning labor market. 
It may serve as a useful complement at some point, but 
countries seeking to prepare their workforces for the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution would do well to invest in and level up 
performance across these areas. Here again, a systemic 
rather than silver-bullet approach is likely to be most effective.
Implications for International Economic Cooperation
Major economies should undertake a coordinated effort 
to boost global growth by identifying and implementing 
the demand- and supply-side structural reforms that are 
most needed to activate more fully the virtuous circle of 
inclusive growth in their economies. Governments should 
examine whether based on peer comparison they have  
unutilized policy space in one or more of the Framework’s  
15 sub-domains and then draw upon the structural policy  
analyses of other international economic organizations, 
particularly the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) which has a wealth of analysis and 
prescriptions in these domains, as well as the World Bank,  
International Labour Organization (ILO), and others, to  
develop an action agenda tailored to their circumstances.  
The World Economic Forum and these organizations could 
provide further support by facilitating public-private,  
interdisciplinary input into and support for the agendas that 
emerge. Such a global effort in 2017 to reinvigorate global 
growth by broadening its base and strengthening its  
long-term foundations – making it less dependent on  
short-term macroeconomic measures and export demand – 
is precisely what the world economy needs to combat  
the cyclical and secular pressures weighing on growth.  
The G20 Enhanced Structural Reform Agenda, launched  
during China’s recent presidency, provides an opening for 
such a coordinated international initiative. 
International organizations should embrace this  
reformulation and reprioritization of structural economic 
policy in their public signaling, country advice, and 
development cooperation programs. By virtue of their 
public profile and intimate relationship with the economic 
ministries of governments, the major international economic 
organizations have a vital role to play in the establishment  
and scaled application of this new and more inclusive  
growth model.
The international community should buttress national 
efforts by:
• funding a major increase in institution-building
assistance for developing countries in the
corresponding policy domains.
• reforming development finance institutions (DFIs) to
support a scaling of blended, public-private financing
of sustainable infrastructure to promote worldwide
implementation of the Paris Agreement of the 21st
Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and progress toward
The Report also derives a composite index that ranks 
countries based on their combined KPI scores, the Inclusive 
Development Index (IDI).This new global index conveys 
a more integrated sense of the relative state of economic 
development – and recent performance – than conventional 
rankings based on GDP per capita alone. Some countries 
score significantly better on the IDI than on the basis of GDP 
per capita, suggesting they have done a relatively good job of 
making their growth processes more inclusive: they include 
countries at very different stages of economic development 
such as Cambodia, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, 
South Korea, and Vietnam. By contrast, other countries 
have significantly lower IDI rankings than GDP per capita 
rankings, indicating that their growth has not translated as 
well into social inclusion; these include Brazil, Ireland,  
Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, and the United States.
Significantly, 51% of the 103 countries for which these data are 
available saw their IDI scores decline over the past five years, 
attesting to the legitimacy of public concern and challenge 
facing policymakers regarding the difficulty of translating  
economic growth into broad social progress. In 42% of 
countries, IDI decreased even as GDP per capita increased. 
In over 75% of economies,wealth inequality was a chief  
culprit. It rose 6.3% on average during this period.
Implications for National Policy
Many countries have significant unexploited potential to 
simultaneously increase economic growth and social  
equity. But activating the virtuous circle of inclusive 
growth more fully will require them to change their  
approach to structural reform, reimagining it as an ongoing 
process of continuous improvement within a diverse ecosystem 
of demand- and supply-side policies and institutions, the 
combined effect of which is to diffuse opportunity, income, 
security, and quality of life as part of the growth process.  
The construction and maintenance of this policy and  
institutional ecosystem deserves equal and parallel emphasis 
with the traditional focus of top economic policymakers: 
macroeconomic, trade, and financial supervision policies. 
Rebalancing policy priorities in this manner would imply a  
profound change for many countries and indeed for the 
“growth model” that has been posited for a generation by 
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Figure 3: Inclusive Development Index (IDI) Top Performers
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the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The  
infrastructure intensity of the SDG and climate agendas 
(and the employment intensity of infrastructure  
investment) suggests that they could provide much of 
the impetus for global growth over the coming 10-15 
years, especially if combined with a broader structural 
shift of economies toward inclusive growth as outlined 
above. Most of the leaders of DFIs recognize the  
need for a strategic shift in their role from direct lending 
(usually to sovereigns) to catalyzing much larger  
multiples of domestic and international private investment 
through greatly expanded emphasis on co-investment, 
risk mitigation, aggregation, and project development 
technical assistance. However, their boards and staff 
are not yet fully supportive of or equipped for this shift. 
Shareholder governments and the business community 
must mobilize to seize this opportunity by engaging in 
collective work to surmount these impediments.
• resetting the priorities of trade and investment
cooperation to scale trade-related small-business
activity and employment; reduce barriers to trade in
services (which are often labor-intensive) and investments
in industrial value chains (in which relatively few
developing countries participate extensively); catalyze a
leveling up of social and environmental practices within
such value chains so as to maximize their payoff for
sustainable development in developing countries while
minimizing the fear in developed countries of a global
race to the bottom in social protections; and modernize
and align international investment and regional trade
agreements in order to strength their contribution to
sustainable development, simplify the conduct of
business across multiple jurisdictions, and reduce
discrimination, particularly against small countries that
are not part of major regional agreements.
Conclusion
Efficient markets and macroeconomic stability are essential 
for economic growth. But how well growth benefits society as 
a whole depends on the framework of rules, incentives, and 
institutional capacities that shape the quality and equity of 
human capital formation; level and patience of real-economy 
investment; pace and breadth of innovation; effectiveness 
and flexibility of worker protections; coverage and adequacy 
of social insurance systems; quality and breadth of access  
to infrastructure and basic services; probity of business  
and political ethics; and breadth and depth of household 
asset-building.
This recognition and the rebalancing of policy priorities it  
implies is what is required for governments to respond more 
effectively to decelerating growth and rising inequality –  
to take seriously the social frustrations increasingly being 
expressed through the ballot box and on the street. Such 
frustrations have an essential validity. The implicit income 
distribution system within many countries is in fact 
severely underperforming or relatively underdeveloped, 
but this is due to a lack of attention rather than an iron 
law of capitalism. Inequality is largely an endogenous rather 
than exogenous challenge for policymakers and needs to 
be recognized and prioritized as such in order to sustain 
public confidence in the capacity of technological progress 
and international economic integration to support rising living 
standards for all.
A coordinated global initiative along these lines is what is 
required to transform inclusive growth from aspiration into  
action – into a new global growth agenda that places 
people and living standards at the center of national 
economic policy and international economic integration. 
Such an effort to reshape the assumptions and priorities  
of the way modern market economies organize themselves  
to generate socioeconomic progress can only be realized  
with the engagement of all stakeholders. This calls for  
a collective commitment to greater responsiveness and 
responsibility in economic leadership by government  
and business leaders alike. The Forum’s System Initiative  
on Economic Growth and Social Inclusion is intended  
to serve the international community as a platform for such 
public-private cooperation.
Section 1: The Challenge
The world economy is at a crossroads. Global growth is 
slow by post-World War II standards, and decelerating. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects growth of 3.1% in 
2016,1 down from a rate of about 4% in 2011.2 International 
merchandise trade is decelerating even faster, declining from 
an average growth rate of 7% between 1980 and 20113 to 
an estimated 2% or less in 2016.4 The relationship between 
growth in global trade and GDP has reversed from a post-war 
pattern in which merchandise trade grew about one-and-a-half 
times faster than economic output to one in which it is  
expanding at about three-quarters of the GDP growth rate.5
After generating the majority of global growth since the 
financial crisis, the BRICS countries and other major emerging-
market economies are experiencing a marked slowdown, 
with the possible exception of India. Advanced economies are 
even less buoyant. While the US economy is showing strength 
recently, nearly all of Europe as well as Japan, Canada, and 
possibly even Australia are expanding at less than 2% – many 
barely more than 1% – despite the application of years of 
extraordinary monetary stimulus in the Eurozone and Japan. 
Monetary policy is near the zero lower bound in the Eurozone, 
Japan, and the US, with interest rates either explicitly or  
effectively negative while inflation is negligible.6 Yet investment 
and output remain sluggish, leading some observers to believe 
that these economies have entered an extended period of 
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secular stagnation7– a chronic propensity to grow slowly – 
weighed down by accumulated debt and changing  
demographics. See the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA) perspective on demographic changes and inclusive 
growth (Box 1), as well as Box 2 on secular stagnation  
and long-term investment, contributed by McKinsey  
Global Institute.
The prospect of secular stagnation is all the more worrisome 
because many countries have already been experiencing a 
secular dispersion of income and opportunity. While income 
inequality across countries has declined significantly over the 
past 20 years, it has grown markedly within a wide range 
of countries.8 A combination of accelerating technological 
change, global integration, domestic deregulation, and  
immigration has been driving major changes in labor markets 
in most advanced countries. This has resulted in heightened 
dislocation, pressure on median wages, and insecurity, even 
though these countries have enhanced efficiency and overall 
national income. At the same time, many developing countries 
have had difficulty diffusing the benefits of rapid growth  
and industrialization widely enough to satisfy rising social  
expectations. In rich and poor countries alike, social inclusion 
is a burning political issue.
The dawning Fourth Industrial Revolution appears likely to 
accelerate the forces of dispersion. Advanced technologies are 
being applied and combined in ways that promise to transform 
Part 1. Rising to the Challenge of Inclusive Growth and Development
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Box 1: UNFPA: Demographic Changes, Economic Growth, and Social Inclusion
According to the Population Division of the United Nations, the world’s population will grow to about 9.7 billion by  
mid-century. This means that between now and 2050, the world will add as many people as lived on the planet  
in 1950. However, the distribution of this growth will be highly uneven. Population growth is highest in the world’s  
least-developed countries, but is decelerating in the more advanced developing countries. Indeed, in more and more 
developing and developed countries, fertility levels have fallen below replacement level, and in several of these  
countries populations are projected to shrink in the years to come.1 
These demographic megatrends affect almost all aspects of social and economic development, including production  
and consumption, environmental sustainability, and access to health, education, housing, sanitation, water, food,  
and energy.2 They also affect employment and social protection, including pensions.3 The world’s least-developed  
countries already confront a major employment challenge that will be multiplied as the number of young people entering 
the labor market grows.4 By contrast, the more advanced economies are experiencing rapid aging and are projected to 
see a shrinking of the working-age population. 
From an economic perspective, what matters for economic growth, household income, and living standards is not the 
number of people who work but rather the productivity of those who work, and how the benefits are redistributed in  
society. Because of relatively low labor productivity and labor compensation, even a large number of working people in 
the least-developed countries can support only a small number of dependents. Inversely, high labor productivity  
and labor compensation in developed countries allow a small number of working people to support a large number  
of dependents. However, many countries have seen a falling labor share in income, even as they have seen a growth  
in labor productivity.5 
Sustained and sustainable economic growth therefore depends on labor productivity growth. Promoting this is a  
question of growth-oriented macroeconomic policies and productive investments in the real economy, as well  
as adequate investment in technological advancements and human capital. Harnessing the capabilities of young  
people will help produce a demographic dividend. 
1 United Nations, “The World Population Prospects,” https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf.
2 “Population Dynamics in the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Report of the Global Thematic Consultation on Population Dynamics,” United Nations 
Population Fund, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, and International Organiza-
tion for Migration (2013), https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/Outcome-Report-Pop-dynamic-and-post-2015-dev-agenda-
14-March-2013.pdf.  
3 M. Herrmann, Consequential Omissions: How Demography Shapes Development – Lessons from the MDGs for the SDGs (New York: UNFPA, 2015).
4 United Nations Population Fund, “Population Dynamics in the Least Developed Countries: Challenges and Opportunities for Development and Poverty 
Reduction” (2011), https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/CP51265.pdf; “Growth, Employment and Decent Work in the Least Developed  
Countries,” ILO (2011), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publication/wcms_153868.pdf.
5 ILO and OCED, “The Labour Share in G20 Economies – Report Prepared for the G20 Employment Working Group Antalya, Turkey” (2015). 
Box 1: Demographic Changes, Economic Growth, and Social Inclusion (cont’d.)
The following are some policy recommendations to address the needs of young people and to ensure countries  
on the cusp of demographic transition reap the benefits of the dividend:6  
• Empowerment: Increase investment in family planning and other maternal and child-health programs; enact and
enforce laws to prevent early marriage; expand coverage of basic newborn, infant, and child-health services.
• Education: Invest in the education system to increase the number and quality of educational opportunities
available; enact laws to mandate extended schooling for longer periods of time and equally for females and males;
promote female education to increase enrollment and attainment; prioritize measures that increase the number
of females who complete secondary education; and promote informal education programs for women who
are out of school either because of age or family obligations. For example, microfinance programs can offer
adult women micro-credits for pursuing education courses, which can include subjects such as hygiene, nutrition,
and family planning.
• Employment: Invest in economic sectors that can create significant employment opportunities for the youth;
ensure that new jobs are progressively created in more knowledge-intensive sectors with greater added value
as the educational quality of the population increases; expand vocational training opportunities to ensure that
students graduate with skills useful for the current work environment in addition to general know-how.
The Framework outlined in this Report describes many of these recommendations, though the focus on youth will be 
critical. These policies can enable countries to realize a first and second demographic dividend, promote economic 
growth, and encourage greater social cohesion. 
6 UN Economic Commission for Africa and African Union Commission, “Creating and Capitalizing on the Demographic Dividend for Africa” (2013), http://
gatesinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Issues%20Paper%20-%20Creating%20and%20Capitalizing%20on%20the%20Demographic%20Dividend%20for%20
Africa_En.pdf.
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Box 2: McKinsey Global Institute: Fall in Long-Term Investment Puts Pressure on Inclusive Growth  
Since the financial crisis of 2008, investment in advanced economies has collapsed. In Europe, business, residential,  
and public investment declined by €260 billion every year in real terms from 2008 to 2015 (Chart 1). Policymakers  have 
directed effort at restimulating demand and investment, to which end the European Commission has implemented the 
“Juncker Plan.” 
However, long-term investment was already falling in Europe for decades before the crisis. In Germany, for instance, net 
investment has declined from 12% of GDP in 1970 to only 3% today (Chart 2).1 The decline is evident in public, business, 
and residential investment. 
Public investment is down in both the United States and Europe since the crisis, despite ultra-low interest rates, due to 
a shortfall in demand. Gross business investment in the United States may have recovered to long-term ranges, but net 
business investment has decreased from an average of 4.8% between 1960 and 2000 to only 2.8% in 2014. Household 
investment has collapsed to only 3% since the crisis and into 2014, barely up from its 2011 trough of 2.9%.
A prolonged lack of investment causes real damage to the economy. In the short run – and as is becoming evident now, 
also in the mid-long run – low investment dampens demand, slowing growth and putting pressure on employment. In the 
long run, a lack of investment can hollow out the productive capacity of the economy.
There are multiple links between slow investment and inclusiveness too – in both directions. Business investment largely 
follows demand.2 But higher-income households’ propensity to consume is significantly lower than that of lower-income 
households, who tend to spend what they get. When a growing share of national income goes toward capital gains and 
higher-income deciles, demand can be weak, and, with it, investment.
Low investment can also negatively affect inclusiveness. On the asset side, a lack of investment opportunities pushes interest 
rates down and asset prices up, disproportionately benefiting high net-worth households while pushing, for instance,  
home ownership out of reach for many. On the income side, a good share of investment tends to be in construction activity 
– a sector that provides jobs and incomes for low-skilled segments of the population. And investment can drive productivity –
and hence incomes – for all.
What can be done about the dearth of investment? Public investment is typically only 5-10% of total public budgets, but can 
give a fillip to private co-investment. Increasing infrastructure investment is one obvious opportunity. Estimates by McKinsey 
suggest an investment gap of 0.7% of GDP in the United States and 0.4% in the United Kingdom and Germany, for instance.3 
Public investment could be encouraged by adjusting public accounting standards to capitalize such investments on the bal-
ance sheet and depreciate them over the life cycle of the assets. Further, adopting global best practices in project selection 
and delivery as well as management of existing assets could reduce the cost of public works by 40%.
To stimulate business investment, the macroeconomic outlook and aggregate demand need to improve first. This has 
implications for both monetary and fiscal policy, but also for redistributive and pre-distributive policies that put money into  
the hands of those who spend. Unambiguous regulatory signals can trigger investment. For instance, clear carbon pricing 
pathways can encourage businesses to invest in energy and emissions saving products, services, and technologies. 
Governments have acted to stabilize housing markets and, thus, residential investment, with one notable omission: reform of 
urban land markets. The need for structural reform has become ever clearer after the financial crisis, and much has been said 
about cutting red tape in labor and product markets. Lesser attention seems to have been paid to rethinking the trade-offs 
involved in establishing urban land-use policies, zoning requirements, building codes, and the like, which can all weigh heavily 
on housing investment.
Concerted effort, including many of the structural reforms described elsewhere in this Report, will be required to counter the 
long-term decline in investment that is hampering growth and inclusiveness.
Box 2: Fall in Long-Term Investment Puts Pressure on Inclusive Growth (cont’d.)
1 McKinsey Global Institute, “Secular Stagnation and Low Investment: Breaking the Vicious Cycle” (April 2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/
europe/secular-stagnation-and-low-investment-breaking-the-vicious-cycle.
2 McKinsey Global Institute, “A Window of Opportunity for Europe” (June 2015), http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/europe/a-window-of-opportunity-
for-europe.
3 McKinsey Global Institute, “Bridging Global Infrastructure Gaps” (June 2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-
insights/bridging-global-infrastructure-gaps.
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• As technological disruption accelerates in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution,13 how can societies organize
themselves better to respond to the potential employment
and other distributional effects? Are expanded transfer
payments the only or primary solution, or can market
mechanisms be developed to widen social participation in
new forms of economic value creation?
These questions beg the more fundamental one of whether a 
secular correction is required in the existing economic  
growth model. Is there need to alter the mental map of how 
policymakers conceptualize and enable national economic  
performance? Is there another way to cut the Gordian knot of 
slow growth and rising inequality, to turn the current vicious 
cycle of stagnation and dispersion into a virtuous one in which 
greater social inclusion and stronger and more sustainable 
growth reinforce each other?
This is precisely what government, business, and other leaders 
from every region have been calling for. Over the past several 
years, a worldwide consensus has emerged on the need for 
a more inclusive growth and development model that would 
retain the key learnings of the past regarding the allocative  
efficiency of markets, importance of macroeconomic stability, 
and positive-sum game benefits of international specialization 
and exchange, yet would deliver far greater social participation 
in the process and benefits of growth. The United Nations 
2030 Agenda and the Hangzhou G20 Leaders Communique 
are prominent recent examples.
However, this global consensus is mainly directional rather than 
operational. International policy guidance has been selective 
and ad hoc. No larger, systemic framework has emerged to 
guide policymakers even as social frustration has continued to 
mount. Inclusive growth remains more a discussion topic than 
an action agenda. 
multiple industries and disintermediate many job categories. 
In particular, the increased sophistication and declining cost of 
industrial robots and algorithm-based artificial intelligence are 
projected to transform manufacturing and services in a variety 
of sectors over the next few decades, leading to major job 
losses in absolute and, quite possibly, net terms.
Far from affecting advanced countries alone, this new industrial 
revolution may upend the traditional conception of the process 
of economic development. Labor intensive low- and medium-
skill manufacturing has provided a ladder out of widespread 
poverty for countless countries over the past two generations. 
See Box 3 on the challenge of declining labor shares,  
authored by the International Labor Organization (ILO). But  
over past years, the labor intensity of manufacturing has  
decreased and the use of industrial robots has begun to drive  
a significant “re-shoring” of production to advanced countries, 
a trend that could become transformational.9 Alert to this 
threat, China became the world’s largest purchaser of industrial 
robots in 2013.10 
Social impatience with stagnation and dispersion is spiking 
in advanced countries, as illustrated most dramatically by the 
recent Brexit vote and the US presidential campaign. This  
frustration is contributing to the growing popularity throughout 
the West of political parties that challenge the fundamental 
tenets of the post-war liberal international economic order, 
including trade liberalization, supranational governance,  
and expanded capital and labor mobility. At the same time, 
increasingly educated and connected populations in  
developing countries are raising their own demands for more 
widely-shared economic opportunity and prosperity.
Around the globe, leaders of governments and other  
stakeholder institutions enter 2017 facing a set of difficult 
and increasingly urgent questions:
• With fiscal space limited,11 interest rates near zero, and
demographic trends unfavorable in many advanced and
middle-income countries, does the world economy indeed
face a protracted period of relatively low growth? Will
macroeconomics and demography determine the destiny
of the world economy for the foreseeable future?
• Can rising in-country inequality be satisfactorily redressed
within the prevailing liberal international economic order?
Can those who argue that modern capitalist economies
face inherent limitations in this regard – that their internal
“income distribution system” is broken and likely beyond
repair – be proven wrong?12
Box 3: ILO: The Challenge of Declining Labor Shares
Recent research points toward a decline in the labor share of income around the world.1 This means the proportion of  
economic growth allocated to wages has fallen – an indication that labor productivity has increased more rapidly than 
wages. The 2012 Global Wage Report of the International Labour Organization (ILO) found that in 16 developed countries 
with available data, the adjusted labor share declined from an average of 75% in the mid-1970s to about 65% just  
before the global financial and economic crisis.2 It also found a decline in the labor share in developing countries between 
the mid-1990s and the end of the 2000s, a finding confirmed in a recent study.3
At the same time, wage and income inequality have increased in many countries, leading to the question of whether,  
and how, the two trends are related. One common observation is that since labor income is more evenly distributed across 
households than capital income, the decline in the labor share concentrates total income at the top of the distribution. 
Some recent evidence does indeed suggest that falling labor shares are correlated with increasing income inequality.4  
Even if other research points toward growing wage inequality as the main culprit for growing income inequality, the  
declining labor shares have certainly played some role.5 
Various factors have caused this decline, including the adoption of labor-saving technology, globalization of trade, pressure 
from financial markets to increase dividends, decline in workers’ bargaining power, and weakening of labor market  
institutions. In emerging economies, factors also include structural transformation toward more capital-intensive sectors 
and privatization of state-owned enterprises. While there is general agreement on this list of factors, different studies  
attribute different weights to each, and there are also variations between countries. 
How can this decline be reversed? The most recent ILO Global Wage Report observes that many countries have recently 
adopted or strengthened minimum wages in the face of growing wage inequality and declining labor shares.6 Since the 
early 1990s, nine OECD countries – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Israel, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia,  
the United Kingdom, and, more recently, Germany – have adopted a statutory minimum wage. Many developing and 
emerging economies have also established or strengthened minimum wages. China adopted a minimum wage in 1994 
and strengthened it in 2004; the Russian Federation complemented its national minimum wage with regional floors in 2007; 
Malaysia adopted a national minimum wage in 2013; and Brazil has consistently increased wage rates since 1995.  
In most cases, minimum wages have reduced wage inequality to some extent without causing any noticeable adverse 
effects on employment. The first report of the German minimum wage commission found, for example, that the number of 
workers with hourly wages below €8.5 has been reduced by about 3 million since the introduction of a national minimum 
wage in January 2015, while overall employment has continued to grow. 
Such positive outcomes, however, require that minimum wages be set at an adequate level – one that balances the needs 
of workers and their families with economic factors.  Furthermore, minimum wages alone are no silver bullet for reducing 
high inequality, and must be complemented with other measures and conditions including social protection, enabling 
environment for sustainable enterprises, and collective bargaining power for workers to determine working conditions. 
Well-designed social protection systems are key for ensuring at least a basic level of income security and effective access 
to healthcare, which in turn help redress inequalities, reduce and prevent poverty, raise labor productivity, empower people 
to engage in decent work, and promote inclusive growth. 
1 L. Karabarbounis and B. Neiman, “The global decline of the labor share,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, No. 1 (2014): 61-103. 
2 International Labour Office, “Global Wage Report 2012/13: Wages and equitable growth” (2012), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@
dcomm/@publ/documents/publication/wcms_194843.pdf. 
3 K. Trapp, “Measuring the Labor Share of Developing Countries: Learning from Social Accounting Matrices,” WIDER Working Paper 2015/041, summary 
available at http://www1.wider.unu.edu/inequalityconf/sites/default/files/posters/Trapp-poster.pdf (accessed on October 25, 2016).
4 M. Jacobson and F. Occhino, “Labor’s Declining Share of Income and Rising Inequality” (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2012), https://www.cleveland-
fed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2012-economic-commentaries/ec-201213-labors-declining-share-of-income-and-
rising-inequality.aspx.
5 M. Francese and C. Mulas-Granados, “Functional income distribution and its role in explaining inequality,” IMF Working Paper WP/15/244 (2015). 
6 International Labour Office, “Global Wage Report 2016/17: Wage inequality in the workplace” (2016), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_537846.pdf. 
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However, inclusive growth is more than that. An economy is 
not a business, and history and scholarship have shown that 
there is a feedback loop between the bottom- and top-lines 
(growth and equity) in a national economy. This feedback loop 
can run in a positive or negative direction. That is, broadly-
shared prosperity can be a tonic for growth, creating a virtuous 
cycle of buoyant domestic consumption, increased business 
and investor confidence, higher investment, stronger  
aggregate demand, expanding employment, rising wages, 
further boosting consumption and demand, and thus even 
stronger growth. Alternatively, the dispersion and hollowing out 
of living standards within an economy can create a pernicious 
cycle of sluggish consumer demand, anemic business and  
investor confidence, weak investment, expanding unemployment 
or underemployment, stagnant wages, and thus even slower 
growth. Indeed, some have argued that growing economic 
inequality and insecurity contributed importantly to the financial 
crisis in the United States.15
The global aspirational consensus on inclusive growth has 
been reinforced by a growing body of empirical economic 
research about the relationship between inequality and  
economic growth.16 There is mounting evidence that inequality 
has a statistically significant negative impact on growth, and 
that reducing inequality can enhance and strengthen the  
resilience of growth. According to research by the IMF, for 
example, if the income share of the top 20% increases,  
GDP growth tends to decline over the medium term. One 
explanation is that wealthier households spend a lower fraction 
of their incomes, which could reduce aggregate demand and 
undermine growth.17 In contrast, an increase in the income 
share of the bottom 20% is associated with higher GDP 
growth. If the income share of the rich is lifted by 1 percentage 
point, GDP growth decreases by 0.08 percentage points.18 If 
the income share of the poor and the middle class is increased 
by 1 percentage point, GDP growth increases by as much as 
0.38 percentage points over five years.19
Similarly, OECD research finds that an increase in inequality 
by three Gini points is correlated with a decrease in economic 
growth by 0.35percentage points per year for 25 years –  
a cumulative loss of 8.5%.20 This is primarily because higher 
levels of inequality are associated with poorer households  
finding it harder to invest in health and educational opportunities, 
thereby lowering human capital accumulation and social  
mobility.21 The economic threat of income inequality to a  
nation’s well-being lies primarily in the large bottom segment  
of society not advancing. In response to these findings, the 
OECD is working on a new metric of multidimensional living 
standards, in a bid to capture the well-being of societies more 
Section 2: Policy Framework and Metrics
In an effort to help narrow the gap between aspiration and  
action, the World Economic Forum’s System Initiative on  
Economic Growth and Social Inclusion released a beta version 
of an “actionable framework” in 2015: The Inclusive Growth 
and Development Report. The Framework grew out of a series 
of multistakeholder consultations, including with leading  
experts in the international organizations and research  
institutions most active on the topic. Reflecting the Forum’s 
public-private culture, it was developed in a practical,  
results-oriented manner, similar to how a business would  
construct a new strategy or solve a major problem:
• First, define success.
• Second, examine what works based on observable
success stories and leading practices.
• Third, set metrics to benchmark practice and
performance accordingly.
This Report represents a refinement and fuller elaboration of 
the Framework and accompanying metrics based on inputs 
received through numerous channels over the past year. 
Defining Success
The ultimate objective of national economic performance is 
broad-based and sustained progress in living standards,  
a concept that encompasses wage and non-wage income 
(e.g., pension or child care benefits) as well as economic  
opportunity and quality of life. This is the bottom-line basis on 
which a society evaluates the economic dimension of its  
country’s leadership.
Economic growth is a means to this end, albeit a very  
important one. Indeed, strong economic growth is the sine 
qua non of improved living standards. While a growing national 
economic pie does not guarantee that the size of every  
household’s piece will be larger, such an outcome is  
arithmetically impossible unless the overall pie does indeed 
expand. Growth creates the possibility of a positive-sum game 
for society, even if it does not assure it.14
To borrow from a business concept, growth can be thought 
of as the top-line measure of national economic performance, 
with broad-based or median progress in living standards 
representing the bottom-line. Inclusive growth can be thought 
of as a strategy to increase the extent to which the economy’s 
top-line performance is translated into the bottom-line result 
society is seeking, i.e., broad-based expansion of economic 
opportunity and prosperity. 
Box 4: Limitations of GDP as a Metric of National Economic Performance 
In developing a new policy framework and a new set of metrics for inclusive growth and development, it is worth reflecting 
on the shortcomings of GDP for this purpose. GDP is the most widely used measure of a country’s economic progress, 
and is considered useful as an accounting tool for economic output, value added, and productivity, as also for its  
connection with other variables such as employment. Although the concept of GDP was always intended as a measure 
of economic activity exclusively, it has frequently been used as a proxy for well-being, even by some economists. In recent 
years, concerns have grown that GDP may not even be an accurate measure of economic activity after all.22
“Beyond GDP” refers to a longstanding debate within mainstream economics aimed at developing indicators of progress 
that are as clear and compelling as GDP but also more inclusive of other measures of well-being, including environmental, 
social, and quality-of-life aspects. There are two sets of issues in favor of moving beyond GDP: the limitations of GDP as  
a measure of output; and the limitations of using GDP as a measure of social and economic progress.
Limitations of GDP as an output measure 
GDP no longer provides an adequate measure of economic activity. Most economists agree that GDP was an important 
innovation for the conduct of economic policy in that it helped capture the size of an economy and how it was growing.23 
Early post-war efforts to measure GDP also promoted the use of data collection methods and household surveys that 
proved to be helpful for other purposes as well.24
Beyond the disadvantages of using a single monetary value of GDP,25 there is recognition that the figure does not properly 
reflect the complexity of the modern economy.26 Recent technological progress has altered business operations and  
created new means of exchanging and providing services while blurring the distinction between work and leisure.27  
Current statistical techniques find it hard to capture the transaction and price of these activities. Evidence of this is seen 
in the fact that, over the last decade, widened Internet access has rapidly increased the number of products consumed 
online, but the share of nominal gross value added in the digital sector has barely changed over the same period.28
GDP does not capture the full extent of the digital, globalized economy, where the variety of goods and services is vast  
and companies operate across borders in a way that makes it difficult to allocate value added accurately.29 It also fails to 
measure the quality of goods and the fruits of innovation that lead to improvements in goods or services, which is important 
in measuring change in real income and consumption. These create a consumer surplus that GDP fails to account for.30 
The growth of the sharing economy is likely to increase the amount of uncounted economic activity in the economy.31
Measuring intangible investment highlights another limitation of GDP as a measure of output. This becomes more relevant 
as economies move from capital- to knowledge-based production, which is particularly relevant with the advent of the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution. GDP should account for investments in physical assets such as machinery and plants.  
But it must also account for long-term investments made by companies in knowledge accumulation that are not counted 
in GDP: research and development, brand-building, worker training, and the development of advanced organizational 
practices, for instance.32
Limitations of GDP as a measure of social and economic progress
Particularly critical to the focus of the present Report are several problems with using GDP as a measure of social and  
economic progress. GDP is unable to explain the distribution of growth (whether for income, consumption, health,  
education, or any other factor). This means that using GDP as a measure of prosperity will fail to account for who is getting 
richer, and how – consequences that could have profound implications for society. In the United States, for example,  
GDP doubled over a 30-year period but median household income only grew 16%.33 Studies have shown how inequality 
breeds issues including more health problems in society, corruption, and lower productivity.34
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GDP does not measure the overall standard of living or well-being of a country, concepts which are multidimensional and 
not solely contingent on economic factors. These include dimensions such as health, education, and employment, which 
are not adequately captured in a measure like GDP. It has been shown that after a certain point, increases in GDP will be 
offset by externalities such as increased inequality.35 Given that GDP is monetized, it does not capture the full consumer  
surplus, which includes the non-monetary value of goods and services. For example, the time savings accrued through 
easy access to information through the Internet are not included in GDP. 
Intergenerational equity, which refers to whether economic performance is being pursued at the expense of future  
generations, is another limitation of GDP. Increasing output, which at first glance would be “good” for GDP, may come  
at the expense of externalities such as environmental damage, reduced leisure time, or the depletion of natural resources.36 
In other words, there is no link between GDP and the sustainability of the economy.
Beyond GDP: Proposals for alternative measurement tools
Following the financial crisis, the number of economists and organizations calling for alternative measures of growth is  
rising.37 The Stiglitz Commission Report makes 12 recommendations on moving from production to well-being.38 These 
range from including measures of income, consumption, and wealth – both market and non-market, as well as their  
overall distribution – to objective and subjective measures of well-being, such as health, education, personal activities, 
and environmental conditions. The European Commission, which has worked on the issue for a decade, has outlined a 
roadmap for new indicators that includes up-to-date measures on environmental protection and quality of life; distribution 
between income, health, education, and environmental quality; overall sustainability; and social issues.39
The UN Human Development Index is a summary measure of key dimensions of human development: life expectancy, 
education, and standards of living.40 Angus Deaton has shown a positive correlation between economic prosperity and life 
satisfaction, and economists frequently recommend including measures of subjective well-being when considering  
social progress.41 The OECD launched a Better Life Index, which provides an interactive tool for users to identify countries 
that align with their preferred indicators of well-being.42 See Box 5 for a discussion of the OECD’s work on the productivity- 
inclusiveness nexus. The New Economics Foundation provides a similar platform for its Happy Planet Index.43 Stewart  
Wallis, when chair of the Foundation, called for factors such as fairness to be included in any alternatives.44 Several calls 
have been made to move away from quantity and toward quality.45 The discussion is also moving into mainstream  
economic journalism – for example, The Economist newspaper has covered the topic extensively.46
In other words, a lot of good work has been done to frame a different way of thinking about economic progress. Yet,  
to date there have been few concrete proposals on how to manifest that thinking in a specific policy framework or growth 
model, on the one hand, and set of national economic performance metrics, on the other. This Report is intended as a 
concrete contribution in this regard.
Box 4: Limitations of GDP as a Metric of National Economic Performance (cont’d.) Box 5: OECD: Working on the Productivity-Inclusiveness Nexus
In recent years, many governments have been faced with the challenge of promoting stronger productivity growth, while 
also having to ensure that the proceeds are equitably distributed. New work on the “productivity-inclusiveness nexus”  
at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) examines this challenge in depth and puts 
forward a new policy framework to help governments address rising inequalities and slowing productivity growth. 
Since the beginning of the millennium, 90% of OECD countries have experienced a slowdown in labor productivity 
growth, in the wake of decades of rapid technological advancement. OECD analysis shows this slowdown results from  
a growing difference in performance between firms at the global productivity frontier – “frontier firms” – and their  
non-frontier counterparts.1 In manufacturing, the early 2000s saw labor productivity at the global frontier increase rapidly 
at an average annual rate of 3.5%, compared with just 0.5% for non-frontier firms. As explored elsewhere in this Report, 
recent decades have also seen widespread increases in inequality, in terms of both income and well-being.
Inequalities of income, education, training opportunities, and health tend to feed each other, and also reduce productivity 
and growth. In particular, recent OECD evidence indicates that rising inequality has limited the ability of the bottom  
40% to invest in knowledge and skill-building, worsening inequality and undermining potential productivity. Evidence also 
suggests that growing productivity dispersion across firms has caused widening of the wage distribution over the past 
two or three decades. In part, this may be down to rent capture by frontier firms and suboptimal resource allocation, 
which have limited productivity gains while entrenching inequalities of income.
The OECD’s approach recognizes that making the productivity-inclusiveness nexus work for all will require a comprehensive 
policy framework to account for and address the multiple interactions between inequalities and productivity, and how 
these interactions play out across countries, regions, and firms, and between individuals. This will call upon governments 
to break down policy silos and focus on win-win policies to reduce inequalities and support productivity growth  
simultaneously, while addressing trade-offs. It will also necessitate stronger governance and regulatory mechanisms to 
combat issues like rent seeking and corruption. 
Achieving stronger productivity growth and reducing inequalities requires action to ensure that all people, and particularly 
those at the bottom, are provided with opportunity and equipped with skills to fulfill their productive potential. Beyond 
adequate social-safety nets and labor market-activation policies, this calls for effective education and skills policies to 
better match training with labor market demands and policies targeted at improving health and job quality. 
Businesses have a crucial role to play in making productivity growth both stronger and more inclusive by offering  
employment, contributing to effective skills development and use, and developing knowledge and technologies.  
To enable businesses to play this role, government must foster a policy environment that creates a level regulatory and 
financial playing field for all firms so as to support innovation and its diffusion throughout the economy. For example,  
government provision of unemployment benefits needs to be combined with inclusive policies that place a strong  
emphasis on “activation” to ensure that unemployment duration is reduced and human capital depreciation minimized, 
while also providing the most productive firms with the supply of skilled labor they need.
Competition regimes must encourage new businesses, and much could be done to improve enforcement against global 
enterprises that violate competition laws, including through more cooperation on cross-border cases. Incumbents  
must be prevented from achieving regulatory capture that could allow them to exert undue influence over policy and 
regulatory frameworks. This would require evidence-based decision-making processes that take better account of  
impact assessment and public consultations while ensuring transparency. Many policies will need to be adapted to the  
circumstances of local places, calling for actions at the regional and urban levels. For instance, local conditions can be 
crucial to the effectiveness of efforts to improve labor-market conditions, such as by matching skills and training. In  
addition, local policy actions toward, for instance, ensuring sufficient and affordable housing and transport are essential  
to removing barriers that limit access to opportunity. 
1 OECD, “The Productivity-Inclusiveness Nexus” (2016) and http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/Frontier-Firms-Technology-Diffusion-and-Public-Policy-Micro-
Evidence-from-OECD-Countries.pdf; Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal, “Frontier Firms, Technology Diffusion and Public Policy: Micro 
Evidence from OECD Countries,” The Future of Productivity: Main Background Papers (OECD, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/Frontier-Firms-
Technology-Diffusion-and-Public-Policy-Micro-Evidence-from-OECD-Countries.pdf. 
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do too much, replacing markets or closing the economy 
off from the rest of the world. But we believe this  
prescription defines the role of government too narrowly... 
On the contrary, as the economy grows and develops, 
active, pragmatic governments have crucial roles to play...
(M)ature markets rely on deep institutional underpinnings,
institutions that define property rights, enforce contracts,
convey prices, and bridge informational gaps between
buyers and sellers. Developing countries often lack these
market and regulatory institutions. Indeed, an important
part of development is precisely the creation of these
institutionalized capabilities.50
In fact, economic institution-building has been a crucial part 
of the development path of essentially every country that has 
industrialized and achieved high living standards. Because  
development is a complex and multidisciplinary process – 
many conditions need to be fulfilled in order for widespread 
poverty to be replaced by ever-rising middle-class prosperity – 
this process of institutional deepening occurs across a wide 
spectrum of domains. But the process is not automatic. 
Although rising national income generates additional resources 
and policy space to establish and effectively implement 
such institutional mechanisms as public education systems, 
independent judiciaries, labor protections, social insurance 
systems, competition, investment climate, anti-corruption rules 
and enforcement agencies, and basic and digital infrastructure, 
they do not guarantee it. The pace and pattern of economic 
institution-building is a choice, a function of policy decisions 
and public-private cooperation. Like other aspects of a 
country’s growth model, it is shaped by the prevailing political 
economy and is largely endogenous to the development  
process. Because it is a policy choice, the size of the payoff 
from economic growth to broad socioeconomic progress is as 
well, to a considerable extent.
Indeed, the importance of economic institution-building for  
balanced and inclusive growth was a central lesson of the  
economic and financial crises of the early 20th century. 
Beginning at the turn of the century and gathering force in the 
decades following the Great Depression, most of today’s  
advanced industrialized countries underwent a sustained 
process of institutional deepening to broaden the base and 
strengthen the resilience of their economies. Labor, financial, 
social insurance, competition, and other reforms were 
deliberately aimed at engineering a more inclusive and  
sustainable growth model. They played a critical role in  
supporting the dramatic expansion of the middle class,  
eliminating poverty, and reducing economic insecurity in  
these societies during the latter half of the century.51
accurately. With its Human Opportunity Index, the World Bank 
is another influential organization increasingly turning its  
attention to what is needed in addition to economic growth to 
reduce poverty and share prosperity more widely. 
Examining What Works
The extent to which economic growth broadens economic  
opportunity and improvements in living standards is influenced 
by a diverse mix of structural and institutional aspects of  
economic policy, going well beyond the two areas most  
commonly featured in discussions about inequality: education 
and redistribution. Appreciation of the crucial role of institutions 
– particularly legal frameworks and public agencies that
administer rules and incentives – in the development process
has expanded in recent decades, supported by an accumulating
body of research and practical experience. This includes
seminal research by Nobel Laureate Douglass North, who
explored the important role of institutions in providing the
incentive structure in an economy, shaping the direction of
change, and influencing performance.47 Other scholars have
since built upon these insights, including by documenting
a significant empirical relationship between institutional
development and economic performance.48
The World Bank’s landmark 1993 study, The East Asian  
Miracle,49 examined how eight economies in the region  
succeeded in achieving a remarkable record of “high growth 
with equity” from 1960 to 1990. In a chapter entitled “An  
Institutional Basis for Shared Growth,” its distinguished 
research team concluded: “Of course, few political leaders 
anywhere would reject, on principle, either the desirability of 
growth or that the benefits of growth should be shared.  
What distinguished the High-Performing Asian Economies’ 
leadership was the extent to which they adopted specific  
institutional mechanisms tailored to these goals, and that 
worked.” The team then documented the institutional approaches 
that contributed importantly to this positive outcome in such  
areas as education, land reform, small- and medium-sized 
business support, housing, labor-management relations, 
insulation of policymaking from rent-seeking behavior, integrity 
in public administration, and business-government relations. 
The blue-ribbon Commission on Growth and Development 
chaired by Nobel Laureate Michael Spence drew a similar 
conclusion in its 2008 report, The Growth Report: Strategies 
for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development:
In recent decades governments were advised to  
“stabilize, privatize and liberalize.” There is merit in what 
lies behind this injunction – governments should not try to 
What are the areas of policy and institutional strength that 
have a particularly strong bearing on social participation in the 
process (e.g., productive employment) and outcomes (e.g., 
median household income) of economic growth? This Report 
presents a Framework and a corresponding set of indicators of 
policy and enabling environment conditions in seven principal 
domains (pillars) and 15 sub-domains (sub-pillars) (see Figure 4). 
Societies that have had particular success in building a robust 
middle class and reducing poverty and social marginalization 
have tended to create effective economic institutions and policy 
incentives in many of these areas, while supporting growth 
through sound macroeconomic policies and efficiency-enhancing 
reforms. These pillars and sub-pillars describe the spectrum 
of structural factors within a modern economy that particularly 
influence the breadth of improvement in living standards. A 
detailed description of each of the pillars is provided in Part 3. 
The policy and institutional domains portrayed in this  
Framework represent the ecosystem of structural policy  
incentives and institutions that together and as part of the 
growth process help to diffuse the benefits of an expanding  
national economy widely in terms of household income,  
opportunity, security, and quality of life. This ecosystem 
constitutes the implicit income distribution system – or, more 
precisely, living standards diffusion mechanism – underpinning 
modern market economies. When it performs properly, it tends 
If an economy can be thought of as a garden or arboretum,  
its macroeconomic and competitive environment sets  
the climate (basic conditions of moisture, sunlight, and  
temperature), while its institutions represent nutrients in the soil. 
Improvements in soil fertility can have a pronounced effect  
on the pace and consistency of plant growth, a process that 
takes years to get right and requires regular monitoring and 
modulation. Similarly, the essential fecundity of an economy – 
its yield of broad-based advancement of living standards –  
is shaped by the health of its macro-competitive environment 
as well as the strength of its institutions and policy-based  
incentives in areas particularly important for social inclusion. 
Like both weather conditions and soil quality, these factors 
require equal and ongoing attention. This fundamental lesson 
– and the rebalancing of emphasis in national policy that it
implies – is where the journey toward a more socially-inclusive
growth paradigm begins.52
First and foremost, the practice of inclusive growth and  
development requires widening of the lens through which priorities 
are set in national economic strategies. Macroeconomic,  
finance and trade supervision policies remain critically  
important as they establish the conditions necessary for  
improvements in productivity that help drive growth.  
However, other areas are just as vital to the overriding purpose 
of economic policy: strong, sustained increases in broad  
living standards. 
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Figure 4: Framework: The Policy and Institutional Ecosystem Underpinning Inclusive Growth
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robust legal and competition frameworks. They help channel 
savings efficiently to employment-generating and productivity-
enhancing investment opportunities in the real economy  
as well as support consumer demand and small-scale  
entrepreneurship through widespread access to financial 
services. 
Core labor standards, worker protections, and benefits enable 
wages and household income to rise roughly in line with labor 
productivity, supporting domestic consumption and aggregate 
demand. They can also reinforce growth by supporting labor 
mobility, adjustment, and skills acquisition. Policies that support 
broad access to small business loans, housing finance,  
pension savings, and employee ownership help to democratize 
the generation of wealth and share the gains in national income 
from the economy’s technical progress and its accumulating 
capital stock. The accompanying wealth effect similarly  
stimulates domestic consumption and demand.
to operate in a self-reinforcing cycle in which rising economic 
output and social inclusion feed each other.
Fair and efficient taxation and basic social protections feature 
at the beginning and end of a continuing cycle within the  
development process. They are important not only for addressing 
excess inequality resulting from market outcomes but also for 
mobilizing resources to support crucial public services such  
as education and physical infrastructure, which are vital to  
the creation of economic opportunity, functioning of markets, 
and thus inception and ongoing stimulation of the growth 
process itself. 
Sound legal and competition institutions support efficient  
resource allocation and equal opportunity by preventing 
corruption, unduly high barriers to entry, and concentration 
of rents due to regulatory capture. Investment climate rules, 
incentives, and institutional capacity are important for enabling 
investors to capitalize on the level playing field created by 
Building blocks 
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Rethinking the Nature and Role of Structural Reform
This Framework represents an alternative way of thinking about 
structural economic reform and its role in the development 
process. Structural reform usually refers to measures aimed at 
boosting economic efficiency and macroeconomic stability by 
sharpening market signals and improving the health of public 
finances, often in response to a recent or looming fiscal or  
balance-of-payments crisis. In such circumstances, they tend 
to have the effect of squeezing living standards in the short 
term. But a systematic, sustained effort to strengthen  
institutions and policy incentives across the Framework’s  
15 sub-domains – or to address particular weaknesses  
identified therein – also constitutes an exercise in structural  
reform, albeit one that mixes demand- and supply-side 
measures for the express purpose of boosting broad living 
standards while reinforcing the rate and resilience of growth. 
This rebalanced and enlarged notion of structural reform is  
best pursued as a long-term strategy forming an integral part 
of the development process rather than as a crash effort to 
preempt or recover from a crisis.53 If a society is seeking a 
more inclusive model of economic growth, then the deliberate 
and progressive cultivation of institutional strength in these  
areas must be placed at the heart of its growth strategy,  
because these are the frameworks and mechanisms that  
constitute its economy’s implicit income distribution system 
– the mechanism by which the social benefits of economic
growth are diffused widely in the form of broad-based
progress in living standards (employment, income, security,
and quality of life).
The essential measure of the inclusiveness of a society’s 
growth model is the extent to which it produces broad gains 
in living standards before fiscal transfers. For this reason, six of 
the Framework’s seven main pillars relate to structural policy 
and institutional factors that influence the composition of 
private-sector activity and the distribution of outcomes within 
the market itself. In particular, because wages and returns to 
self-employment and small-business ownership constitute  
a very high percentage of the income of all but the wealthiest 
households, factors that shape these elements of national 
income figure prominently in the indicators that have been  
assembled.
At the same time, since the focus of this exercise is inclusive 
growth and development rather than social inclusion per se, 
the set of policies and institutions it highlights and the specific 
benchmarking indicators it chooses must be consistent with 
the promotion of economic dynamism and growth. An inclusive 
If these key enabling factors are in place, a strong entrepreneurial 
and investment culture takes hold, fostering competitive  
industries and quality employment opportunities that in turn 
support domestic demand. Coming full circle, robust domestic 
demand spurs further investment and stimulates increases in 
growth via an efficient and fair tax system that generates the 
additional public resources needed to increase investment in 
the quality of the country’s basic services, infrastructure, and 
social safety net – widening economic opportunity and output 
still further.
To help governments and stakeholders understand the extent 
to which this policy and institutional ecosystem has been  
optimized in their country, a database of cross-country statistical 
indicators has been compiled in each sub-pillar, permitting 
comparison at the pillar, sub-pillar, and individual indicator level 
within peer groups. These Policy and Institutional Indicators 
(PIIs) yield a distinct profile of each country’s institutional 
strength and utilization of policy space relative to its peers. 
These country profiles of benchmarking data are like diagnostic 
scans of each country’s structural policy and institutional  
enabling environment as it relates to their capacity to capture 
the synergies between growth and social inclusion. They  
illustrate the distance from best practice in their peer group in 
areas that particularly matter for driving broad-based progress 
in living standards. The results are presented in four groups of  
countries based on level of economic development as  
measured by national income. 
Tables 13-16 display the four groups of countries, comparing 
the pillar and sub-pillar scores of each country via a traffic-light 
shading scheme that ranks countries relative to their group. 
Red corresponds to the lowest relative performance within the 
group, yellow to the median, and dark green to the best  
performance. Since this color scheme ranks countries only 
within each comparator group, colors are not comparable 
across income groups. However, the absolute numerical score 
values (on a scale of 1 to 7) that are displayed in each data 
field are largely comparable across the entire sample of 109 
countries. When countries are missing data, this is indicated by 
white shading and a numerical value of N/A. If data is missing 
for more than 30% of indicators, the sub-pillar score is also left 
blank. See Part 3 for a full  description of the methodology. In 
addition to the cross-country sub-pillar tables presented in this 
Report, the version of the Report available online includes full 
individual country data profiles (wef.ch/igd17). These Country 
Profiles list the score for every indicator within every sub-pillar 
for each country covered by the Report. An example of a full 
country profile is included below in Part 2.
Figure 5: Virtuous Circle of Inclusive Growth and Development
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Figure 6: The Varying Role of Redistribution in Reducing Inequality Figure 6: The Varying Role of Redistribution in Reducing Inequality (cont’d.)
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long-term economic growth and competitiveness; it 
is possible to be pro-equity and pro-growth at the same 
time. Several of the strongest performers in the Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) also have a relatively 
strong inclusive-growth and development profile.
• Policies and institutions supporting social inclusion
are not solely a luxury of high-income countries. There
is extensive overlap in absolute scores across at least
three of the four income groups of countries in the
sub-pillars of Business and Political Ethics, Tax Code,
Financial System Inclusion, Intermediation of Business
Investment, Productive Employment, Concentration of
Rents, and Educational Quality and Equity.
• More fundamentally, when seen from a practical,
evidence-based perspective,the current debate on
inequality and social inclusion is unduly narrow and
unnecessarily polemicized. It is possible, indeed
essential, to be pro-labor and pro-business, to
advocate a strengthening of both social inclusion
and efficiency of markets through a stronger focus
on institutions. The inequality debate focuses almost
exclusively on up-skilling of labor and redistribution –
when it moves beyond problem identification. For many
countries, these may be among the most appropriate
responses to widening dispersion of incomes, but they
represent only a minority of the policy options available.
To focus only on them is to miss the fuller opportunity
to adapt or “structurally adjust” one’s economy to the
challenge of strengthening the contribution of economic
growth to broad-based progress in living standards in
the face of forces such as technological change and
global economic integration that can pull in the opposite
direction.
Other actionable options that are not traditionally thought of 
as equity-enhancing because they concern strengthening the 
enabling environment for real economy business investment 
and entrepreneurship can be just as critical to a country’s  
success in expanding employment, boosting wages, and 
widening asset ownership, which are central to advancing 
progress in living standards. The scaling and leveling effects  
of technology are increasing returns to capital and innovation.  
But while digitization in particular will continue to create 
enormous challenges for employment in many industries and 
countries, it also has the potential to create extensive  
opportunities for new entrepreneurs and small businesses by 
reducing barriers to entry and transaction costs as well as  
disintermediating and unbundling existing activities performed 
by larger organizations, including in international trade.  
growth strategy can only be effective if it reinforces, or at least 
does not undermine, incentives to work, save, and invest. This 
is a further reason why the Framework concentrates in large 
part, though by no means exclusively, on policy levers that 
influence relative incentives within the private sector rather than 
those that effect direct transfers through the public sector. 
Given the breadth and complexity of this policy ecosystem  
as well as the important role each country’s particular  
political economy plays in shaping it, there is no single ideal 
policy mix for the pursuit of inclusive growth. It is most  
important to view the entire spectrum of the Framework as an 
integrated system that merits deliberate cultivation as an  
integral part of the growth and development process with  
periodic upgrading to address weaknesses revealed in one 
part of the ecosystem or another.
A culture of continuous improvement is required with respect 
to this policy and institutional ecosystem informed by evidence 
and experience. Indeed, as discussed in the presentation of 
these results below, no country excels across all 15 domains 
of the Framework. All have room for improvement and learning 
from peers. For this reason, the Framework weights all  
sub-pillars and pillars evenly, and refrains from providing  
rolled-up scores across the pillars.
Figure 6 shows one facet of the considerable variation in 
emphasis by countries within this policy and institutional 
ecosystem. It illustrates the relative weight placed on pre- and 
post-transfer mechanisms (pillars 1-6 or pillar 7, respectively). 
Countries with comparable Gini ratios often achieve them 
through very different means, including very different levels 
of redistribution through the tax code and social insurance 
programs. 
Among the patterns and conclusions that emerge from the 
Policy and Institutional Indicator data are:
• Larger fiscal transfers are not necessarily incompatible
with long-term growth and competitiveness, but
neither are they always the primary or most effective
available option for broadening socioeconomic
inclusion. Many of the world’s most competitive
economies have high levels of social protection and the
significant tax burdens these imply. However, other countries
achieve moderate or low Gini ratios mainly because
their pre-transfer level of inequality is comparatively
modest to begin with rather than due to the significance
of their transfers.
• There is no inherent trade-off in economic policymaking
between the promotion of social inclusion and that of
Section 3: Performance Metrics – National Key  
Performance Indicators and Inclusive Development Index
The policy framework presented above provides a practical  
guide for thinking about how to achieve greater synergy between 
economic growth and social inclusion through the cultivation of 
a fuller ecosystem of relevant structural policies and institutions. 
The corresponding policy metrics provide a tool to gauge the 
level of policy effort in the different subdomains of the Framework 
in specific countries. These Policy and Institutional Indicators 
(PIIs) illustrate the extent of institutional strength or policy space 
utilization in this regard relative to peers.
But if the ultimate measure of national economic performance 
is not the “top-line” concept of GDP growth but rather the 
“bottom-line” one of broad-based and sustained progress in 
living standards, new and expanded performance metrics are 
also required.
How should countries track their performance on inclusive 
growth and development? Given the multidimensional nature 
of living standards – and the systemic nature of the strategy 
needed to achieve and sustain them – a wider set of Key  
Performance Indicators (KPIs) is needed than Gross Domestic 
Product per capita, which is the conventional metric used to 
measure countries’ level of economic development. The  
Dashboard of National KPIs presented here includes GDP as 
well as the best available cross-country measures of other 
Moreover, as manufacturing productivity improves and societies 
age, the market for services – many of which are less tradable 
across borders than goods – will expand, creating further  
opportunities for small-business ownership and asset building. 
Improving the regulatory and financial environment for running 
and investing in a small business can help a larger proportion 
of the working population to capture a larger share of these 
gains through the profits and equity appreciation that can  
accompany business ownership. 
Similarly, in today’s more internationally competitive and  
technologically dynamic environment, the effectiveness of private 
investment in the real economy is a critical determinant of a 
country’s ability to support productive industrial employment. 
This includes the cost, patience, and range of risk capital 
available for long-term investment in productive capacity and 
productivity improvements. Other critical determinants of the 
number and quality of employment opportunities include the 
quality and cost of infrastructure and basic services that link 
goods to markets and equip people for jobs, as well as the  
extent of deadweight losses to economic efficiency and  
innovation in the form of corruption and rents. A strategy to 
improve the enabling environment in these areas must be  
considered just as integral to the construction of a more  
inclusive model of economic growth as efforts to improve skills 
or fiscal transfers.
Figure 7: National Key Performance Indicators
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Inclusive Development Index
In addition to the National KPI Dashboard showing each country’s 
performance on each individual key performance indicator, a 
composite index has been calculated ranking countries based 
on their combined scores: the Inclusive Development Index 
(IDI). The IDI provides composite scores and international 
rankings for both the absolute level of performance and the 
most recent five-year trend.54 Countries are separated into two 
groups, advanced economies and developing economies, due 
to differences in the definitions of poverty between them. The 
result is an index that captures a more integrated picture of the 
relative state of economic development than that provided by 
GDP alone, particularly if the ultimate objective of development 
is understood to be sustained, broad-based advancement of 
living standards rather than increased production of goods and 
services, per se.
If the IDI absolute ranking of a country illustrates its level  
(or accumulated achievement) of inclusive development, 
then its trend ranking provides a window on recent performance 
(generally the average rate over the past five years). This is the 
metric most useful for governments and stakeholders seeking 
to assess the effect of changes in policy in the medium term, 
i.e., within a typical political cycle. In this sense, the trend
IDI ranking and underlying KPI data are the closest analogy
to the key performance indicators that business and other
organizations typically use to track the effectiveness of strategy
implementation.
Tables 1-3 present IDI country rankings and illustrate how this 
new composite indicator compares with the traditional ranking 
of countries by GDP per capita. It is not surprising that there is 
a high correlation – of 0.75 – between the two measures,  
particularly given that the IDI includes GDP per capita as one of 
its 12 indicators. Indeed, Germany and Sweden have exactly 
the same rank for both (12 and 6, respectively) and five  
countries only differ by one rank, namely Australia, Austria, 
Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland. These are the countries 
whose broader inclusive growth performance is highly  
consistent with their growth in national output more specifically. 
However, three advanced countries have a rank that is at  
least 10 positions higher in the IDI than in the basic GDP  
per capita measure, namely the Czech Republic, New Zealand, 
and the Slovak Republic. These are countries where, despite 
comparatively low output per capita, much is in place for an 
inclusive and sustainable growth process as they move  
forward. The United States presents a striking counterexample. 
It ranks ninth in terms of GDP per capita but a very low 23rd  
important facets of sustained, broad-based progress in living 
standards. Four such indicators have been chosen within each 
of the three pillars: growth and development; inclusion; and 
intergenerational equity and sustainability.
Growth and Development
The first pillar captures four core metrics of economic growth 
and development: GDP per capita; labor productivity, which 
underpins wages that in turn account for the overwhelming 
majority of household income; employment, a proxy for the 
breadth of economic opportunity and ultimately family security; 
and healthy-life expectancy, a measure of the quality of life.
Inclusion 
The second pillar includes four core measures of social inclusion: 
median household income, perhaps the single best proxy for 
the breadth of progress in living standards; poverty rate, a 
measure of the extent to which progress occurs at the bottom 
of the income scale; income Gini, the standard international 
measure of inequality; and wealth Gini, the analogous measure 
of wealth concentration.  
Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability
The third pillar incorporates four measures of intertemporal 
equity and sustainability for the reason that growth and gains 
in living standards are not truly socially-inclusive if they are 
generated in a manner that unduly and unsustainably burdens 
younger and future generations. These are: adjusted net  
saving, which measures the true rate of saving in an economy 
after taking into account investments in human capital,  
depletion of natural resources, and damage caused by  
pollution; public indebtedness as a share of GDP, which 
roughly illustrates the scale of borrowing by the current  
generation against the capacities of future ones; the dependency 
ratio or proportion of retirees and youth (under 15 years of age)
to the working-age population, which is also a leading indicator 
of likely future pressure on a nation’s finances; and carbon  
intensity of economic output, an indicator of the country’s  
relative performance on climate change. 
A detailed definition of each indicator is presented in Part 3.  
As with the Policy and Institutional Indicators (PIIs) in the 
preceding section, the National KPI data has been compiled 
in tables comparing the pillar and sub-pillar scores of each 
country via a traffic-light shading scheme that ranks countries 
relative to their group. Red corresponds to the lowest relative 
performance within a group, yellow to the median, and dark 
green to the best. Since this color scheme ranks countries  
only within their respective comparator groups, colors are  
not comparable across the two groups of advanced and  
developing countries.
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Figure 8: Inclusive Development Level and Trend for Advanced Economies
Part 1. Rising to the Challenge of Inclusive Growth and Development
22  |  The Inclusive Growth and Development Report 2017
Part 1. Rising to the Challenge of Inclusive Growth and Development
The Inclusive Growth and Development Report 2017  |  23 
China
Inclusive Development Level and Trend for Developing Economies
-12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15-15
3
4
4.5
3.5
-1-2
5 year trend
IDI Performance within income group
7
0
-15 150
Best
Worst
First quintile
Second quintile
Third quintile
Fourth quintile
Fifth quintile
Visible area
O
ve
ra
ll 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 (1
 =
 w
or
st
, 7
 =
 b
es
t) 
Receding Slowly Receding Slowly Advancing Advancing 
Watch out Bright spots
Blind spots Stand out
Vietnam
Ukraine
Tunisia
Thailand
Philippines
Paraguay
Pakistan
Nicaragua
Morocco
Mongolia
Georgia
Nepal
Moldova
Macedonia, FYR
Lao PDR
Sri Lanka
Iran, Islamic Rep. Indonesia
Guatemala
El Salvador
Cameroon
BoliviaBangladesh
Armenia
Honduras
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
Albania
Tanzania
Serbia
Panama
Peru
Poland Romania
Russian Federation
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Malaysia
Croatia
Costa Rica
Colombia
Brazil
Chile
Azerbaijan
Argentina
Cambodia
Mexico
Dominican Republic
Senegal
Nigeria
Mauritania
Swaziland
Lesotho
Kyrgyz Republic
India
Burkina Faso
Mali
Burundi
Rwanda
Zambia
Average 3.86
Ghana
South Africa
Sierra Leone
Tajikistan
Namibia
Chad
Uganda
Guinea
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mozambique
Bulgaria
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Box 6: Alternative Weighting of IDI Indicators and Pillars
The Inclusive Development Index presented in this report has been calculated by giving equal weight to the three pillars – 
growth, inclusion, and intergenerational equity – as well as the 12 indicators therein. However, if the bottom-line measure 
of national economic performance is sustained, broad-based progress in living standards, then a case could be made that 
the indicator or indicators that most closely approximate this concept should be weighted more heavily.
As measured by household surveys, median household income is attracting growing interest as an alternative to GDP per 
capita, the more commonly cited measure of a country’s material wellbeing.1 One drawback with GDP per capita is that it 
takes no account of distribution: it simply divides a nation’s income by the size of its population. If inequality in that country 
is very high, the resulting figure will provide a misleadingly optimistic suggestion of living standards for most individuals.
Analysis of the 12 Key Performance Indicators that comprise the Inclusive Development Index, alongside the seven pillars 
of Policy and Institutional Indicators, suggests that median household income is indeed a reasonable proxy for inclusive 
growth and development as a whole even though it captures only one of the four dimensions of broad-based progress in 
living standards – income; opportunity; security, and quality of life – emphasized in the Report. Of all the 12 KPIs, median 
household income correlates most closely with overall performance on the seven PII pillars (0.89).
If the Index were recalculated increasing by a factor of three the weight given to median household income, countries 
ranking better would include the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Belgium. Doubling the weight given to both median 
household income and the poverty rate, which would capture not only income-based progress at the median but also at 
among the poorest of society, would see countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Mauritania, Mozambique and South Africa 
rise up the rankings and countries like China, Romania and Bangladesh decline somewhat. Table 8 (in Part 2) shows how 
the Index would look if recalculated in this manner. 
Readers interested in making their own adjustments to weightings given to different pillars can explore the interactive 
online tool at wef.ch/igd17. 
1 L. Nancy Birdsall and Christian J. Meyer. 2014. “The Median Is the Message: A Good-Enough Measure of Material Well-Being and  
Shared Development Progress.” CGD Working Paper 351. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
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tax, and investment climate institutions – a reform strategy 
with a sharper focus on these basic building blocks could help 
boost growth and social equity simultaneously. 
In sum, strengthening the policy and institutional ecosystem 
supporting inclusive growth deserves to be a top policy  
priority for countries, whether they are experiencing slow 
growth, elevated inequality, or both. This is an imperative for 
countries seeking to thrive in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. 
The debate about how countries can preempt the further job 
losses and concentration of wealth that may otherwise  
accompany the proliferation of robots, artificial intelligence, 
and other technologies has quickly gravitated to the idea of 
a universal basic income. Some version of a universal basic 
income may form part of an appropriate policy response. But it 
is unlikely to be effective or feasible by itself, whether due to  
the fiscal burden it may create or the aspects of social  
inclusion it may not fully address, such as the sense of dignity 
and fulfillment that comes from being part of the growth  
process by having a good job or the opportunity to start a  
business. Here again, a systemic rather than silver-bullet  
approach is likely to be most effective.
Specifically, five dimensions of workforce development and 
security merit particular attention in industrial countries seeking 
to keep pace with the labor market challenges accompanying 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Policy and Institutional  
Indicator (PII) data suggest that few countries, if any, are  
performing well across all five.
1) Active labor-market policies: As the pace of change
accelerates in the economy, the enabling environment for
worker adjustment and training becomes more vital. The
Policy and Institutional Indicator (PII) data suggest that
some countries such as Denmark, Sweden, and Finland
have kept pace thus far. Others, notably the US, Israel,
and Japan, are lagging substantially behind. For example,
the US invests only 0.11% of GDP in active labor-market
policies (training and job search assistance) compared
with an OECD average of 0.6% and levels of 1% or more
among top performers. A gap such as this predisposes
countries to skills mismatches, long-term under- and
unemployment, eroding labor force participation rates,
and persistent geographical pockets of social exclusion,
that is to say lower economic growth and social inclusion.
2) Equity of access to quality basic education: Inequitable
educational opportunity is another source of avoidable
under- and unemployment and suppressed human and
economic potential. The policy indicator data reveal large
variations in country performance, suggesting that some
countries can learn a considerable amount from the
practices of others. Across several measures of the
the growth process and its benefits, in addition to rendering 
their economies more vulnerable to fluctuations in exports and 
commodity prices.
Efficient markets and macroeconomic stability are essential 
to economic growth. But how well growth benefits society as 
a whole depends on the framework of rules, incentives, and 
institutional capacities that shape the quality and equity of  
human capital formation; the level and patience of real 
economy investment; the pace and breadth of innovation; the 
effectiveness and flexibility of worker protections; the coverage 
and adequacy of social insurance systems; the quality and 
breadth of access to infrastructure and basic services; the  
probity of business and political ethics; and the breadth and 
depth of household asset building.
This recognition and the resulting rebalancing of policy priorities 
is what is required for governments to respond more effectively 
to decelerating growth and rising inequality – to take seriously 
the social frustrations increasingly being expressed through  
the ballot box and on the street. These frustrations have an  
essential validity. The implicit income distribution system of 
many countries is in fact severely underperforming or relatively 
underdeveloped, but this is due to a lack of attention rather 
than an iron law of capitalism. Inequality is largely an endogenous 
rather than exogenous challenge for policymakers and needs 
to be recognized and prioritized as such in order to sustain 
public confidence in the capacity of technological progress 
and international economic integration to support rising living 
standards for all.
For many countries, a reimagined process of structural reform 
aimed at broadening the base and benefits of growth may also 
be the best hope for accelerating its rate in the current context. 
For example, in advanced countries experiencing diminishing 
returns from extraordinary monetary policy measures, limited 
fiscal space, and unfavorable demographic trends (e.g., Japan, 
USA, and the EU, to different degrees), a mixture of demand- 
and supply-side structural reforms could boost consumption 
and job creation in the short term while raising the economy’s 
longer term growth potential through lasting improvements  
in labor productivity, household finances, real economy  
investment, and innovation.  
In middle-income countries experiencing weak exports and 
commodity prices, monetary policy constrained by the risk of 
currency depreciation and capital flight, and limited fiscal space 
(e.g., most of the BRICS), a structural reform agenda of this 
nature is precisely what could rebalance their growth model 
toward more robust domestic consumption. Similarly, for  
lower-income countries with extensive social marginalization 
– due to poor resourcing of, and inequitable access to, basic
services, education, and infrastructure, as well as weak legal,
Several important implications for national policymaking and 
international economic cooperation flow from this policy  
framework and benchmarking data. Action on them by  
major economies would offer a path for the world economy  
out of its current predicament of slowing growth, rising  
in-country inequality, and eroding public support for  
international integration.
National Policy
Many countries have significant unexploited potential to  
simultaneously increase economic growth and social equity. 
But activating the virtuous circle of inclusive growth more  
fully will require them to:
1) Reconceptualize domestic structural reform as an
ongoing systemic process encompassing a multidisciplinary
set of demand- and supply-side factors that together
support the diffusion of economic opportunity and
national income, thereby deepening the foundations and
broadening the base of growth itself.
2) Place as much emphasis on the construction of this
wider structural policy and institutional ecosystem as they
traditionally do on macroeconomic, finance and trade
supervision policies, which influence mainly the efficiency
and level of economic activity.
Rebalancing policy priorities in this manner would imply a  
profound change for many countries and indeed for the 
“growth model” that has been posited for a generation by 
much of the economic policy establishment, including key 
international organizations.  
The wider ecosystem of structural policies and institutional 
capacities described in this Report underpins the capacity of 
modern market economies to diffuse the gains from growing 
national income throughout society in the form of broad-based 
progress in living standards. It is the “income-distribution  
system” of a modern market economy writ large. Its robustness 
as a whole determines how effective government is in shaping 
the inclusivity of growth. Fiscal transfers and tertiary education 
are important, but they are just two of a much larger set of 
relevant policy levers.
This ecosystem has deteriorated or has been inert in many 
advanced countries over the past two decades as the forces 
propelling secular dispersion – technological change, global 
integration, domestic deregulation, and increased immigration 
– have intensified. For their part, many developing countries
have lagged in constructing its basic elements as they have
begun to industrialize and integrate into the global economy,
missing an opportunity to include more of their populations in
on the IDI, the largest difference by far of all advanced  
economies, indicating that what looks like healthy growth is in 
fact characterized by significant shortcomings in terms of the 
inclusiveness and sustainability of the growth process.
Table 3 (in Part 2) shows the difference for a selection of  
developing countries. Here the correlation between GDP per 
capita and the IDI is a bit lower at 0.73, although for many 
countries the relationship is quite strong, for example, for  
Lithuania and Hungary. However, 18 out of 82 developing 
countries display an IDI score that is nine places or more higher 
than their GDP per-capita ranking. Six of these – Azerbaijan, 
Nicaragua, Vietnam, Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Nepal – 
register IDI scores that are 20 or more places higher than their 
GDP per capita rankings, suggesting that their development 
model is considerably more balanced and inclusive than that 
of countries with a comparable national income per capita. 
By contrast, 16 of 82 countries register an IDI ranking that is 
nine places lower than their GDP per capita standing. Six of 
these – South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland, Nigeria, Zambia, and 
Mauritania – have IDI ranks that are 20 or more places lower 
than their GDP per capita standing. 
Section 4: Implications for National Policy and 
International Economic Cooperation – Toward a 
New Global Growth and Development Agenda
The policy framework, policy metrics (Policy and Institutional 
Indicators), and performance metrics (National KPI Dashboard 
and related Inclusive Development Index) presented above are 
intended to provide countries with tools that can help turn the 
goal of inclusive growth into a practical and measurable plan of 
action. To be certain, these metrics have their own limitations, 
and the decision about which elements are more important 
than others is left to the user insofar as the tables presented 
above weight each indicator equivalently. But while they do  
not purport to tell everything about national economic  
performance, they do provide a more integrated and  
complete picture than the conventional metric of GDP per 
capita, particularly if the overriding objective is the one  
stated so often by so many stakeholders in recent years: 
achieving a more socially-inclusive model of economic growth 
and development. In addition, the interactive version of the  
Index presented at wef.ch/igd17 enables the user to vary the 
weighting of the indicators in the Index to emphasize the  
elements they think are most important for their country’s  
circumstances. See Table 8 (in Part 2) for one such scenario.
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But first and foremost, infrastructure investment should be 
considered a structural element of a strategy to generate  
sustained improvements in economic efficiency and broad 
living standards over time, rather than merely a tactic to 
stimulate the economy and boost output in the near term.
International Economic Cooperation
Reconceptualizing domestic structural reform as an ongoing 
systemic process encompassing a wider range of demand- 
and supply-side factors that influence the pattern of growth 
and the diffusion of its benefits – and according such a  
continual process of institutional deepening as much weight  
as macroeconomic, financial supervision and trade policy – 
would imply a profound change in the “growth model” that  
has shaped the thinking of much of the economic-policy  
establishment for an entire generation, including in key  
international organizations. This reimagining of structural  
economic policy holds the key to translating inclusive growth 
from global aspiration into global action.
How could international cooperation help individual countries 
and the world economy as a whole move in this direction?    
First, major economies could undertake a coordinated effort 
to boost global growth by identifying and implementing 
the structural reforms that are most needed to activate 
the virtuous circle of inclusive growth in their economies. 
Governments could use the Framework and the metrics  
presented here as a starting point for an examination of whether 
their structural policy enabling environment for inclusive growth 
has been optimized, i.e., whether, on the basis of the experience 
and practices of their peers, they have unutilized policy space 
in one or more of the 15 sub-domains. They could then draw 
upon the structural policy analyses of other international  
economic organizations, particularly the OECD which has a 
wealth of deep analysis and prescription in these domains, as 
well as the World Bank, ILO, and others, to develop an action 
agenda tailored to their circumstances. The World Economic 
Forum and these organizations could provide further support 
by organizing public-private, interdisciplinary input into and 
support for the agendas that emerge. Such a global effort in 
2017 to reinvigorate global growth by broadening its base  
and strengthening its long-term foundations – making it less 
dependent on short-term macroeconomic measures and  
export demand – is precisely what the world economy needs 
to combat the cyclical and secular pressures weighing on 
growth.  The process undertaken by the Canadian  
government, as described in Box 7, to develop a new 
inclusive-growth strategy provides a constructive example for 
other countries.
and/or part-time workers tend to experience weaker 
statutory benefits and protections in many countries, 
there is a risk that inequality will expand as a result of the 
changing nature of work. Most such rules were crafted in 
an earlier era, and updating them should be a priority in 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Figure 10 illustrates the 
gaps and variability in rules across OECD countries.
5) School-to-work transition: Many advanced economies
have made great progress in raising the proportion of
student population that goes on to attain a tertiary
education degree. Others still have a considerable way to
go in making university education broadly accessible, with
Canada, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Slovak
Republic having enrollment rates below 60%, compared
with 80% or above in the top-12 OECD countries. At the
same time, some advanced countries appear to be
significantly underinvesting in technical, software, and
skilled trades. In six countries – Canada, Singapore,
Republic of Korea, Japan, Ireland, and reportedly the
US (for which official data are incomplete) – fewer than a
third of secondary students enroll in vocational programs.
A universal basic income is no substitute for these five crucial 
institutional underpinnings of a well-functioning labor market. 
It may serve as a useful complement at some point, but 
countries seeking to prepare their workforces for the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution would do well to invest in the strength of 
this ecosystem as a whole. Countries lagging in a majority of 
these domains should set a discrete national target and  
public-private implementation strategy for increasing investment 
in their people across these areas. 
Increased infrastructure investment has also emerged as an 
important policy option for responding to slow growth and 
rising inequality. But this, too, is not a panacea. Countries at 
various stages of development have chronically underinvested 
in infrastructure. In advanced countries, particularly, the  
principal rationale being offered to reverse this trend is a  
macroeconomic one: to provide a relatively short-term 
stimulus to employment creation and aggregate demand. While 
this could indeed be a helpful and appropriate contribution 
of increased infrastructure investment in some countries – 
particularly as part of a strategy to provide central banks with 
additional policy space to normalize interest rates – it should 
generally be a secondary rationale. A well-structured and 
sustained program of infrastructure investment is fundamentally 
about raising the growth potential and quality of life within an 
economy. It boosts economic efficiency, reduces deadweight 
losses in productivity, and improves human well-being over 
time. It can also create macroeconomic benefits or risks in  
the short term depending on prevailing economic conditions. 
Singapore, Ireland, and the Czech Republic would also 
benefit from greater initiative in this area. Gender gaps  
in income are even more pronounced – with female  
workers earning an estimated 60% or less of the level 
earned by men – in the United Kingdom, Korea,  
Netherlands, Japan, Italy, Austria, Greece, Ireland, Israel, 
and the Slovak Republic. Rates in top-performing  
countries, by contrast, are 80% or more. 
4) Non-standard work benefits and protections: Almost
half of the jobs created between 1995 and 2007 in  
OECD countries were temporary, part-time, or involved 
self-employment.55 As sharing, on-demand, and  
care-economy jobs expand along with the digital economy 
and employers seek to remain as flexible as possible in 
the global market, this part of the labor sector is likely to 
expand further. Because self-employed, temporary,  
impact of socioeconomic status on educational  
performance,Luxembourg, France, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Israel, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Austria, and 
Greece exhibit the greatest weakness, with Japan,  
Estonia, Finland, and Canada leading the way. Laggards 
in this area risk locking-in higher levels of inequality and 
social exclusion across generations.
3) Gender parity: It is generally recognized that redressing
major disparities in the participation of women in the
workforce can be one of the most effective ways to raise
rates of economic growth and progress in broad living
standards. East Asian economies have particular room for
improvement in this area, with Japan and Korea having
among the widest gender gap in labor participation within
the OECD (i.e., female rates of less than 80% of men).
However, other countries such as Italy, Greece,
Figure 10: Statutory Benefit Differences between Non-standard and Standard Work, by Benefit, 201056
1. Part-time workers are excluded if working less than nine hours a week.
2. In Japan, part-time workers are entitled to unemployment benefit if working more than 
20 hours per week.
3. There is no unemployment benefit in Mexico. Labour law requires employers to pay 
dismissed employees a lump sum.
NO BENEFIT OPTIONAL  
ENROLMENT
SAME RULES AS THE 
GENERAL SCHEME
DIFFERENT RULES FROM  
STANDARD WORKERS
Source: Social Security Administration (2010), Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Asia and the Pacific, Government Printing Office; Social Security Administration. 
(2010), Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe, Government Printing Office; Social Security Administration (2011), Social Security Programs Throughout the 
World: The Americas, Government Printing Office.
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -1 0 0
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 -2 0
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -2 -2 1
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -2 -2 0
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 -1 1 0 -2 -2
Czech Republic 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -2 0 0
Denmark 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 0
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 0
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 -2 0
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 -2 -2 -1 0
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 0 1 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -2 -2 0
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -2 0
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 -2 1
Japan 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -2 -2 0
Korea 0 0 1 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0
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Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 -2 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -2 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 -2 0
Slovak Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 -2 -1 0
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 -2 0
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 -2 0
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 -2 0
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -2 1 0
United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2 0 1 0 -2 -2 0
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Box 7: Canada’s Approach to Inclusive and Sustainable Growth 
Following the election of a new government in 2015, Canada has embarked on a plan to spur economic growth while 
creating conditions that allow the largest possible proportion of its population to share in the benefits that a growing 
economy brings.1 Canada’s commitment to inclusive growth and its ambitious plan to revitalize its economy, foster  
long-term growth, and strengthen the middle class now provides a model for the international community.2 Central to  
this plan is Canada’s continued commitment to diversity, immigration, and global investment.
Canada’s approach to inclusive and sustainable growth recognizes that there are no quick and easy solutions to fostering 
durable and broadly-shared growth. That is why the Government of Canada is using a broad set of policy levers. It began 
by taking steps to create fairer income distribution through provision of direct income support. Benefits for low- and  
middle-income families with children were increased, which is expected to reduce the number of children living in poverty 
by roughly 40%. Income taxes have also been reduced for nearly nine million middle-class Canadians. 
Further, the government has taken steps to reinvigorate growth, starting with increased investment in public infrastructure; 
redoubling of efforts to attract foreign capital through the establishment of a new agency, the Invest in Canada Hub; and 
changes to Canada’s immigration system to provide faster access to top talent globally. New investments in infrastructure 
totaling $95 billion will boost economic growth and social inclusion by reducing traffic congestion and commute times,  
and by providing more affordable housing. A new institution, the Canada Infrastructure Bank, will be set up to focus on  
attracting private capital to spur innovative funding and financing for infrastructure projects. This bank will work with  
governments and investors to provide better results for middle-class Canadians by identifying potential projects and  
investment opportunities that contribute to larger economic, social, and environmental returns.
The government is also taking steps to ensure that Canadians have the tools they need to succeed in the modern  
economy. New measures have been enacted to make post-secondary education more affordable, the employment 
insurance system more inclusive, and the retirement income system more secure.
In addition, recognizing that transitioning to a green economy will be essential to sustained economic growth, the  
government is investing $5 billion over the next five years in green infrastructure and in providing incentives for families and 
firms to reduce emissions. In partnership with subnational governments, the federal government will implement carbon 
pricing and establish meaningful environmental targets for green infrastructure projects. These changes will lead to reduced 
energy consumption and improved water quality in Canada’s lakes and rivers. Ultimately, there will be better outcomes for 
communities facing threats from climate change.
The Government of Canada has also introduced important measures to advance gender equality. Budget 2016 included 
new investments in Status of Women Canada – a government agency that promotes equality for women and their full  
participation in the economic, social and democratic life of the country3 – to enhance its capacity to provide government-
wide support on the gender-based analysis of programs, policies, and legislation. 
On the economic front, a new “Canada Child Benefit” was introduced to provide families with more support for raising 
children, directly assisting women’s labor market attachment and their long-term economic security. The Government  
of Canada also increased the “Guaranteed Income Supplement” top-up benefits in order to lift low-income single seniors, 
many of whom are women, out of poverty. 
1 Government of Canada, “A Plan for Middle Class Progress – Fall Economic Statement 2016” (2016); Growing the Middle Class – Budget 2016” (2016), 
http://www.budget.gc.ca/2016/docs/plan/toc-tdm-en.html; Advisory Council on Economic Growth, “The Path to Prosperity – Resetting Canada’s Growth 
Trajectory” (October 20, 2016).
2 “Canada’s Example to the World: Liberty Moves North,” The Economist (October 29, 2016); Christine Lagarde, “Statement at Conclusion of Visit to 
Canada” (September 14, 2016), http://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2016/09/14/pr16405-statement-by-imf-managing-director-christine-largarde-at-the-
conclusion.
3 http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/index-en.html. 
Box 7: Canada’s Approach to Inclusive and Sustainable Growth (cont’d.)
On the international stage, Canada is committed to strengthening its place in the world, and recognizes the importance of 
international assistance. The ongoing review of Canada’s international assistance will help to refocus policy and  
programming on supporting fragile states and helping the poorest and the most vulnerable – focusing particularly on 
women and girls. In this effort, Canada will also encourage multilateral institutions to place gender equality at the core  
of their work. 
Canada is also changing the way it looks at the performance of its economy by adopting a new lens that measures  
progress differently by placing greater weight on broad-based gains rather than strict economic measurements that might 
miss the bigger picture. This new perspective combines metrics like job creation with equally important outcomes like  
quality of life, job satisfaction, poverty reduction, and access to opportunities.
This is being put into practice through a new emphasis on data and measurement. This approach, termed the “results 
and delivery” approach, was inspired by the UK model of “Deliverology.”  Developing and monitoring an appropriate set of 
indicators is a key component of this approach. Building from Canada’s participation in the working group that developed 
and refined the indicators in this Report, the results and delivery approach will help Canada with its own efforts to track 
progress on inclusive growth.
Canada recognizes that to be at the forefront of the changes in the global economy, the public and private sectors must 
work together to help create conditions for success. In March 2016, Canada’s Minister of Finance announced the 
creation of the Advisory Council on Economic Growth to focus on policy actions that generate strong and sustained long-
term  economic growth that is shared across income groups. The Council has used the World Economic Forum’s 
Framework  for Inclusive Growth to evaluate the implications of its recommendations for inclusiveness. Informed by 
advice and  recommendations from the Council, Canada will continue to develop its long-term plan to boost growth in the 
face of  challenges like those posed by an aging population. 
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institutional improvements that broaden social participation 
in the process and benefits of growth.
— Shift the emphasis of development finance institutions 
from direct lending to catalyzing much larger amounts 
of blended, public-private financing for development, 
particularly for sustainable infrastructure.
— Reset the priorities of international trade and investment 
cooperation.
Increasing development assistance to support economic  
institution building: As indicated above, the path to a more 
inclusive and resilient growth model begins with a deeper 
appreciation of the important role that legal frameworks and 
institutional enforcement capacities play in the development 
process in such areas as tax administration; competition; 
investment; anti-corruption: judiciary; labor; environment; social 
protection; and business-government relations. This is an 
important, if somewhat neglected, lesson of the Western  
and East Asian industrial development experience, judging by 
the low absolute and relative amount of development  
assistance dedicated to this purpose. The policy advice given 
by the international financial institutions (IFIs) should reprioritize 
institution-building in these areas of structural economic policy, 
while bilateral donors and multilateral development banks 
should significantly increase (perhaps double or triple from a 
very low base) related capacity-building assistance. This will 
require a significant shift in resourcing and skills within these 
international institutions.
Scaling public-private financing of sustainable infrastructure: 
There is widespread agreement on the opportunity for global 
economic growth and social inclusion presented by increased 
infrastructure investment. A similar consensus exists on the 
central importance of infrastructure for the implementation  
of both the Sustainable Development Goals, for which it  
represents an estimated 70% to 80% of the total required 
incremental financing, and the climate change targets set  
in the Paris Accord of the United Nations’ 21st Conference  
of Parties (COP 21).  
The infrastructure intensity of the sustainable development 
goals (SDGs) and climate agendas suggests that they could 
provide much of the impetus for global growth over the coming 
10-15 years, especially if combined with a broader structural
shift of economies toward inclusive growth as outlined above.
The IMF has estimated that a 1% increase in spending on
well-planned and well-executed infrastructure can yield an
increase in a country’s economic output by up to 2.6%
over four years.57
The G20 Enhanced Structural Reform Agenda, launched  
during China’s recent presidency, provides an opening for such 
a coordinated international initiative. G20 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors “committed to further enhancing 
the structural reform agenda, including by developing a set of 
priorities and guiding principles as a reference for G20 reform 
efforts, as well as by creating an indicator system to further 
improve assessing and monitoring of the progress of structural 
reforms and their adequacy to address structural challenges, 
taking into account the diversity of country circumstances.” 
This process, which lists inclusive growth as the last of nine 
focus areas, could be sharpened and infused with a sense of 
urgency by leaders during the German G20 presidency.  
Second, international organizations and their major  
shareholder governments should spearhead a movement 
to increase the social inclusivity of growth around the 
world by embracing this reformulation and reprioritization of 
structural economic policy in their public signaling, country 
advice, and development cooperation programs. They 
could jointly and explicitly state that broad-based progress in 
living standards is the ultimate measure of national economic 
performance (as opposed to expansion of national output, per 
se) and that the structural and institutional factors which shape 
pre- and post-transfer levels of social inclusion are as important 
as the traditional focus of chief economic advisers and finance 
ministers on macroeconomic, financial, and trade policy.  
The drivers of economic efficiency described by the so-called 
Washington Consensus remain important, but they represent 
an incomplete and therefore unbalanced agenda. Cultivation 
of the structural policy ecosystem that underpins the diffusion 
of living standards within a modern market economy requires 
parallel and equal attention. This rebalancing of the growth 
and development process is part of the unfinished business of 
recovery from the financial crisis as well as an important lesson 
to be drawn from the social backlash against globalization in 
some countries. By virtue of their public profile and intimate 
relationship with the economic ministries of governments, the 
major international economic organizations have a vital role to 
play in the establishment and scaled application of this new 
and more inclusive growth model. See Box 8 with a perspective 
from the International Monetary Fund.
Third, major improvements are needed in three specific 
areas of international economic cooperation in order for 
inclusive growth to scale across the world economy:  
— Increase the absolute amount and relative share of 
development assistance devoted to helping countries 
implement demand- and supply-side structural and  
Box 8: To Save Globalization, Its Benefits Must Be Shared More Broadly
Economists tend to be advocates of globalization. The benefits of specialization and exchange are evident within a  
country’s borders; no one would seriously suggest that impeding the flows of goods, labor, and capital within a country 
would raise national welfare. Globalization extends the possibilities of specialization beyond national boundaries. Recent 
work suggests, however, that while globalization is great in theory, vigilance is needed about it in practice. 
The three main components of globalization – goods, labor, and capital – are associated with different costs and benefits. 
The preponderance of the evidence suggests that trade has positive impacts on aggregate incomes, but many people 
do lose out. The economic benefits of migration are very high, but it also has distributional consequences and impacts on 
social cohesion. 
The case for globalization is weakest when it comes to financial globalization – the free flow of capital across national 
boundaries. It has not yielded efficiency benefits as expected, but has been associated with increased inequality. Financial 
globalization also interacts with other policies, in particular domestic fiscal policy, which has distributional effects. 
Aggregate and Distributional Effects of Financial Globalization: Capital account liberalization can allow the international  
capital market to channel world savings to their most productive uses across the globe. Developing countries with little 
capital can borrow to finance investment and promote economic growth without requiring sharp increases in their own 
savings. But equally, there is little doubt about the existence of genuine hazards of openness to foreign financial flows. 
The link between financial globalization and economic growth is complex.1 While some capital flows such as foreign  
direct investment boost long-run growth, the impact of other flows is weaker and critically dependent on a country’s other 
institutions as well as on how openness is sequenced relative to other policy changes.
Moreover, openness to capital flows has increased economic volatility and the frequency of crises in many emerging 
markets and developing economies. About 20 per cent of the time, surges end in a financial crisis, of which one-half are 
also associated with large output declines.2 The ubiquity of surges and crashes gives credence to the claim by Harvard 
economist Dani Rodrik that “boom-and-bust cycles are hardly a sideshow or a minor blemish in international capital flows; 
they are the main story.”
While the drivers of surges and crashes are many, increased capital account openness consistently figures as a risk  
factor – it raises the probability of a surge and a post-surge crash. In addition to raising the odds of a crash, openness 
raises inequality, especially when a crash ensues.3 
Financial globalization also interacts with other policies, notably fiscal policy. The desire to attract foreign capital can  
trigger a race to the bottom in effective corporate tax rates, lowering governments’ ability to provide essential public 
goods. Fiscal consolidation has been shown to increase inequality.
Such direct and indirect distributional effects could set up an adverse feedback loop: the increase in inequality might  
itself undercut growth, which is what globalization is meant to increase in the first place. There is now strong evidence 
that inequality lowers both the level and the durability of growth.4  
1 J.D. Ostry, A. Prati, and A. Spilimbergo, “Structural Reforms and Economic Performance in Advanced and Developing Countries,”  
IMF Occasional Paper No. 268 (2009). 
2 Atish Ghosh, J.D. Ostry, and M. Qureshi, “When Do Capital Inflow Surges End in Tears?” American Economic Review 106, No. 5 (2016). 
3 J.D. Ostry, P. Loungani, and D. Furceri, “Neoliberalism: Oversold?” Finance and Development 53, No. 2 (2016). 
4 J.D. Ostry, A. Berg, and C. Tsangarides, “Redistribution, Inequality and Growth,” IMF Staff Discussion Note 14/02 (2014).
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scaling public-private financing of sustainable infrastructure, 
including to support well-prepared projects that implement the 
climate change-related Nationally Determined Contributions of 
developing countries. This process could link and build upon 
several recent initiatives to support specific, complementary 
elements of this agenda, including the Sustainable Investment 
Partnership61 Convergence,62  Global Infrastructure Hub,63  
Global Infrastructure Facility,64 and Africa50 Infrastructure 
Fund.65  The public-private infrastructure investors’ summit 
that takes place at the Annual Meeting of the World Economic 
Forum as part of its Long-term Investing, Infrastructure and 
Development System Initiative could provide a platform for 
Ministers, MDB presidents, and CEOs to oversee and  
energize this process, including by setting specific goals for  
the system as a whole.
Refocusing trade and investment cooperation: International 
trade and investment have been frequently blamed for rising 
inequality in recent years. However, they have the potential to 
contribute much more to global growth and social inclusion, 
provided the right approaches are taken. See Box 9 with a 
perspective from the World Trade Organization.
A more inclusive approach to international trade and investment 
cooperation will require a shift in policymakers’ emphasis from 
the negotiation of formal new norms such as free  
trade agreements to the facilitation of trade and investment 
activity within as well as among countries. Such an approach 
will necessitate convergence of effort around best practices 
and standards to reduce frictions and enhance social impact, 
on the one hand, and substantially increase capacity-building 
assistance for this purpose, on the other.
Promising opportunities in this respect have been identified 
through an extensive multistakeholder strategic review of trade 
policy and institutional arrangements co-organized by the 
Forum and the International Center for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, the E15 Project, launched in 2011. Four sets of 
recommendations in its January 2016 report, “Strengthening 
the Global Trade Investment System in the 21st Century,”66   
are particularly relevant for inclusive growth by virtue of their 
potential to: a) greatly expand trade-related sales and  
employment by small-business; b) facilitate not only a reduction 
in barriers to trade in services (which are often labor-intensive) 
but also an increase in investments in industrial value chains  
(in which relatively few developing countries participate  
extensively); c) catalyze a leveling up of social and environmental 
practices within these international production networks so as 
to maximize their payoff for inclusive and sustainable growth in 
developing countries, as well as minimize fears in developed 
countries of a global race to the bottom in social protections; 
and d) modernize and harmonize international investment  
But the gap between the current level of infrastructure  
investment and that which is implied by the SDGs and climate 
targets is very large – to the order of 100% or an estimated 
$1-1.5 trillion per year. To close this gap and achieve the goals 
of higher growth, faster and more inclusive development, and 
a peak and then accelerating decline of global GHG emissions, 
the traditional source of most infrastructure financing –  
public spending – will need to be supplemented. Governmental 
budgets and international financial institutions’ (IFI) capital are 
limited and unlikely to see much enhancement in the  
foreseeable future. The only plausible solution is a big boost  
in co-financing from the private sector, and this is where  
international economic cooperation can play a critical role.
A mere 1.6% of the approximately $106 trillion in funds  
managed by private institutional investors worldwide is invested 
in infrastructure.58 Yet a recent investment community survey 
found that over 65% of respondents wished to increase their 
allocations to infrastructure, with a third indicating a desire to 
do so in developing countries.59 The primary obstacles are a 
perception that the risks of infrastructure investment often  
do not correspond to the returns (including with respect  
to recent regulatory capital requirements for certain  
financial institutions) and a lack of well-prepared investment 
project proposals. 
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and bilateral 
development finance institutions can be instrumental in solving 
both of these problems, but will have to make a major shift 
in their strategies, capital allocation, and staff skill-sets as 
advocated over the years by several expert reports.60 Most of 
their leadership recognize the need for a strategic shift in their 
role from direct lending (usually to sovereigns) to catalyzing 
much larger multiples of domestic and international private 
investment through the expanded use of co-investment, risk 
mitigation, aggregation, and project development technical 
assistance. However, their boards and staff are not yet fully 
supportive of or equipped for this shift. As a result, the pace of 
change remains incremental, and the international community 
risks missing a critical opportunity to boost growth, enhance 
social inclusion, and accelerate progress toward the SDGs and 
climate change targets.
Governments and the business community must mobilize to 
seize this opportunity and increase public-private financing of 
sustainable infrastructure in the next few years. They should do 
so by engaging in collective work at both the C-suite and  
working levels to surmount impediments that have been  
identified in terms of risk-return, project development pipeline, 
aggregation, and regulatory capital. Leaders from governments, 
DFIs, and other institutional investors, banks, and infrastructure- 
related firms should join a process along these lines aimed at 
Box 8: To Save Globalization, Its Benefits Must Be Shared More Broadly (cont’d.)
The way forward: These findings suggest several steps to redesign globalization. The first is to recognize the flaws in 
globalization, especially in relation to financial globalization. The adverse effects of financial globalization on macroeconomic 
volatility and inequality should be countered. Among policymakers today, there is increased acceptance of controls to 
restrict foreign capital flows that are viewed as likely to lead to – or compound – a financial crisis. While not the only tools 
available, capital controls may be the best option when it is borrowing from abroad that is the source of an unsustainable 
credit boom.5  
Beyond this, in the short run, the extent of redistribution could be increased. This can be done through some combination 
of higher tax rates (greater progressivity in income taxes and increased reliance on wealth and property taxes, for instance) 
and programs to help those who lose out from globalization. 
In the case of trade, programs of adjustment assistance do exist. That they have not always worked well in the past  
is an argument for fixing, not discarding, them. In the case of migration, too, compensation to potential losers could be 
expanded by targeting areas that witness more entry of foreign workers. This can be done by providing generous  
unemployment insurance benefits and allocating more resources to active labor-market policies aimed at matching  
displaced workers with jobs. 
In the longer run, the solutions lie not in redistribution but in mechanisms that achieve “pre-distribution.” More equal access 
to health, education, and financial services ensures that market incomes are not simply a function of peoples’ starting  
point in life. This does not ensure that everyone will end up at the same point. But the provision of opportunities to do well 
in life regardless of initial income level, combined with the promise of redistribution for those who fall behind, is more  
likely to build support for globalization than will simply ignoring the discontent with it. 
5 J.D. Ostry, A. Ghosh, M. Chamon, and M. Qureshi, “Tools for Managing Financial-Stability Risks from Capital Inflows,” Journal of International Economics 
88 (2012): 407-21.
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Facilitate reductions in barriers to trade in services and 
to investment in industrial value chains
• Develop a comprehensive WTO Framework for Trade
Facilitation in Services, with both capacity-building and
graduated normative elements as in the recent WTO
Trade Facilitation Agreement to support the inclusion of
developing countries.
• Establish a Global Value Chain Partnership, a public-private
platform to improve the cross-country inclusivity and
social responsibility of global supply chains. The platform
would facilitate cooperation between governments
seeking to integrate their economies with international
supply chains and the companies and experts who could
be their partners. The action orientation of the partnership
would be underpinned by important new analytical efforts
to map existing value chains and impediments to their
expansion in new geographies. It would also assemble
examples of good practice that can inform the
strategies of developing countries to maximize the
objective of sustainable development from their participation
in these production networks.
Catalyze the leveling up of social and environmental 
standards
• A group of like-minded governments could catalyze
the scaling of responsible supply-chain practices by
multinational and other companies around the world by
forming an open club that establishes a common floor
for such standards. They would assist other countries to
join them by offering trade preferences and substantial
capacity-building assistance. The 2014 German G7
initiative to spread responsible supply-chain practices
and the Sweden-led Global Deal to promote social
dialogue could be building blocks for such a coordinated
international effort to promote best practice, benchmarking,
and consistent reporting by multinational companies
regarding the contribution of their operations in
developing countries on the key dimensions of sustainable
development.
• The recent partnership between the World Bank and
the World Economic Forum to create an “Inclusive
Development Hub” to facilitate the contribution of
responsible value chains to inclusive development could
provide a platform to facilitate progress in this respect in
cooperation with the International Trade Center’s
supply-chain traceability project, the ILO-administered
Vision Zero Fund, and other capacity-building programs
that aim to strengthen developing countries’ labor
ministries.
and regional trade agreements in order to strengthen their  
contribution to sustainable development, simplify the conduct 
of business across multiple jurisdictions, and reduce  
discrimination against small countries, particularly those that 
are not part of major regional agreements. Specifically: 
Scaling internet-enabled small-business trade
• Create comprehensive, online, single points of enquiry
for cross-border service providers to learn about the
regulatory, licensing, and other administrative requirements
in the host country.
• Establish higher, standardized de minimis customs levels
to facilitate cross-border flows of small packages supplied
by Internet-enabled retail services providers, especially
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), for example by
adopting a $100 (or even $200) minimum common
threshold for developing countries and a higher threshold,
such as $800, for advanced countries.
• Adopt interoperable, digitally-enabled single windows for
customs and border compliance with open application
program interfaces (APIs) that allow developers to create
digital platforms which seamlessly link SMEs with various
countries’ single windows.
• Establish clear rules pertaining to electronic transmission
of data and related services by aligning rules with
eading practices regarding intermediary liability, privacy,
intellectual property, consumer protection, electronic
signature, and dispute settlement; and by allowing the
free flow of data across borders subject to an exceptions
provision based on Article XIV of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) concerning the right of
countries to protect the privacy of personal data as long
as such right is not used to circumvent the provisions of
the agreement.
• Initiate negotiations to establish a plurilateral digital trade
agreement among a forward-looking group of countries
from various regions, incorporating a comprehensive set
of policies and multistakeholder practices such as those
outlined above in order to maximize the growth and
employment potential of Internet-enabled trade. If such a
group included, among other countries, the United States,
China, and the European Union, its provisions could be
extended on a most-favored-nation basis to all countries
as a “critical mass” agreement under WTO rules, thereby
serving as a powerful stimulus to global growth and
employment, particularly in the SME sector.
Box 9: WTO: Trade has Reduced Global Poverty and Made Development More Inclusive 
In 2016, a rise in anti-globalization sentiment put the spotlight on trade agreements. Trade plays a pivotal role in  
supporting growth and lifting people out of poverty around the world. However, it is clear that more can be done to 
foster inclusiveness in the trading system and ensure that the benefits of trade are more widely shared. It is useful  
to look at this at three levels: countries, companies, and people.
Countries: In recent decades, developing countries have become increasingly integrated into the global economic and 
trading system. As a result, they have experienced rapid economic growth, resulting in convergence towards income levels 
found in developed countries. Between 2000 and 2015, the share of developing economies in world output increased  
from 42% to 57% (based on purchasing-power parity). Their share in world trade (i.e. merchandise exports) also rose from  
33% to 47% during the same period. This integration has been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the number of 
poor people in the developing world, which more than halved from 1.7 billion in 1999 to 766 million in 2013.
However, this convergence appears to have stalled recently. The world is in a period of low growth and trade, and 
projections suggest this is set to continue (see Chart 1). Actions to reduce trade costs could improve prospects for  
convergence. Implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) would be an important step here. WTO  
research suggests that implementing the TFA would benefit all countries, with the largest gains accruing to developing  
and least-developed countries.1 If the TFA is fully and speedily implemented, developing countries would see their  
exports rise by over 3.5% per annum – nearly double the expected increase in the exports of developed countries.  
This would allow developing countries’ exports to surpass those of developed countries a full decade earlier than would 
have been the case without the TFA.2  
Companies: Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) continue to have more difficulties than larger firms in overcoming 
trade barriers and costs. Recent evidence suggests that both fixed costs (those that do not change with the size of shipment) 
and variable costs (those that increase with the size of shipment) impede participation in trade of SMEs more than that of 
larger firms. Hence any initiative that reduces these costs is bound to allow many more SMEs to engage in trade.
Burdensome procedures and customs and trade regulations are major sources of fixed costs for SMEs. By reducing delays 
in export time, the TFA has the capacity to boost SMEs’ role in exports.3 Evidence shows that micro, small, and medium-
sized firms are far more likely than large firms to export, and to increase their export shares, when the requirements to clear 
exports are reduced.
People: Open trade favors poor consumers more than rich consumers because they spend relatively more on sectors that 
are traded while high-income individuals consume more services, which are traded less. For the bottom 10th percentile of 
the income distribution, the increase in real incomes from opening up of trade is 63%, while it is only 28% for the top 90th 
percentile.4  
The importance of addressing the tariff barriers faced by the poor is also clear from the analysis of the 2001 US-Vietnam 
Bilateral Trade Agreement. Between 2002 and 2004, the provinces in Vietnam that experienced the largest tariff cuts in the 
US market also experienced the biggest declines in poverty.5 The reallocation of workers from the informal to the formal 
sector, induced by the agreement, played an important role in this outcome.6  Having joined the WTO in 2007, Vietnam has 
gone on to make great strides in its development, fueled in large part by trade. 
1 World Trade Organization, “World Trade Report 2015: Speeding up Trade: Benefits and Challenges of Implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement” (2015), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report15_e.pdf.  
2 L. Fontagné, J. Fouré, and A. Keck, “Simulating World Trade in the Decades Ahead: Driving Forces and Policy Implications” (World Trade Organization, 2016), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201405_e.pdf. 
3 “World Trade Report 2016: Levelling the Playing Field for SMEs” (World Trade Organization, 2016), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_
report16_e.pdf.  
4 Pablo D. Fajgelbaum and Amit K. Khandelwal, “Measuring the Unequal Gains from Trade,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 131, No. 3, (2016): 1113-80. 
5 Brian McCaig, “Exporting Out of Poverty: Provincial Poverty in Vietnam and U.S. Market Access,” Journal of International Economics 85, No. 1 (Elsevier, 2011):  
102-113. 
6 Brian McCaig and N. Pavcnik, “Export Markets and Labour Reallocation in Low-Income Countries,” NBER Working Paper No. 20455 (2014).
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Box 9: Trade has Reduced Global Poverty and Made Development More Inclusive (cont’d.)
More recent research on poverty also shows that tariffs and non-tariff barriers are higher for the poor, which limits their 
chance to access international markets. In India, for example, tariffs faced in destination markets are increasingly higher  
for goods produced by individuals in lower-income groups (see Chart 2). Households in rural areas face an average tariff 
10.9 percentage points higher than their urban counterparts. This underlines that the poor are likely to pay the highest 
penalty if countries stall in their efforts to reduce barriers to trade, or worse, begin to roll back the reforms that have  
been achieved to date.
Box 9: Trade has Reduced Global Poverty and Made Development More Inclusive (cont’d.)
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of best policy and corporate practices such as those described 
in Box 12 on Innovation to Deliver Shared Growth and Box 
11 on how Microsoft is advancing a technological revolution 
for all. The Initiative is also developing a new long-term policy 
benchmarking framework on Future Preparedness69 related 
to its ongoing Global Risks Report, and produces the Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report publications as well as a  
number of related specialized regional and sector reports  
produced in cooperation with partners.70  
All of this activity helps to shape the World Economic Forum’s 
meetings and communities around the world, including its  
Annual Meetings, Regional Summits, and National Strategy 
Meetings. It will inform as well the development of the Forum’s 
new Center on the Fourth Industrial Revolution in San Francisco, 
California, which will examine governance considerations 
related to emerging technologies, including cross-cutting  
societal issues such as those addressed by this Report. 
Through this System Initiative, the Forum seeks to contribute  
to a better appreciation within societies of how to make  
inclusive growth and development a reality at a time of  
accelerating change.
practice that promote inclusive growth. It then enables their 
application in specific countries and regions by leveraging 
the Forum’s platform to stimulate direct cooperation for this 
purpose among governments, international organizations, 
companies, civil society, and experts. 
The Initiative’s role as an enabling platform to facilitate direct 
cooperation (i.e., action) on inclusive growth and development 
by multiple relevant stakeholders, including other international 
organizations, is reflected in the design and recommendations 
of this Report. Important policy contributions have been 
provided by the IMF, OECD, ILO, World Bank, WTO, Finance 
Ministry of Canada, and McKinsey Global Institute. Valuable 
lessons in the practice of inclusive growth at the corporate level 
have been contributed by Microsoft and Barclays. The Report’s 
central recommendation is that countries eager to improve 
social inclusion and economic growth should assemble a much 
wider structural economic reform strategy than has been the 
norm, drawing from the considerable expertise available within 
the international community, particularly in the OECD, ILO, 
World Bank, and other international organizations specializing 
in these areas. 
This practical, action-oriented platform approach is reflected  
as well in the Initiative’s work program, which has three  
interrelated dimensions: developing new policy frameworks 
and metrics (of which this Report is a principal manifestation); 
identifying and disseminating best practice in terms of  
both public policy and corporate practice; and facilitating 
multistakeholder engagement in the development of national 
and regional strategies by governments on the one hand, and 
of corporate strategies by firms on the other. The Initiative’s 
multistakeholder platform is available to facilitate policy support 
and stakeholder engagement.
Examples include the Initiative’s multistakeholder regional 
projects in Latin America in cooperation with the Inter-American 
Development Bank67 and in Europe with Brussels-based  
economic think-tank Bruegel and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB).68 They also include its global collaboration with 
the World Bank Group and the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) to support the development, launch, 
and implementation of innovative public-private collaboration 
programs to make economies and societies more inclusive 
while moving the needle on achieving the SDGs. (See Box 10 
on Sustainable Value Chains.) This will include a virtual platform 
offering a publicly-accessible diagnosis of opportunities for  
targeted action, a series of innovation labs, as well as global 
and regional symposia and roundtables to present the best 
ideas and identify how the diagnosis can be turned into  
practice. This partnership is intended to facilitate the sharing  
This more systemic approach to combating inequality requires 
not only a new growth strategy but also a broader set of  
metrics that capture the bottom-line objective of national 
economic policy: sustained, broad-based progress in living 
standards. Three complementary sets of metrics – Policy and 
Institutional Indicators illustrating relative institutional strength 
and policy effort; National Key Performance Indicators; and an 
Inclusive Development Index providing an alternative ranking 
of countries’ levels of development and recent progress – have 
been developed for this purpose as part of this Report. All 
of this data has been compiled in individual Country Profiles, 
which are available online.
This new growth and development agenda requires a  
commitment to action at the national and international levels. 
Governments should use this new framework and metrics to 
develop national programs to address identified weaknesses 
with the support of international organizations and other  
stakeholders, particularly with respect to expanded investment 
in workforce productivity, compensation, and security. The 
international community should buttress these national efforts 
by funding a major increase in institution-building assistance for 
developing countries in the corresponding policy domains. It 
should also reform development finance institutions to support 
a scaling of blended, public-private financing of sustainable 
infrastructure to promote worldwide implementation of the 
Paris Agreement and progress toward the SDGs. And the 
international community should reset the priorities of trade and 
investment cooperation to facilitate commerce and investment 
in several new respects that would boost global economic 
growth and social equity.
A coordinated global initiative along these lines is what is  
required to transform inclusive growth from aspiration into  
action – into an agenda that places people and living standards 
at the center of national economic policy and international 
economic integration. Such an effort to reshape the  
assumptions and priorities of the way modern market  
economies organize themselves to generate socioeconomic 
progress can only be realized with the engagement of all 
stakeholders. This calls for a collective commitment to greater 
responsiveness and responsibility in economic leadership by 
government and business leaders.
The World Economic Forum’s System Initiative on Economic 
Growth and Social Inclusion provides a platform for such  
multistakeholder commitment and engagement. Recognizing 
the high degree of interest around the world in innovative,  
evidence-based solutions that are replicable in different  
contexts, the Initiative works with its partners to distill and 
disseminate positive examples of public policy and business 
• A more integrated effort across these initiatives, combined
with an appeal by governments to their multinational
enterprises to apply to overseas operations the basic
worker rights and pollution-control practices that they
apply at home, could transform global supply-chain
practices over the next few years.
Modernize and harmonize international investment and 
regional trade agreements 
• A public-private process to create a Model Investment
Agreement, using the G20 Guiding Principles for Global
Investment Policymaking and UNCTAD Investment Policy
Framework for Sustainable Development as starting
points, could seek to build common ground on various
facets of investment agreements, including state and
investor obligations. Formulated as a best practice open
for voluntary adoption, this model framework would be a
bottom-up way to spur modernization and harmonization
across the more than 3,200 existing international
investment agreements.
• Similarly, a comprehensive, open-information platform, an
RTA (regional trade agreement) Exchange, would enhance
transparency and understanding about the similarities
and differences among the more than 400 existing RTAs,
encouraging a dynamic of learning, best-practice
adoption, and cooperation to enable the alignment and
even multilateralization of subsets of various rules in a
way that reduces the de facto discrimination and trade
diversion experienced by developing countries that are not
members of the world’s major regional free-trade blocs.
Section 5: Conclusion and Next Steps for Public-Private 
Cooperation
A new global growth agenda to counteract secular stagnation 
and dispersion is possible. This strategy must primarily be 
a structural one that rebalances the growth model that has 
guided the international community for a generation by  
fostering a renewed appreciation of the crucial role that a wide 
ecosystem of both demand- and supply-side structural policies 
and institutions plays in diffusing opportunity, income, security, 
and quality of life while strengthening the resilience and even 
rate of growth.  
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Box 10: World Bank: Sustainable Value Chains and Inclusive Growth
An open global economy has been critical in reducing poverty and raising income around the globe, thanks to its key  
distinguishing feature: the flow of know-how from high-income to lower-income countries. Global Value Chain (GVC)  
integration brings growth and development, and GVCs can be a powerful engine for economic and social advancement, 
as evident from the substantial upward income mobility in China and other economies that have embraced GVC-led 
growth strategies.
Firms that have internationalized have increased their productivity and efficiency by mixing and matching comparative 
advantages from different locations.1 In developing countries, GVCs have allowed suppliers to not only increase productivity 
but also upgrade production into higher-value segments of their respective industries. The process facilitates exports and 
imports in intra-firm trade, encourages the utilization of network technology, and taps into new sources of capital.2 
Nevertheless, income growth has not translated into progress in economic and living standards for all. Research shows 
that GVC integration leads to more net jobs but lower job intensity, especially at the low-skill end, since GVC-related  
production tends to be more capital-intensive.3 Workers and smaller firms in both developed and developing countries  
have been subject to more sudden, less predictable, and less controllable economic shocks than in previous decades  
due to the ease of movement of knowledge and information.4 In many developing countries, GVCs have remained  
delinked from the local context, leading to limited improvements in jobs, living conditions, technology transfers, and  
knowledge spillovers.5  
As the world of international production matures, the need for more inclusive and sustainable models of economic 
progress is becoming apparent.6 Three enablers will help achieve progress:
• Financing: Markets in general provide less financing for SMEs and new entrepreneurs than socially desirable,
particularly in emerging markets. Hence, innovative and transnational financial instruments are necessary, as is
financing that takes into account the local know-how, pool of talent, distribution channels, business relationships,
business models, and access to technology in the assessment of repayment ability.
• Investment in people: Education and skills training, active labor-market policies, and social safety nets are key
ingredients in an effective package of policies that must complement liberalization.
• Improving the policy environment: This is imperative to encourage investment, public and private measures to
upgrade supply-side capabilities, and increase businesses’ ability to exploit new market opportunities.
While the needs are clear, concrete policy and business responses are not. To address some such information and  
coordination failures, the World Bank Group and the World Economic Forum are collaborating on a “New Vision for  
Development” aimed at advancing public-private collaboration to ensure that firms engaging in global markets can help 
create more sustainable value chains. By developing a user-friendly virtual platform and incubating a community of  
champions seeking to advance a more inclusive model of international production, this initiative aims to share and facilitate 
the adoption of innovative, evidence-based solutions, and connect public and private actors. The aim is to ensure that 
firms’ engagement in global markets – for goods, services, investment, and ideas – generates more inclusive economic 
growth and more social impact around the world. 
1 Richard Baldwin, “Trade and Industrialization after Globalization’s Second Unbundling: How Building and Joining a Supply Chain are Different and Why it Matters,” 
NBER Working Paper 17716 (2011). 
2 Daria Taglioni and Deborah Winkler, Making Global Value Chains Work for Development (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2016).
3 Cali Massimiliano and Claire Hollweg, “The Labor Content of Exports in South Africa: A Preliminary Exploration” (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2015). 
4 Richard Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University  
Press, 2016). 
5 Thomas Farole and Deborah Winkler, “The Role of Mediating Factors for FDI Spillovers in Developing Countries: Evidence from a Global Dataset,” in Making Foreign 
Direct Investment Work for Sub-Saharan Africa: Local Spillovers and Competitiveness in Global Value Chains, eds. T. Farole and D. Winkler: 56-86 (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, 2014). 
6 Cusolito Ana Paula, Raed Safadi, and Daria Taglioni, Inclusive Global Value Chains: Policy Options for Small and Medium Enterprises and Low Income Countries 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank Group and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2016). 
Box 11: Microsoft: Advancing a Technology Revolution for All
A new industrial revolution is under way. The world has entered an era of rapid transformation with amazing potential to  
not only serve business but also help address the most pressing issues of the day.1 At the heart of this revolution is  
cloud computing, where innovations are enabling the collection, storage, and analysis of data at breathtaking speed and 
scale. Such breakthroughs will surely help serve humankind, though society must remain conscious of technology’s  
disruptive potential. One question that must be asked is: How can society ensure that the benefits of the cloud are  
universally accessible and equitably shared?
The situation calls for a broad-based approach by governments, coupled with shared responsibility and action by the 
private sector. To ensure technology benefits everyone, collaboration is needed to foster a cloud that is trusted,  
responsible, and inclusive. In other words, “a cloud for global good.”2 
For this purpose, Microsoft is taking comprehensive action in partnership with governments, non-profits, and other  
organizations. One example is in the area of affordable Internet access, where there is great disparity between developed 
and developing countries.3 To help bridge this divide, the company is utilizing TV white spaces, the unused or underutilized 
spectrum frequencies, to support more than 20 affordable Internet-access projects in over 15 countries by the end of 
2017. In ongoing projects, Microsoft is seeing positive impact including improved educational results, creation of new  
businesses and jobs, and growth in the number of connected communities. 
It is also important to ensure that people everywhere have access to educational opportunities that provide the skills  
and knowledge needed to thrive in a digital economy. Microsoft Philanthropies is working with non-profits, schools,  
governments, and other businesses to improve the digital skills of people of all ages, and to make computer science 
education accessible to more young people around the world. In 2015, Microsoft made a three-year commitment of 
US$75 million to fund computer-science education programs globally. These programs have reached millions of  
youth in 60 countries, providing computational thinking and problem-solving skills that can be applied in any career,  
a greater ability to innovate, and the opportunity to pursue sought-after computer-science jobs.
Bringing the power of cloud computing to the non-profit organizations that are empowering others and addressing vital 
societal issues is a critical investment for the future. In 2016, Microsoft launched an initiative to donate US$1 billion  
of cloud services to support 70,000 non-profits worldwide over three years. It has already reached more than half  
this number, enabling a broad array of non-profits to achieve their missions with increased insight, efficiency, and impact. 
While these examples indicate significant steps forward in making the cloud more inclusive, the challenges and  
solutions are bigger than any one company can attempt. All stakeholders must work together to realize a technology 
revolution for all. 
1 See, for example, “Deep Shift – Technology Tipping Points and Societal Impact,” World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on the Future of Software  
& Society Survey Report (September 2015), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC15_Technological_Tipping_Points_report_2015.pdf.  
2 “A Cloud for Global Good – A Policy Roadmap for a Trusted, Responsible and Inclusive Cloud,” Microsoft (2016), http://www.microsoft.com/cloudforgood. 
3 ICT Data and Statistics Division, “ICT Facts & Figures” (International Telecommunication 
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Box 12: Barclays: Innovating to Deliver Shared Growth (cont’d.)Box 12: Barclays: Innovating to Deliver Shared Growth 
This Report highlights the public policy framework needed to promote inclusive economic growth, but the private  
sector also has a key role to play. Since 2012, Barclays’ Social Innovation Facility (SIF) has been fostering an environment 
conducive to social innovation across business lines and geographies with the aim of facilitating inclusive, shared  
growth for all. 
SIF incubates products throughout the development period, right from market scoping to commercialization. This enables 
Barclays to overcome common challenges to successful social innovation such as short-term planning horizons, limited 
risk appetite, and competing priorities and resources.
The facility identifies and pilots innovative approaches by discovering talent across business lines. It also works with internal 
product development teams as well as external start-up technologies through Rise, Barclays’ open-innovation platform.1  
To date, SIF has funded over 40 projects with an average financial commitment of around £600,000. These projects 
include financing of agricultural supply chains in Africa and conducting research on investor motivations for impact investing 
using Behavioral Finance expertise.2 The insights from this work have informed the development and launch of Barclays’ 
impact-investing proposition. This offering will enable clients to make investments that generate social and environmental 
impact in addition to financial returns by choosing select investment products and services.
SIF will also incubate the Barclays Women in Leadership Index, which features companies with a female CEO or with  
more than 25% female representation on corporate boards, with the aim of building awareness of the importance of 
gender parity in corporate leadership and bolstering relationships with institutional investors (see Chart 1 for a performance 
overview). In 2016, the Bank of Montreal launched a new mutual fund that tracks the Barclays North American WIL. 
Most recently, in October 2016, Barclays’ SIF funded the launch of an “Impact Series” from the Barclays research team, 
designed to explore the impact of economic, demographic, and disruptive changes on markets, sectors, and society at 
large. The inaugural report, Sustainable Investing and Bond Returns,3 explores the relationship between environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) investing and bond portfolio performance. The research shows that a high-ESG portfolio 
outperforms a low-ESG portfolio over a seven-year horizon, with the governance score leading to the strongest impact on 
performance and credit quality. 
Barclays also has a range of programs focused on digital empowerment more broadly, which will be a key driver of growth 
in the future. The Barclays Digital Development Index assesses the outcomes of digital empowerment in 10 markets across 
the globe, focusing not only on individual empowerment but also on the wider context, attitudes, and policies that can 
foster confidence in a digital world (see Chart 2 for summary country rankings; detailed Index results and underlying data 
are available online).4   
1 Barclays’ open-innovation platform, https://thinkrise.com/. 
2 Barclays Wealth and Investment Management, “The Value of Being Human: A Behavioural Framework for Impact Investing and Philanthropy” 
(September 2015), https://wealth.barclays.com/content/dam/bwpublic/global/documents/wealth_management/wp-a-behavioural-framework-for-
impact-investing-and-philanthropy.pdf.
3 Barclays Investment Bank, “Sustainable Investing and Bond Returns” (October 2016), https://www.investmentbank.barclays.com/our-insights/esg-
sustainable-investing-and-bond-returns.html.
4 Barclays Bank Plc., “From Inclusion to Empowerment: The Barclays Digital Development Index” (July 2016), https://digitalindex.barclays/.
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Germany ranks 13th on the IDI with a mostly middling  
performance across the subdimensions of the Index, but 
moving modestly in the right direction over the last five years. 
While its income inequality is somewhat average among 
advanced economies, wealth inequality is high, ranked 25th. 
GDP is also highly carbon intensive, an issue the government 
is actively working to address. The Framework shows that 
Germany has managed to keep youth unemployment low  
by European standards, while providing high median living 
standards and an economy that delivers a high share of 
income to workers. This is explained in part by the success 
of its vocational training programs in equipping workers with 
skills that the market demands. Citizens also benefit from 
strong social protection, and businesses can access the 
finance they need to develop, though new business creation 
remains muted compared with many peers. Other areas  
requiring attention include increasing participation of women 
in the workforce, improving the progressivity of the tax mix, 
and addressing regulations that protect incumbents and  
concentrate rents (thus stifling new business creation). 
Greece ranks lowest out of all 29 advanced economies on 
the IDI, while also registering the worst five-year trend in 
scores among this group. Several developing economies 
manage a higher score, which indicates how urgently reforms 
must continue as the country struggles to emerge from a 
deep economic crisis. The Framework indicates the many 
areas in which Greece must make progress to put in place 
the drivers of future growth and inclusiveness. Particular 
priorities include reforming the education and training systems 
to improve outcomes and narrow the gaps between students 
from different socioeconomic backgrounds; addressing  
high levels of corruption and red tape that are holding back 
business creation and development; and incentivizing  
companies to move out of the informal sector to create better 
employment opportunities and widen the tax base needed for 
the government’s coffers. 
Finland comes in 11th overall, its IDI score having declined 
over the last five years in part due to the slow growth of its 
already-low GDP per capita and a rising dependency ratio. 
However, it continues to perform exceptionally well across 
most areas. The Framework shows that Finland makes  
effective use of market levers to deliver greater social  
inclusion, ranking 8th in this area. It tops the rankings for 
education and training, which are characterized by both 
high quality and inclusiveness of outcomes, with only small 
differences in educational performance between students at 
different income levels. It is also ranked 1st for asset-building 
(in the form of employee stock ownerships and profit-sharing 
schemes) and does well at fostering entrepreneurship, with 
businesses facing relatively little red tape. Corruption and  
rent seeking are low, and workers receive comparatively  
generous wages. Finland could, however, improve its use 
of fiscal transfers: although the tax code is progressive and 
effective at reducing poverty and inequality, it could be less 
distortionary in terms of incentivizing work and investment. 
France is ranked 18th on the IDI, with declines across several 
areas over the past five years suggesting that efforts to promote 
social inclusion and equity have not been fully effective.  
Employment levels are low and the results related  
to intergenerational equity are of significant concern, with a 
rising dependency ratio and growing public debt putting  
future prosperity at risk. The inclusive growth Framework 
points to more weaknesses than strengths driving these  
outcomes. Strengths include excellent infrastructure and 
basic services, particularly transport and healthcare, as well 
as strong social protection, which is necessary given poor 
market outcomes. France’s weaknesses include significant 
red tape in creating or growing businesses, which applies 
brakes on employment creation; and a tax system that  
distorts incentives to work and invest. These and other 
factors have led France’s youth unemployment levels to be 
among the highest in advanced economies. 
Canada ranks 15th on the IDI, having made modest progress 
in the last five years. The country benefits from high median 
living standards, a relatively high employment rate, and a 
dependency ratio that is favorable at present. On the other 
hand, income inequality is wider compared with peers, labor 
productivity has improved slightly, and carbon intensity of 
GDP is high. The Framework shows that Canada benefits 
from reasonably strong access to finance for businesses, 
though they remain relatively small, not managing to scale as 
in some peer economies. Canada ensures strong equity of 
educational outcomes for students from all socioeconomic 
backgrounds, but formal and vocational curricula must  
continue to be adapted to the needs of a rapidly transforming 
economy. Canada’s tax code – especially property taxes–   
effectively promotes inclusivity of economic outcomes. Some 
steps that could further foster inclusivity, and which the  
government is in many cases exploring, include broadening 
family-leave policies, making child care more accessible  
and affordable to increase the participation of women in  
the workforce,and taking measures to foster greater  
entrepreneurship for new business creation and scaling. 
Denmark is ranked 5th on the IDI, driven by strong  
environmental stewardship and intergenerational equity. Its 
social protection system also fosters inclusive outcomes as 
Denmark makes effective use of fiscal transfers to correct 
the higher levels of income and wealth inequality delivered by 
market outcomes. The Framework indicators show that  
Denmark benefits from low levels of corruption, but the 
banking sector and some rents are rather concentrated as 
compared with the situation in its peer countries. It has a 
strong culture of entrepreneurship and relatively low levels of 
bureaucracy facing business creation and operations. Wage 
compensation is equitable, with a high labor share of income 
and a particularly low gender pay gap. However, it would 
benefit from higher quality and equity in its education system, 
as well as greater financial inclusion to encourage business 
investment. 
Advanced Economies 
Countries in the advanced economy category are best  
positioned to ensure inclusive growth, as they have the  
greatest financial means and generally sophisticated markets 
and economic frameworks. Yet the extent to which they  
succeed varies widely. The Nordic countries, Switzerland, 
New Zealand, and Canada do comparatively well, while  
others such as the United States, France, and several countries 
in Southern and Eastern Europe fall short in many areas. 
Australia ranks 8th among all countries on the Inclusive 
Development Index (IDI), reflecting its strong growth and 
intergenerational equity. The country is also delivering quite 
well in terms of intergenerational equity but could do more to 
broaden the distribution of income and wealth. The Framework 
indicates that Australia’s economy is particularly characterized 
by strong asset-building, entrepreneurship, and new business 
creation (ranked 3rd among advanced economies). This is 
thanks to its supportive regulatory framework and lack of 
red tape, as well as healthy access to finance for business 
creation and development. Access to education is excellent, 
though its quality could be improved, as could the equity of 
outcomes for students from different income levels. There 
is also scope to increase the participation of women in the 
workforce, for example through more affordable child care, 
which could help to lower the high rates of temporary and 
involuntary part-time employment. Australia could also make 
further use of fiscal transfers, improving the generosity of 
social protection benefits, to ensure more equitable outcomes 
from growth.
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Singapore is not ranked on the IDI because data is unavailable 
on poverty and median incomes. On other measures, it 
scores well on intergenerational equity and recent per-capita 
growth, but less well on income inequality as well as the 
extent to which the economy is carbon intensive. The  
Framework ranks Singapore low among all advanced  
economies on its use of taxes and transfers to tackle its high 
levels of income inequality. Singapore has many strengths 
to build on, however: rigorous business and political ethics 
(ranked 3rd); an excellent education system (with top scores 
in PISA Reading and Math)1 catering well to students from 
lower-income backgrounds; and strong entrepreneurship 
supported by excellent access to capital (scoring well   
on financial intermediation for real economy investment).  
Unemployment is extremely low at 3%, as is youth  
unemployment at 7%. However, the country ranks poorly on 
female participation in the labor force and the economy would 
benefit from narrowing the gender pay gap. Another priority 
is finding ways to translate productivity gains into pay rises 
– the share of national income going to labor, as opposed to 
capital, is relatively low and declining.  
Spain ranks 26th among the 29 advanced economies on the 
IDI, with a score that has worsened over the last five years. 
This reflects slow GDP per capita growth as well as high 
income inequality and poverty, with median living standards 
worsening in recent years. The Framework shows that the 
positives for Spain include relatively strong infrastructure  
and improving basic services, particularly transport and 
healthcare. Its challenges include a relatively low-quality 
education system which does little to lift up students from 
underprivileged socioeconomic backgrounds; high  
unemployment, particularly among the youth; and a large  
informal sector. Creating high-quality employment opportunities 
will depend on making it easier and more financially viable 
to start new enterprises. Improving access to information 
technology could help.
Norway tops the IDI, with improvements over the last five 
years reflecting its success in following a clearly articulated 
policy to pursue inclusiveness in its growth process. Median 
living standards are high and rising, while inequality is the 
lowest among advanced economies after taxes and transfers. 
The Framework shows that in particular, the country  
benefits from strong use of market levers to promote  
equitable outcomes while keeping social protection effective. 
Norway’s strengths include a high degree of social mobility, 
low unemployment, and high female labor force participation 
– with generous policies on parental leave and affordable  
child care that keep talented women and parents in the  
workforce. Strong collective bargaining protects workers’ 
rights. Nonetheless, even in Norway there is some room for 
improvement – the education system could do more to  
prepare the workforce for a rapidly changing economy. 
Fostering a greater culture of entrepreneurship would inject 
further dynamism into the economy. 
The Republic of Korea ranks 14th overall on the IDI with 
measureable improvements over the last five years, despite 
recent political turmoil. The country does especially well  
on intergenerational equity – with high savings rates,  
significant spending on education, and favorable demographics. 
However, Korea suffers from elevated poverty rates despite 
impressive employment levels – potentially related to the low 
overall number of citizens in the labor force as women’s  
participation is among the lowest in advanced economies. 
This is also likely related to an exceptionally high pay gap  
between men and women. Among the country’s strengths 
is its excellent education system which delivers relatively 
equitable outcomes. Areas of concern include rent-seeking 
behavior among those in power, and a regulatory system 
that perpetuates the concentration of rents within a limited 
number of large, family-run companies. The country could do 
more to promote inclusiveness through its social protection 
system, including healthcare.
The Netherlands comes in 7th overall on the IDI, with  
relatively low income inequality and poverty, as well as an  
ability to provide reasonably high median living standards.  
The Framework shows that the country benefits from  
top-notch basic infrastructure and health services, as well as 
an education and training system that does a reasonably 
good job of ensuring that student performance is not  
hindered by socioeconomic background. The country also 
benefits from strong business creation, which is powered 
by a culture of entrepreneurship, strong asset-building, and 
generally good access to finance. While social protection is a 
strength, the tax system could do more to further inclusivity – 
notably through a more progressive income tax and a higher 
capital tax. 
New Zealand owes its overall 9th position on the IDI in 
large part to low level of debt, high employment rate, and 
a lack of wealth inequality compared with peers. While its 
level of income inequality is among the worst in all advanced 
economies (27th rank among 29 countries), this is managed 
through a strong system of progressive redistribution. The 
Framework shows that New Zealand’s strong points include 
little red tape around business creation (ranked 1st), strong 
business and political ethics (2nd), and easy availability of 
financial intermediation for real economy investment (1st).  
The country also manages to foster greater inclusivity through 
its tax code and social protection schemes without distorting 
the market, ranking 8th on this measure. Opportunities to 
make growth even more inclusive include a focus on  
ensuring more equitable outcomes in the education system 
for students from various socioeconomic backgrounds, and 
vocational training that is more effective at linking vulnerable 
people with productive employment opportunities. 
Italy, a country in the midst of some political instability, ranks 
27th out of the 29 advanced economies on the IDI, with its 
overall score having deteriorated over the last five years.  
This particularly reflects poor performance in terms of growth, 
employment, and intergenerational equity, with a high  
debt-to-GDP ratio potentially weighing on future generations. 
There are also high levels of exclusion in the economy – Italy 
ranks a low 21st on levels of poverty and inequality. The 
Framework shows that Italy’s social protection system does 
not start to address these concerns as it is neither particularly 
generous nor especially efficient. Italy also suffers from  
pervasive corruption and concerns about business and  
political ethics. Entrepreneurship is constrained by poor 
access to finance – an issue also related to low levels of 
research and patenting activity – limiting job creation and 
growth. In this context, unemployment, involuntary part-time 
work, informality, and vulnerable employment remain high, 
even as women’s participation in the workforce is extremely 
low and the gender pay gap is high. Further, there is little 
social mobility, indicated by the high intergenerational  
persistence in wage differentials. 
Japan ranks a low 24th on the IDI among advanced  
economies. Some of its clear strengths are the longest 
healthy-life expectancy and relatively low wealth concentration. 
On the other hand, the country struggles with high poverty, 
with 16% of households earning less than half the median 
income. In addition, high debt and an increasingly high 
dependency ratio – in both cases the worst among advanced 
economies – point to a lack of intergenerational equity as a 
major concern. The Framework shows that despite these 
poor outcomes, Japan still gets a lot of the basics right:  
education is equitable and of high quality, whose outcomes 
feed into a highly-skilled workforce that benefits from low 
levels of informality and unemployment. Areas of concern 
include the gender gap – more affordable child care could 
incentivize greater participation of women in the workforce, 
which will be critical for the country given its growing  
demographic challenges. Despite having a high level of  
patenting activity, technological readiness, and private  
spending on research and development, Japan registers  
relatively few new businesses – which could be related to 
administrative barriers, or negative attitudes toward  
entrepreneurial failure. Promoting a stronger culture of  
entrepreneurship will also be important for driving more  
dynamism in the economy.
1 Program for International Student Assessment, the triennial international survey 
which aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing the skills  
and knowledge of 15-year-old students, https://www.oecd.org/pisa/aboutpisa/.
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Chile ranks 10th on the IDI, with its score of 4.46 up by 
2.07% in the last five years and reflecting good performance 
across a range of indicators. It tops the rankings for  
healthy-life expectancy (70.5 years) in its income group, 
and comes second only to Lithuania in GDP per capita. It 
achieves top-10 rankings in labor productivity, median living 
standards, and debt-to-GDP ratio. The Framework shows 
that in terms of strengths driving inclusive growth, Chile has 
been able to develop world-class infrastructure and basic 
services, and has markedly improved access to education 
over the years. In order to improve further, it must focus on 
delivering more equitable education outcomes regardless 
of socioeconomic background, reduce the extent of market 
dominance by a handful of firms, and make taxation more 
progressive and social security more comprehensive. 
China comes in 15th among the developing economies on 
the IDI, but has seen improvements across a number of  
indicators in the last five years. China’s score has increased 
by 1.65% during this time, placing it 20th among 79 countries 
in terms of progress, despite relatively strong growth in 
GDP per capita and labor productivity. China has one of 
the highest carbon intensities of GDP among developing 
economies (ranking 67th), and wealth inequality has risen to 
extremely high levels. The Framework indicates that in terms 
of strengths, employment outcomes remain strong, thanks 
to reasonably vigorous competition, entrepreneurship, and 
business creation. Going forward, key priority areas include 
investment in productive infrastructure, and improvements  
in healthcare and access to education. Although the  
country has seen a significant reduction in poverty over recent 
decades, China could do more through an enhanced social 
safety net and targeted fiscal transfers. 
Upper-Middle Income Countries 
The upper-middle income category includes several countries 
from Latin America and Eastern Europe, as well as a handful 
in Asia and Africa. It includes all the BRICS except for India 
(Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa). Nearing the income 
levels of advanced economies, these countries have  
considerable resources at their disposal, but their growth and 
development processes vary in the level of inclusiveness. 
Argentina ranks 11th out of the 79 developing countries on 
the Inclusive Development Index (IDI), with its score (4.43 
out of 7) representing a slight decrease (0.11%) from five 
years ago. While GDP per capita remains somewhat low and 
the poverty rate is relatively high for a country at its level of 
development, income and wealth inequality indicators show 
that inequality is not as significant a concern as in many other 
countries. Looking at the seven areas of the Framework,  
or the “inputs” into inclusive growth and development,  
Argentina’s strong points include relatively good basic services, 
especially health; a progressive taxation system; and  
good social protection. The country has registered small 
improvements in the quality of education, employment,  
and labor compensation, as well as in asset-building and  
entrepreneurship. However, red tape still makes it hard to  
create companies, while access to finance remains difficult 
and corruption levels high. Argentina needs to create more 
new businesses to reduce unemployment, particularly among 
the youth, and improve its infrastructure. 
Brazil is 30th on the IDI, having weakened somewhat over 
the last five years. Brazil continues to benefit from relatively 
low unemployment, though formalizing the significant informal 
sector would bring in more tax revenue that could be spent 
on basic services and infrastructure – an imperative given 
that the country ranks close to the bottom on the public debt 
indicator (68th). Its economy is becoming more carbon  
intensive, ranking 65th on the trend for developing economies. 
The Framework indicators show that to make growth more  
inclusive, the education system must be upgraded, particularly 
so that young people from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds, 
currently doing less well, can benefit from a level playing field. 
Healthcare affordability and access must also be addressed. 
Corruption remains a major problem, undermining trust  
in the system and making it more difficult to achieve many 
development goals. 
The United States, despite being a global economic and 
innovation powerhouse, ranks only 23rd on the IDI. Although 
the country has grown rather rapidly in recent years, it is 
among the three advanced economies with the highest levels 
of poverty and income inequality. Median household income 
has been on a downward trend, though there has been a 
slight improvement in the past couple of years. Its high  
levels of debt call into question its fiscal sustainability.  
The Framework shows that the US does have some strong 
foundations for improving inclusiveness – it enables strong 
asset-building and entrepreneurship, with easy access to 
capital and other supporting conditions for business creation. 
However, several areas require attention. Policy reform on 
parental leave and affordable child care could improve  
participation of women in the workforce and deepen the talent 
pool. Higher wages could also help to boost consumption 
which has been constrained since the financial crisis. While 
taxes on inheritance, property, and capital have some effect 
on inequality, the tax code remains comparatively regressive 
by not levying taxes on those best able to contribute. The 
United States has a less comprehensive social-safety net than 
many other advanced economies, constraining not only living 
standards but also some risk-taking critical for innovation. 
Switzerland follows Norway and Luxembourg on the overall 
IDI, ranking 3rd on the back of robust growth and employment, 
high median living standards, strong environmental  
stewardship, and a fair degree of intergenerational equity. 
Among Switzerland’s many strong points are good basic 
services and infrastructure, particularly ground transport and  
healthcare; lack of corruption; and a vigorous vocational  
education system that contributes to high levels of social  
mobility. More could be done, however, to reduce inequality 
and distribute gains from growth more fairly – the country’s 
capital and property taxes help to reallocate income, but its 
concentration of wealth is among the highest in advanced 
economies. Other points where improvement could be  
made include increasing the talent pool by making child  
care more affordable and narrowing the gender pay gap. 
The dynamism of the economy would be boosted by greater 
entrepreneurship through efforts such as improving access  
to finance for small, non-financial corporations. 
The United Kingdom comes in 21st on the IDI. Its median  
living standards have declined over the last several years, and 
it scores relatively low on health-adjusted life expectancy 
(24th rank), income inequality (22nd), and measures of 
intergenerational equity such as adjusted net savings. The 
UK’s efforts to deliver inclusive growth show a mixed picture. 
Its strengths include relatively vigorous business creation, 
supported by access to finance – both important drivers of 
new employment and growth –though it is not yet clear what 
impact the recent Brexit referendum will have on investment. 
The country also makes good use of the tax code – including 
property, inheritance, and progressive income taxes –  
to make economic outcomes more equitable. However, it 
needs to improve the education system to better prepare the 
workforce, address youth unemployment, and fix low levels 
of social mobility. Ensuring better access to quality healthcare 
for all is also a priority, as is increasing the participation of 
women in the labor force, for example through improved labor 
protection and better access to affordable child care. 
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Lower-Middle Income Countries 
Countries in the lower-middle income category have sufficient 
income to lift much of the population above subsistence level, 
but only some countries have managed to do so – in many 
cases, inequality of wealth and income remains a significant 
challenge. These countries must work both on enhancing 
productivity to create conditions for growth, and on ensuring 
that growth is broad-based and inclusive. This category 
includes several South Asian economies, and a number of 
countries from sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region. 
Egypt has a score of 2.94, placing it 73rd among the 79 
developing economies on the IDI. The country struggles with 
many aspects of inclusive growth. Over five years, its GDP 
per capita and labor productivity have barely grown. Income 
and wealth inequality remain high. Unemployment is also 
high, especially among the young, and the dependency ratio 
is increasing, meaning that more and more people who  
are not in the workforce need to be supported by ever fewer 
workers. Egypt also suffers from an extremely high  
debt-to-GDP ratio and high carbon intensity of GDP,  
placing the future at risk. The Framework indicates that the 
education system does not reach a sufficient proportion  
of the population and that quality is lacking. Despite a  
history of entrepreneurship, business and employment  
creation remain constrained by insufficient finance, poor 
transport infrastructure, and pervasive corruption.  
Many workers are in vulnerable employment situations,  
often in the informal economy.
El Salvador is ranked 41st out of the 79 developing countries 
on the IDI with a score of 4.00. Even though inequality and 
poverty rates are lower than many peers, debt levels have 
been on the rise, putting future growth at risk. The Framework 
indicators show that to further enhance inclusive growth,  
it will be critical to upgrade education and provide better 
healthcare. El Salvador must also urgently work toward 
increasing the dynamism of its economy, for example by 
streamlining bureaucratic procedures and improving access 
to financing. 
Turkey’s score of 4.30 places it 20th on the IDI. It has the 
highest labor productivity among this group, high GDP per 
capita and living standards, and low poverty. In terms of 
Framework indicators these good outcomes are driven by 
strengths such as relatively high competition among  
companies, which ensures that large individual firms do not 
dominate the economy and stifle activity. Turkey also benefits 
from a fairly sophisticated financial sector, which adds to this 
business dynamism by providing investment. On the other 
hand, the unemployment rate is somewhat high, particularly 
among the young. This points to the continuing need to 
strengthen the education system, especially to make  
outcomes more equitable for students from all income 
groups. Expanding female participation in the labor force is 
also a priority, alongside reducing the wide gender gap in pay.
Venezuela ranks 26th among the 79 developing economies 
on the IDI, and its GDP per capita, while still relatively high, 
is decreasing at one of the fastest rates among developing 
economies. Venezuela’s natural capital is quickly depleting 
and its labor productivity has not grown in over five years.  
Additionally, despite much talk about providing more  
equitable outcomes, wealth inequality in the country is high.  
In terms of Framework indicators, corruption is widespread, 
and many Venezuelans have been driven to work in the 
informal sector. The quality of education is poor, not providing 
students with the skills needed for an economy undergoing 
rapid changes. Further, infrastructure is underdeveloped  
and the country struggles to provide even the most basic  
services to its citizens. Low levels of business activity  
reflect bureaucratic barriers and a lack of capital available  
for investment, even as employment has barely grown in  
five years. 
Poland ranks 4th among developing economies on the IDI, 
its high score of 4.57 reflecting strengths in GDP per capita, 
labor productivity, healthy-life expectancy, and median living 
standards, in addition to relatively low poverty and inequality. 
In terms of Framework results, Poland tops the education and 
skills pillar: education and training are of comparatively good 
quality, and outcomes are relatively equitable among students 
from different income groups. The country also has the  
strongest social protection system among peers, though  
its tax system would benefit from reforms to strengthen  
incentives to work and invest. Investments must also  
be made in critical areas such as infrastructure and basic  
services, particularly healthcare. 
The Russian Federation is ranked 13th among developing 
economies on the IDI. Its median living standard is relatively 
high compared with other emerging economies, and its 
poverty rate is low by developing-country standards. Its 
unemployment rate is also comparatively low, though youth 
unemployment is significant and many people are forced to 
work in the informal sector. The education system is universal 
and fosters reasonably equitable outcomes, though its quality 
must be improved to better confront the realities of a rapidly 
changing economy. Another area for improvement is financial 
intermediation, especially providing more financing for small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), a sector that would benefit 
likewise from less red tape in starting and growing a business. 
A more progressive tax code and expanded social safety net 
would also improve Russia’s ability to deliver a more inclusive 
growth process to its citizens. 
South Africa ranks 70th among developing economies on 
the IDI, despite having the 19th-highest GDP per capita  
in this group – a difference that represents significant  
underperformance on other factors key to socioeconomic 
well-being. Its healthy-life expectancy is just 54.4 years,  
placing South Africa 66th out of 79 countries, while its  
employment rate is the lowest of all countries bar Mauritania 
and Jordan. South Africa also suffers from extremely high 
income inequality, wealth inequality, and carbon intensity of 
GDP. Developing talent by improving the low level of tertiary 
enrollment would help to capitalize on the strength of the 
highly developed financial system and the country’s  
entrepreneurial culture. 
Costa Rica is 9th on the IDI among developing economies. 
It is second only to Chile in terms of healthy-life expectancy 
(69.8 years), and its median living standard is high. On the 
other hand, inequality is of concern as the country appears in 
the bottom 15 developing countries for its income Gini. With 
regard to the Framework indicators, among the strengths of 
Costa Rica are the relatively good provision of basic services 
including sanitation and clean drinking water, and relatively 
high-quality and accessible healthcare. However, further 
improvement is needed in upgrading transportation  
infrastructure and enhancing access to education. The 
country could also improve incentives to work and invest via 
a more progressive and less distortionary tax system, while 
business creation and growth would benefit from more  
developed financial markets and better access to capital. 
Malaysia ranks 16th on the IDI for developing economies, 
scoring 4.39. The country benefits from strong labor productivity 
and relatively high median living standards, though its wealth 
Gini indicates that inequality is of some concern and the high 
debt-to-GDP ratio indicates that the country could be putting 
future prosperity at risk. The Framework indicators show 
that Malaysia’s strong performance is underpinned by quality 
infrastructure and basic services, including good healthcare 
on a par with many advanced economies; and by banks and 
equity markets that provide businesses with reliable access to 
financial resources, helping boost business development and 
entrepreneurship. In terms of further enhancing the ability of 
the country to grow inclusively, the education system should 
provide quality education to all and the social safety net could 
be developed further. 
Mexico ranks 29th on the IDI with a score of 4.13. This middling 
result has not changed much in recent years, in part driven  
by slow growth in GDP per capita and labor productivity since 
2011. Inequality remains high, with the country ranked 62nd 
among developing economies. These and other indicators 
show that Mexico could do more to achieve a more inclusive 
growth process. The Framework indicates that youth  
unemployment, in particular, remains somewhat high at close 
to 10%, which is more than double the rate for the general 
population. This emphasizes the need to improve vocational 
and on-the-job training as well as, more generally, upgrading 
the education system to ensure greater equity of outcomes 
regardless of socioeconomic background. Mexico must also 
do more to boost its resources to invest in these areas,  
especially as the tax base remains constrained by the large 
size of the informal sector. Further, corruption and security 
concerns undermine confidence in the system. 
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Tunisia ranks 44th on the IDI, having seen a decline over the 
last five years. It ranks well on the equity pillar, given its  
relatively good outcomes in the areas of poverty elimination, 
reduction of income and wealth inequality, and improvement 
in median living standards. On the other hand, its employment 
rate is low (41.3%), and its adjusted net savings rate signals  
a need to invest more in the future. The Framework  
indicates that Tunisia’s basic services, in particular its  
healthcare system, are relatively good for a lower-middle 
income country. Yet the education system is not delivering 
sufficiently high-quality outcomes and is failing to reach  
many young people. This helps to explain why youth  
unemployment is high. The informal sector remains large,  
and Tunisia needs to do more to unleash markets to create 
new businesses and jobs. 
Ukraine ranks 47th on the IDI, scoring measurably lower than 
it did five years ago. Continuing hostilities in the east of the 
country are possibly rolling back some progress, as they  
disproportionately affect the least well-off, driving talented 
people to leave the country for opportunities elsewhere. 
Ukraine has a low dependency ratio (43.3%), but performs 
poorly on all other measures of intergenerational equity. It 
also has one of the highest levels of wealth inequality of all 
developing countries. On the positive side, it has low income 
inequality and poverty. The Framework indicates that its 
education system is supportive of inclusive growth, with high 
enrollment rates and equitable outcomes for students across 
socioeconomic levels. The middle class remains large, and 
good healthcare and unemployment benefits help Ukraine 
rank first in its income group on social protection. Priorities 
should include improvement in vocational training, reduction 
of the administrative burden on new business creation,  
expansion of finance for entrepreneurs, and enhanced focus 
on tackling corruption. 
Nigeria has the resources and entrepreneurial environment to 
build an inclusive economy, but has not yet done so, ranking 
71st of 79 developing economies on the IDI, with its score on 
a downward trend over the past five years. Life expectancy 
is under 48 years – one of the lowest among all countries 
covered – the poverty rate is high, and living standards are 
among the lowest in developing economies. Nigeria’s  
dependency ratio is in the bottom 10, with too few workers 
supporting too many people not in the workforce. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the country’s economy is becoming highly 
carbon intensive. The Framework shows that Nigeria faces a 
number of challenges in addressing these issues. Educational 
enrollment and quality are poor, and participation in the labor 
force is quite low, even as the informal sector is large. The 
country also suffers from poor infrastructure and a lack of 
basic services, with corruption and diversion of public funds 
making it difficult for the government to deliver public goods. 
Despite a relatively entrepreneurial environment, Nigeria  
is not yet able to ensure growth that is sustainable and  
broad-based. 
The Philippines has seen a mild decline in its IDI score over 
the past five years, with a score of 4.00 placing it 40th  
among 79 developing economies. GDP per capita and 
labor productivity are both growing, but poverty and wealth 
inequalities remain high. The Framework shows that access 
to education has widened, but the quality of education must 
be improved. The country could reduce its high levels of 
inequality by upgrading infrastructure and improving provision 
of basic services. Corruption and security concerns are  
also highly problematic for the proper functioning of the 
economy and for business creation, which is also hindered  
by burdensome red tape.
Thailand has seen a mild improvement in the inclusiveness 
of its growth and development, with a score of 4.42 placing 
it 12th on the IDI. The country has some good foundations in 
the shape of high employment, low poverty, and good living 
standards, though wealth inequality is increasing, indicating 
room to improve market mechanisms for delivering inclusion. 
The Framework indicates that while the quality of education 
has declined somewhat, it remains good relative to peers, 
with high enrollment rates. Female labor force participation is 
also high, though paid maternity leave could be extended.  
Efforts should be made to encourage greater entrepreneurship 
and business creation in order to bring workers from the 
informal economy into the formal sector. Doing so would 
widen the tax base that would allow the country to reinforce 
its social protection system. 
Indonesia has a relatively high IDI score of 4.29, placing it 
22nd on the Index. Its performance has benefited from good 
labor productivity growth and a reduction in poverty, though 
both income and wealth inequality are high. The country has 
a low debt-to-GDP ratio compared with its peers. As per the 
Framework indicators, Indonesia could raise needed revenues 
for building infrastructure and providing basic services by 
making its tax system more progressive. The education  
system offers good quality, though enrollment levels need  
to be raised. Unemployment is low overall, but youth  
unemployment is over 30% and women’s participation in the 
labor force remains low, limiting the talent available in  
the workforce. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has seen a decline in the  
inclusiveness of growth, losing over 1.54% in its score in the 
last five years, but still ranks 21st among the 79 developing 
economies on the IDI. The country has strong labor  
productivity relative to its peers, as well as high healthy-life 
expectancy, low dependency ratio, and manageable  
debt-to-GDP. The decline in score has mainly been attributed 
to drops in GDP per capita and labor productivity, as well as 
low employment and rising wealth inequality. The middle class 
remains comparatively large, but has been shrinking.  
Employment levels are extremely low (rank 76) and Iran’s 
economy has one of the highest levels of carbon intensity in 
the world (rank 75). The Framework shows that in terms of 
addressing some of its challenges, Iran makes good use  
of fiscal transfers for more equitable outcomes, with a  
progressive taxation system that provides resources  
needed for the country’s relatively high spending on social 
protection. Priority areas include tackling gender gaps in 
education, employment, and health; and formalizing informal 
economic activity, for example by making it easier to start  
and grow a business.
Jordan ranks 54th among 79 developing economies with an 
IDI score of 3.50. The country’s employment rate is among 
the lowest globally, and joblessness reaches almost 30% 
among the youth. Jordan’s labor productivity and median  
living standards are comparatively high; and income and 
wealth inequality are comparatively low. With regard to the 
areas measured in the Framework, infrastructure is  
well-developed; and basic services such as sanitation  
and healthcare are relatively good. On the other hand, the 
education system is not accessible for sufficient numbers of 
young people, and the country should make efforts to bring 
more female talent into the workforce. In addition, the tax 
 system would be more supportive of inclusive growth if it 
were more progressive.
Ghana’s IDI score of 3.50 places it 55th out of 79 developing 
economies. It has run up an exceedingly high debt-to-GDP 
ratio in recent years, continues to have a very high poverty 
rate, and is not sufficiently protecting its natural capital. On 
the other hand, labor productivity and employment, while 
still somewhat low, have grown over the last five years. The 
Framework indicates, however, that youth unemployment 
remains quite high, pointing to the need for further improving 
the quality of education as well as the equity of outcomes 
across socioeconomic backgrounds. Ghana must improve 
its infrastructure and healthcare system. The country has 
the advantage of relatively low corruption compared with its 
peers, and the recently-elected government has vowed to 
tackle it further. Reductions in the administrative burden on 
entrepreneurs would also significantly improve the business 
environment.
India, with a score of only 3.38, ranks 60th among the 79  
developing economies on the IDI, despite the fact that its 
growth in GDP per capita is among the top 10 and labor 
productivity growth has been strong. Poverty has also been 
falling, albeit from a high level. On the other hand, its  
debt-to-GDP ratio is high, raising some questions about the 
sustainability of government spending. With regard to  
Framework indicators, educational enrollment rates are  
relatively low across all levels, and quality varies greatly,  
leading to notable differences in performance among  
students from different socioeconomic backgrounds.  
While unemployment is not as high as in some other  
countries, the labor force participation rate is low, the informal 
economy is large, and many workers are in vulnerable  
employment situations with little room for social mobility.  
A more progressive tax system would help raise capital for 
expenditure on infrastructure, healthcare, basic services,  
and education. India scores well in terms of access to finance 
for business development and real economy investment. 
However, new business creation continues to be held back  
by corruption, underdeveloped infrastructure, and the  
large administrative burden involved in starting and running 
companies.
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Tanzania ranks 51st among the 79 developing countries on 
the IDI. It has low GDP per capita, low labor productivity,  
and low median living standards, with much of the population 
still below poverty level. Healthy-life expectancy is only  
54.2 years and the country has a high dependency ratio. 
However, inequality in net income and wealth is relatively low. 
The Framework indicates that in its income group, Tanzania 
outperforms all other countries in asset-building and  
entrepreneurship. Its unemployment rate is relatively low,  
and the rate of female participation in the workforce is high 
while the gender pay gap is narrow. However, corruption  
and access to finance remain problematic for business 
development, and many workers are subsisting in vulnerable 
employment. Access to education is expanding, but quality 
needs to be improved as differences in performance  
outcomes persist across income groups, particularly in 
secondary school. Other priority areas for Tanzania include 
upgrading infrastructure and basic services. 
Zimbabwe ranks 61st among developing countries on the 
IDI, faring poorly on indicators including GDP per capita, labor 
productivity, and healthy-life expectancy. The country boasts 
a high employment rate but will need to create many new 
jobs for a growing youth bulge. The dependency ratio is  
striking at 80.4 youth and elderly per 100 workers. The 
Framework shows that its strengths include a narrow gender 
gap in education and health, and a nominally progressive 
tax code. However, use of tax revenues is compromised 
by corruption, with poor corporate and government ethics 
and a high concentration of rents accruing to a small elite. 
The country’s net-income Gini is among the world’s highest. 
Zimbabwe does a decent job of getting children into primary 
school, but secondary and tertiary rates lag behind those of 
many low-income economies, and the quality of the overall 
education system is in great need of improvement. Many 
workers remain entrenched in poverty, and businesses face 
bureaucratic barriers in accessing finance and getting  
business done more generally. Much is needed in Zimbabwe 
to enable a more inclusive growth and development process. 
Kenya ranks 65th on the IDI, with its performance declining 
somewhat over 4% in the last five years. Kenya has  
comparatively low labor productivity and GDP per capita, as 
well as a high dependency ratio. Wealth inequality has  
worsened considerably over the years. On the other hand,  
it has a larger middle class than most countries in this group. 
The Framework indicates that businesses have relatively good 
access to bank and equity finance, and the quality of the  
education system is reasonably good, though it needs to 
reach more students and generate more equitable outcomes 
to tackle high unemployment (9.2%) and shrink the  
informal sector. Access to basic services and infrastructure 
also needs to be developed: 43% of Kenya’s population uses 
the Internet, but only 23% have access to electricity, 30% to 
sanitation, and 63% to drinking water. Other priorities include 
reducing red tape and tackling rampant corruption. 
Nepal ranks 27th on the IDI, showing remarkable improvement 
over the last five years. Notably, its poverty rate has declined 
by 25 percentage points in this time, and its income inequality 
(net income Gini) by almost 8 points. It outperforms all  
others on the intergenerational equity pillar during the most 
recent year, and has relatively low unemployment, including 
youth unemployment, and strong female participation in the 
workforce. However, it does poorly on GDP per capita and 
labor productivity. The Framework indicates that the informal 
sector remains large and wages low, leaving many workers 
in poverty. Priority areas include tackling corruption and 
administrative barriers to starting and growing a business, as 
well as continuing to improve infrastructure and basic services 
including education – particularly the availability and quality of 
vocational training. 
Rwanda has seen a decline in its performance over the last 
five years, ranking 68th among the 79 developing countries 
on the IDI. Its scores on GDP per capita, labor productivity, 
net income and wealth Ginis, poverty rate, and median living 
standards are low. On the other hand, Rwanda does well in 
other areas: the employment rate is 85%, second only to  
Tanzania among developing countries; it has a high  
female labor force participation rate and good social mobility. 
The Framework shows that among low-income countries, 
Rwanda benefits from excellent business and political ethics 
(ranked 1st), having taken effective measures to combat 
corruption and bribery. Businesses also have relatively good 
access to finance. In order to make the economy more  
inclusive, Rwanda must continue to invest in infrastructure 
improvements and upgrade the education system to  
nsure not only access but also quality teaching and equity  
of outcomes.
Cambodia ranks 43rd on the IDI, with hardly any change  
on aggregate over the last five years. The country benefits 
from high employment, though labor productivity remains  
low, despite some improvement over the last five years.  
The Framework shows that Cambodia tops its income group 
on intermediation of business investment, and its basic 
infrastructure and services are better than most of its peers. 
However, it spends less on education as a percentage of 
GDP than most peers, and indeed both enrollment rates  
and quality of education and vocational training need  
improvement. Cambodia would also benefit from better  
infrastructure and basic services, particularly healthcare.
Chad ranks 62nd of 79 developing countries, with its overall 
performance having deteriorated over the last five years 
from an already low base. It outperforms other developing 
countries in one area – carbon intensity of GDP – but severely 
lags behind in many others, including GDP per capita and 
the dependency ratio. Healthy-life expectancy, at 46.1 years, 
is lower than all countries bar Sierra Leone, and 65% of  
the population lives below the poverty line – though this  
represents a reduction of almost 20 percentage points over  
the last five years. The Framework indicates that only half  
the population has access to drinking water and 12% to  
sanitation. Education is far from delivering needed benefits: 
on average, pupils attain only 1.5 years of low-quality  
schooling, and lack the skills for even basic economic  
activities. Infrastructure and basic services remain rudimentary. 
Yet it is not only in the investment-heavy areas where Chad  
is holding back the inclusiveness of its growth process.  
With regard to legislation, it is harder to start a business in 
Chad than almost anywhere, massively constraining business 
and job growth, and resulting in a large informal economy. 
The rate of vulnerable employment is among the highest  
in the world. 
Vietnam ranks 25th on the IDI, its performance having  
deteriorated slightly over the last five years despite a significant 
reduction in poverty over that time. It benefits from a low  
dependency ratio and relatively high employment, though 
youth unemployment is somewhat higher, pointing to the 
need to improve the quality of education and increase enrollment 
at all levels. The Framework indicates that it is harder to start 
a business or enforce a contract in Vietnam than in peer 
economies, and an underdeveloped financial sector makes  
it difficult for businesses to obtain financing. Improvements 
are needed in infrastructure and basic services such as 
healthcare, where out-of-pocket expenses remain high.  
Police services also need to be reformed to better tackle 
security challenges. 
Low Income Countries 
Most countries in the low income category are in sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia, with a few from other developing 
regions. Many have relatively low levels of inequality, but 
also low income overall with living standards for much of the 
population barely above subsistence level. Efforts are needed 
in many areas to generate the productivity and growth 
necessary to underpin inclusive economies, including poverty 
alleviation and improved public services such as healthcare, 
education, and training. 
Bangladesh ranks 36th out of 79 developing economies 
on the IDI. It has improved GDP per capita and reduced 
public debt over the last five years, but wealth inequality has 
increased substantially. The Framework indicates that one 
of Bangladesh’s strengths is better access to finance from 
banks and the equity market than most other countries at the 
same income level. However, business development is held 
back by red tape and rampant corruption, with many driven 
to do business in the large informal economy. Infrastructure 
and basic services are in dire need of improvement, as is the 
education system – enrollment rates at primary level are low, 
quality of education is poor, and lower-income students do 
particularly badly, thereby perpetuating inequality. 
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Note: IDI scores are based on a 1-7 scale: 1=worst
and 7=best. Trends are based on percentage
change between 2011 and 2015 (using indicators
available during both years). Advanced and  
developing economy IDI scores are not strictly  
comparable due to different definitions of poverty.
Several countries are not covered due to missing
sub-pillar data including Singapore and Algeria
as well as Jordan, Zimbabwe, Egypt and Yemen
which were missing historic trend data on inclusion
related indicators. 
 Norway 6.02 1 2 1.87 6 18
 Luxembourg 5.86 2 1 -2.49 23 17
 Switzerland 5.75 3 3 1.85 7 21
 Iceland 5.48 4 13 4.58 1 6
 Denmark 5.31 5 4 1.03 9 25
 Sweden 5.30 6 6 -0.84 20 13
 Netherlands 5.28 7 10 -1.69 21 23
 Australia 5.18 8 7 0.29 13 14
New Zealand 5.09 9 20 3.75 2 8
 Austria 5.05 10 12 0.28 14 19
 Finland 5.04 11 14 -3.10 24 27
 Ireland 5.01 12 5 2.28 4 2
 Germany 4.99 13 15 1.91 5 7
Korea, Rep. 4.95 14 24 1.44 8 3
 Canada 4.90 15 11 0.59 12 15
 Belgium 4.89 16 16 -0.71 19 24
Slovak Republic 4.88 17 29 -0.11 15 4
 France 4.83 18 18 -1.94 22 22
Czech Republic 4.78 19 28 0.89 10 12
 Slovenia 4.75 20 25 -6.13 27 20
United Kingdom 4.69 21 19 -0.61 17 9
 Estonia 4.52 22 30 -0.36 16 1
United States 4.44 23 9 0.71 11 11
Japan 4.36 24 17  -0.61 18 16
 Israel 4.28 25 22 3.38 3 10
 Spain 4.24 26 23 -6.48 28 26
 Italy 4.18 27 21 -4.85 26 29
 Portugal 3.94 28 27 -4.61 25 28
 Greece 3.68 29 26 -7.87 29 30
 Singapore n/a n/a 8 n/a n/a 5
Table 2: Comparative Performance: IDI versus GDP
Advanced Economies DIFFERENCE IN RANK < -5 -2 TO -5 -1 TO 1 2 TO 5 >5
RECENT PERFORMANCE
ECONOMY
LEVEL
IDI  
RANK  
IDI  
SCORE  
GDP PER CAPITA  
RANK
IDI TREND  
RANK
IDI  
TREND
GDP PER CAPITA  
TREND RANK
 1 Norway 6.02 1.87
 2 Luxembourg 5.86 -2.49
 3 Switzerland 5.75 1.85
 4 Iceland 5.48 4.58
 5 Denmark 5.31 1.03
 6 Sweden 5.30 -0.84
 7 Netherlands 5.28 -1.69
 8 Australia 5.18 0.29
9 New Zealand 5.09 3.75
 10 Austria 5.05 0.28
 11 Finland 5.04 -3.10
 12 Ireland 5.01 2.28
 13 Germany 4.99 1.91
14 Korea, Rep. 4.95 1.44
 15 Canada 4.90 0.59
 16 Belgium 4.89 -0.71
17 Slovak Republic 4.88 -0.11
 18 France 4.83 -1.94
19 Czech Republic 4.78 0.89
 20 Slovenia 4.75 -6.13
21 United Kingdom 4.69 -0.61
 22 Estonia 4.52 -0.36
23 United States 4.44 0.71
 24 Japan 4.36 -0.61
 25 Israel 4.28 3.38
 26 Spain 4.24 -6.48
 27 Italy 4.18 -4.85
 28 Portugal 3.94 -4.61
 29 Greece 3.68 -7.87
 n/a Singapore n/a n/a
Table 1: The Inclusive Development Index (IDI)
5 YEAR 
TREND IDI 
OVERALL (%)
2017 Rankings
ADVANCED ECONOMIES DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
OVERALL  
IDI SCORE
RANK  
OVERALL
ECONOMY
 1 Lithuania 4.73 2.01
 2 Azerbaijan 4.73 -0.46
 3 Hungary 4.57 3.14
 4 Poland 4.57 1.12
 5 Romania 4.53 5.17
 6 Uruguay 4.53 4.23
 7 Latvia 4.52 3.75
 8 Panama 4.52 0.99
9 Costa Rica 4.47 -0.58
 10 Chile 4.46 2.07
 11 Argentina 4.43 -0.11
 12 Thailand 4.42 1.12
13 Russian Federation 4.42 1.24
 14 Peru 4.41 1.33
 15 China 4.40 1.65
 16 Malaysia 4.39 1.94
 17 Kazakhstan 4.37 4.36
 18 Bulgaria 4.37 -1.11
 19 Paraguay 4.31 3.97
 20 Turkey 4.30 2.62
21 Iran, Islamic Rep. 4.29 -1.54
 22 Indonesia 4.29 0.81
 23 Croatia 4.28 -5.98
24 Macedonia, FYR 4.27 2.72
 25 Vietnam 4.25 -1.34
 26 Venezuela 4.25 1.61
 27 Nepal 4.24 7.10
28 Dominican Republic 4.14 -0.85
 29 Mexico 4.13 -0.72
 30 Brazil 4.13 -0.35
 31 Georgia 4.09 6.82
 32 Nicaragua 4.08 2.85
 33 Colombia 4.08 0.18
 34 Moldova 4.08 1.43
 35 Mongolia 4.04 5.56
 36 Bangladesh 4.03 0.77
 37 Bolivia 4.02 1.06
 38 Albania 4.02 -5.58
39 Sri Lanka 4.01 -2.14
5 YEAR 
TREND IDI 
OVERALL (%)
OVERALL  
IDI SCORE
RANK  
OVERALL
ECONOMY
 40 Philippines 4.00 -0.52
41 El Salvador 4.00 1.10
 42 Serbia 4.00 -5.06
 43 Cambodia 3.97 0.27
 44 Tunisia 3.94 -3.52
 45 Morocco 3.89 0.66
 46 Guatemala 3.83 1.55
 47 Ukraine 3.67 -3.16
 48 Honduras 3.67 -1.76
49 Lao PDR 3.66 -2.75
 50 Armenia 3.66 -1.86
 51 Tanzania 3.59 -0.09
 52 Pakistan 3.56 -0.03
 53 Tajikistan 3.52 -3.68
 54 Jordan 3.50 n/a
 55 Ghana 3.50 -4.97
 56 Cameroon 3.50 -1.46
57 Kyrgyz Republic 3.49 -4.48
 58 Senegal 3.48 -4.07
 59 Mali 3.39 0.83
 60 India 3.38 2.50
 61 Zimbabwe 3.37 n/a
 62 Chad 3.31 -2.90
 63 Namibia 3.28 1.07
 64 Uganda 3.28 -4.16
 65 Kenya 3.23 -4.33
 66 Burundi 3.22 -3.23
67 Sierra Leone 3.21 4.10
 68 Rwanda 3.20 -8.44
 69 Lesotho 3.12 7.80
70 South Africa 3.09 5.50
 71 Nigeria 3.07 -2.99
 72 Madagascar 3.05 -5.10
 73 Egypt 2.94 n/a
 74 Mauritania 2.89 -6.74
 75 Yemen 2.87 n/a
 76 Zambia 2.84 -9.69
 77 Malawi 2.83 -8.49
 78 Mozambique 2.79 -9.27
 n/a Algeria n/a n/a
5 YEAR 
TREND IDI 
OVERALL (%)
OVERALL  
IDI SCORE
RANK  
OVERALL
ECONOMY
TREND RECEDING SLOWLY RECEDING STABLE SLOWLY ADVANCING ADVANCING
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Developing Economies  
(cont’d.)
Table 3: Comparative Performance: IDI versus GDP
 Philippines 4.00 40 46 -0.5 43 17
 El Salvador 4.00 41 37 1.1 28 58
 Serbia 4.00 42 29 -5.1 66 65
 Cambodia 3.97 43 64 0.3 36 6
 Tunisia 3.94 44 33 -3.5 59 70
 Morocco 3.89 45 42 0.7 35 46
 Guatemala 3.83 46 43 1.6 22 57
 Ukraine 3.67 47 44 -3.2 57 76
 Honduras 3.67 48 49 -1.8 51 55
 Lao PDR 3.66 49 56 -2.7 54 5
 Armenia 3.66 50 40 -1.9 52 21
 Tanzania 3.59 51 70 -0.1 39 29
 Pakistan 3.56 52 60 0.0 38 54
 Tajikistan 3.52 53 68 -3.7 60 16
 Jordan 3.50 54 35 n/a n/a 74
 Ghana 3.50 55 53 -5.0 65 9
 Cameroon 3.50 56 58 -1.5 49 43
 Kyrgyz Republic 3.49 57 65 -4.5 64 35
 Senegal 3.48 58 63 -4.1 61 64
 Mali 3.39 59 69 0.8 32 10
 India 3.38 60 52 2.5 16 7
 Zimbabwe 3.37 61 71 n/a n/a 20
 Chad 3.31 62 67 -2.9 55 61
 Namibia 3.28 63 25 1.1 29 31
 Uganda 3.28 64 74 -4.2 62 52
 Kenya 3.23 65 61 -4.3 63 42
 Burundi 3.22 66 79 -3.2 58 75
 Sierra Leone 3.21 67 76 4.1 9 38
 Rwanda 3.20 68 73 -8.4 71 15
 Lesotho 3.12 69 59 7.8 1 34
 South Africa 3.09 70 19 5.5 5 67
 Nigeria 3.07 71 47 -3.0 56 56
 Madagascar 3.05 72 78 -5.1 67 73
 Egypt 2.94 73 45 n/a n/a 71
 Mauritania 2.89 74 57 -6.7 70 45
 Yemen 2.87 75 62 n/a n/a 79
 Zambia 2.84 76 55 -9.7 74 49
 Malawi 2.83 77 77 -8.5 72 62
 Mozambique 2.79 78 75 -9.3 73 19
 Algeria n/a n/a 31 n/a n/a 60
DIFFERENCE IN RANK < -12 -2 TO -12 -1 TO 1 2 TO 12 > 12
RECENT PERFORMANCE
ECONOMY
LEVEL
IDI  
RANK  
IDI  
SCORE  
GDP PER CAPITA  
RANK
IDI TREND  
RANK
IDI  
TREND
GDP PER CAPITA  
TREND RANK
Table 3: Comparative Performance: IDI versus GDP
Developing Economies
 Lithuania 4.73 1 1 2.0 18 12
 Azerbaijan 4.73 2 24 -0.5 42 63
 Hungary 4.57 3 4 3.1 12 53
 Poland 4.57 4 3 1.1 27 37
 Romania 4.53 5 16 5.2 6 39
 Uruguay 4.53 6 6 4.2 8 32
 Latvia 4.52 7 5 3.7 11 14
 Panama 4.52 8 13 1.0 31 4
 Costa Rica 4.47 9 18 -0.6 44 41
 Chile 4.46 10 2 2.1 17 40
 Argentina 4.43 11 15 -0.1 40 69
 Thailand 4.42 12 28 1.1 26 47
 Russian Federation 4.42 13 11 1.2 25 66
 Peru 4.41 14 26 1.3 24 30
 China 4.40 15 23 1.7 20 2
 Malaysia 4.39 16 12 1.9 19 24
 Kazakhstan 4.37 17 14 4.4 7 33
 Bulgaria 4.37 18 20 -1.1 47 50
 Paraguay 4.31 19 39 4.0 10 27
 Turkey 4.30 20 9 2.6 15 44
 Iran, Islamic Rep. 4.29 21 27 -1.5 50 78
 Indonesia 4.29 22 38 0.8 33 18
 Croatia 4.28 23 7 -6.0 69 68
 Macedonia, FYR 4.27 24 30 2.7 14 48
 Vietnam 4.25 25 54 -1.3 48 13
 Venezuela 4.25 26 8 1.6 21 77
 Nepal 4.24 27 72 7.1 2 36
 Dominican Republic 4.14 28 22 -0.9 46 26
 Mexico 4.13 29 17 -0.7 45 59
 Brazil 4.13 30 10 -0.3 41 72
 Georgia 4.09 31 34 6.8 3 3
 Nicaragua 4.08 32 51 2.8 13 22
 Colombia 4.08 33 21 0.18 0.2 37
 Moldova 4.08 34 50 1.43 1.4 23
 Mongolia 4.04 35 36 5.56 5.6 4
 Bangladesh 4.03 36 66 0.8 34 11
 Bolivia 4.02 37 48 1.1 30 25
 Albania 4.02 38 32 -5.6 68 51
 Sri Lanka 4.01 39 41 -2.1 53 8
DIFFERENCE IN RANK < -12 -2 TO -12 -1 TO 1 2 TO 12 > 12
RECENT PERFORMANCE
ECONOMY
LEVEL
IDI  
RANK  
IDI  
SCORE  
GDP PER CAPITA  
RANK
IDI TREND  
RANK
IDI  
TREND
GDP PER CAPITA  
TREND RANK
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 Iceland 1 4.6 2.5 13 -2.4 19 16.3 1
New Zealand 2 3.8 3.4 8 5.5 2 2.7 4
 Israel 3 3.4 7.2 2 1.3 8 1.1 7
 Ireland 4 2.3 3.3 10 -7.5 26 11.8 2
 Germany 5 1.9 4.0 5 -1.8 18 3.7 3
 Norway 6 1.9 1.3 19 1.9 5 2.5 5
 Switzerland 7 1.8 1.7 18 9.0 1 -4.1 24
 Korea, Rep. 8 1.4 4.8 4 3.3 3 -2.2 15
 Denmark 9 1.0 0.9 21 1.6 7 0.7 8
 Czech Republic 10 0.9 3.6 6 0.9 10 -1.1 11
 United States 11 0.7 3.6 7 -2.5 20 0.0 9
 Canada 12 0.6 2.7 11 1.7 6 -2.7 16
 Australia 13 0.3 1.9 16 2.3 4 -2.9 18
 Austria 14 0.3 1.8 17 1.2 9 -2.1 14
 Slovak Republic 15 -0.1 4.8 3 -0.2 13 -3.4 19
 Estonia 16 -0.4 12.2 1 -13.5 29 1.6 6
 United Kingdom 17 -0.6 3.4 9 -1.5 17 -3.8 22
 Japan 18 -0.6 2.3 15 -0.2 13 -4.7 25
 Belgium 19 -0.7 1.0 20 0.4 11 -3.8 23
 Sweden 20 -0.8 2.6 12 -1.4 16 -3.4 20
 Netherlands 21 -1.7 -0.2 24 -3.8 21 -1.1 10
 France 22 -1.9 0.7 22 -1.1 15 -5.6 26
 Luxembourg 23 -2.5 0.5 23 -5.4 22 -2.7 17
 Finland 24 -3.1 -0.5 25 -0.3 14 -8.3 28
 Portugal 25 -4.6 -2.2 29 -7.9 27 -3.6 21
 Italy 26 -4.9 -1.6 27 -7.1 24 -5.7 27
 Slovenia 27 -6.1 -1.5 26 -7.1 23 -8.6 29
 Spain 28 -6.5 -1.9 28 -7.3 25 -9.6 30
 Greece 29 -7.9 -8.6 30 -12.5 28 -1.5 13
 Singapore n/a n/a 2.4 14 n/a n/a -1.2 12
Table 5: The Inclusive Development Index: Trend
Advanced Economies
INTERGENERATIONAL 
EQUITY
RANK OVERALL 
IDI TREND
ECONOMY
INCLUSIONGROWTH
5 YEAR TREND  
(%)
5 YEAR TREND  
(%)
RANK 5 YEAR TREND  
(%)
RANK 5 YEAR TREND  
(%)
RANK
 Norway 1 6.02 6.36 1 5.67 2 6.03 1
 Luxembourg 2 5.86 6.11 4 5.47 4 6.00 3
 Switzerland 3 5.75 6.13 3 5.43 6 5.68 5
 Iceland 4 5.48 5.51 5 5.77 1 5.17 14
 Denmark 5 5.31 5.33 9 5.11 11 5.49 8
 Sweden 6 5.30 5.34 8 4.96 14 5.59 7
 Netherlands 7 5.28 5.28 11 5.27 9 5.29 11
 Australia 8 5.18 5.43 6 4.72 16 5.40 9
 New Zealand 9 5.09 4.94 16 4.64 18 5.67 6
 Austria 10 5.05 5.15 13 5.01 12 4.98 17
 Finland 11 5.04 4.83 19 5.36 7 4.91 19
 Ireland 12 5.01 5.26 12 4.63 19 5.13 15
 Germany 13 4.99 4.98 15 4.91 15 5.06 16
 Korea, Rep. 14 4.95 4.60 22 4.23 23 6.00 2
 Canada 15 4.90 5.32 10 4.68 17 4.70 21
 Belgium 16 4.89 4.76 20 5.45 5 4.47 24
 Slovak Republic 17 4.88 3.80 29 5.62 3 5.22 13
 France 18 4.83 4.73 21 5.31 8 4.44 25
 Czech Republic 19 4.78 4.07 26 4.99 13 5.28 12
 Slovenia 20 4.75 4.09 25 5.25 10 4.92 18
 United Kingdom 21 4.69 4.88 17 4.63 20 4.55 23
 Estonia 22 4.52 4.02 27 3.69 27 5.86 4
 United States 23 4.44 5.35 7 3.53 28 4.44 26
 Japan 24 4.36 5.02 14 4.34 22 3.73 29
 Israel 25 4.28 4.84 18 3.09 29 4.91 20
 Spain 26 4.24 4.17 24 3.97 24 4.58 22
 Italy 27 4.18 4.24 23 4.36 21 3.94 28
 Portugal 28 3.94 3.99 28 3.87 25 3.96 27
 Greece 29 3.68 3.64 30 3.80 26 3.58 30
 Singapore n/a n/a 6.24 2 n/a n/a 5.40 10
Table 4: The Inclusive Development Index: Level
Advanced Economies
INTERGENERATIONAL 
EQUITY
RANK 
OVERALL
ECONOMY
INCLUSIONGROWTH
SCORE  
OVERALL
SCORE RANK SCORE RANK SCORE RANK
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Table 6: The Inclusive Development Index: Level
 Philippines 40 4.00 3.08 45 3.04 57 5.88 5
 El Salvador 41 4.00 3.17 38 3.99 26 4.83 47
 Serbia 42 4.00 2.68 63 4.79 5 4.52 57
 Cambodia 43 3.97 3.22 33 3.53 46 5.17 34
 Tunisia 44 3.94 2.70 61 4.17 19 4.94 44
 Morocco 45 3.89 2.66 64 3.68 35 5.32 25
 Guatemala 46 3.83 3.40 24 3.09 55 4.99 41
 Ukraine 47 3.67 2.99 51 4.28 17 3.74 75
 Honduras 48 3.67 3.20 35 2.77 65 5.04 38
 Lao PDR 49 3.66 3.26 30 3.30 49 4.43 60
 Armenia 50 3.66 3.06 46 4.04 24 3.89 71
 Tanzania 51 3.59 3.00 48 3.07 56 4.69 52
 Pakistan 52 3.56 2.45 71 3.55 44 4.68 53
 Tajikistan 53 3.52 2.99 49 3.52 47 4.06 69
 Jordan 54 3.50 2.50 69 3.62 41 4.38 63
 Ghana 55 3.50 3.03 47 3.25 52 4.21 66
 Cameroon 56 3.50 2.73 60 3.26 50 4.51 58
 Kyrgyz Republic 57 3.49 3.17 39 4.16 20 3.13 79
 Senegal 58 3.48 3.18 37 2.90 60 4.36 64
 Mali 59 3.39 2.44 72 3.02 59 4.71 51 
 India 60 3.38 2.59 65 2.61 67 4.95 43
 Zimbabwe 61 3.37 2.89 54 3.03 58 4.17 67
 Namibia 63 3.28 2.57 66 1.89 76 5.39 22
 Chad 62 3.31 2.47 70 2.86 62 4.61 55
 Uganda 64 3.28 2.99 50 2.60 68 4.26 65
 Kenya 65 3.23 2.70 62 2.62 66 4.38 62
 Burundi 66 3.22 2.88 55 2.79 64 4.00 70
 Sierra Leone 67 3.21 2.30 73 2.83 63 4.51 59
 Rwanda 68 3.20 3.11 42 1.71 77 4.78 48
 Lesotho 69 3.12 1.72 78 2.09 73 5.55 17
 South Africa 70 3.09 2.19 75 2.44 70 4.64 54
 Nigeria 71 3.07 2.06 76 2.28 71 4.88 45
 Madagascar 72 3.05 3.11 41 2.24 72 3.80 72
 Egypt 73 2.94 2.55 67 2.50 69 3.76 74
 Mauritania 74 2.89 1.63 79 3.70 34 3.33 78
 Yemen 75 2.87 1.96 77 3.18 54 3.48 77
 Zambia 76 2.84 2.98 52 1.46 78 4.07 68
 Malawi 77 2.83 2.84 56 2.08 74 3.59 76
 Mozambique 78 2.79 2.53 68 2.06 75 3.78 73
 Algeria n/a n/a 2.76 58 n/a n/a 5.82 7
Developing Economies (cont’d.)
INTERGENERATIONAL 
EQUITY
RANK  
OVERALL
ECONOMY
INCLUSIONGROWTH
SCORE  
OVERALL
SCORE RANK SCORE RANK SCORE RANK
 Lithuania 1 4.73 3.70 10 4.80 4 5.70 12
 Azerbaijan 2 4.73 3.65 18 4.69 10 5.84 6
 Hungary 3 4.57 3.48 23 5.18 1 5.06 37
 Poland 4 4.57 3.67 16 4.69 8 5.35 24
 Panama 8 4.52 3.97 3 3.77 29 5.80 8
 Romania 5 4.53 3.38 25 4.45 15 5.76 9
 Uruguay 6 4.53 3.93 5 4.67 12 4.98 42
 Latvia 7 4.52 3.69 11 4.69 9 5.17 32
 Malaysia 16 4.39 3.82 8 4.13 22 5.21 30
 Costa Rica 9 4.47 3.67 17 3.99 25 5.74 11
 Chile 10 4.46 4.00 2 3.76 30 5.62 13
 Argentina 11 4.43 3.51 22 4.73 7 5.07 36
 Thailand 12 4.42 3.94 4 3.96 28 5.38 23
 Russian Federation 13 4.42 3.69 12 4.14 21 5.43 20
 Peru 14 4.41 3.87 7 3.62 40 5.74 10
 China 15 4.40 3.91 6 3.24 53 6.04 2
 Kazakhstan 17 4.37 4.09 1 4.27 18 4.75 50
 Bulgaria 18 4.37 3.09 44 4.73 6 5.27 27
 Paraguay 19 4.31 3.62 19 3.75 31 5.57 15
 Turkey 20 4.30 3.23 32 4.09 23 5.57 16
 Iran, Islamic Rep. 21 4.29 2.83 57 5.01 2 5.03 39
 Indonesia 22 4.29 3.34 27 3.57 43 5.94 3
 Croatia 23 4.28 3.30 29 4.99 3 4.55 56
 Macedonia, FYR 24 4.27 2.73 59 4.50 13 5.57 14
 Vietnam 25 4.25 3.68 13 3.97 27 5.09 35
 Venezuela 26 4.25 3.68 14 3.75 32 5.30 26
 Nepal 27 4.24 3.35 26 3.25 51 6.11 1
 Dominican Republic 28 4.14 3.26 31 3.66 37 5.50 18
 Mexico 29 4.13 3.68 15 3.55 45 5.17 33
 Brazil 30 4.13 3.80 9 3.58 42 5.01 40
 Georgia 31 4.09 3.19 36 3.66 36 5.42 21
 Nicaragua 32 4.08 3.13 40 3.64 39 5.49 19
 Colombia 33 4.08 3.51 21 3.51 48 5.22 29
 Moldova 34 4.08 2.29 74 4.68 11 5.27 28
 Mongolia 35 4.04 3.21 34 4.49 14 4.41 61
 Bangladesh 36 4.03 3.32 28 2.88 61 5.90 4
 Bolivia 37 4.02 3.54 20 3.65 38 4.87 46
 Albania 38 4.02 2.94 53 4.35 16 4.76 49
 Sri Lanka 39 4.01 3.11 43 3.75 33 5.18 31
Table 6: The Inclusive Development Index: Level
Developing Economies
INTERGENERATIONAL 
EQUITY
RANK  
OVERALL
ECONOMY
INCLUSIONGROWTH
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SCORE RANK SCORE RANK SCORE RANK
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Table 7: The Inclusive Development Index: Trend
 Argentina 40 -0.1 0.5 58 3.0 18 -3.3 55
 Brazil 41 -0.3 2.2 46 3.4 15 -4.6 64
 Azerbaijan 42 -0.5 7.9 14 -9.4 64 2.7 14
 Philippines 43 -0.5 1.7 49 -1.9 47 -0.9 39
 Costa Rica 44 -0.6 0.3 61 2.2 23 -3.0 51
 Mexico 45 -0.7 2.0 47 -2.3 50 -1.5 43
 Dominican Republic 46 -0.9 -1.3 70 1.8 27 -2.3 48
 Bulgaria 47 -1.1 1.9 48 -2.1 49 -1.9 47
 Vietnam 48 -1.3 1.3 53 -4.7 54 -0.5 35
 Cameroon 49 -1.5 1.0 56 -0.2 34 -3.7 60
Iran, Islamic Rep. 50 -1.5 5.0 25 -3.4 52 -3.0 52
 Honduras 51 -1.8 4.0 35 -4.9 55 -3.4 57
 Armenia 52 -1.9 10.6 10 -3.8 53 -8.1 68
 Sri Lanka 53 -2.1 3.9 37 -8.6 62 -0.5 36
 Lao PDR 54 -2.7 3.0 40 -7.7 61 -2.8 50
 Chad 55 -2.9 -3.9 75 0.9 31 -4.6 63
 Nigeria 56 -3.0 -8.2 78 -2.5 51 -0.8 38
 Ukraine 57 -3.2 4.6 32 2.7 20 -13.9 77
 Burundi 58 -3.2 -2.0 72 -7.5 59 -0.2 28
 Tunisia 59 -3.5 0.0 66 0.7 32 -8.5 70
 Tajikistan 60 -3.7 2.5 45 -17.7 70 7.4 3
 Senegal 61 -4.1 2.7 42 -11.2 66 -3.6 59
 Uganda 62 -4.2 6.3 17 -14.9 69 -3.4 56
 Kenya 63 -4.3 4.8 28 -14.5 68 -3.0 53
 Kyrgyz Republic 64 -4.5 9.5 12 -1.3 43 -18.6 79
 Ghana 65 -5.0 4.6 33 -9.6 65 -7.5 66
 Serbia 66 -5.1 1.3 54 -0.5 37 -12.6 76
 Madagascar 67 -5.1 4.5 34 -13.0 67 -7.2 65
 Albania 68 -5.6 0.6 57 -6.2 57 -8.5 69
 Croatia 69 -6.0 -1.5 71 -6.1 56 -8.9 71
 Mauritania 70 -6.7 -9.9 79 -1.3 44 -10.7 72
 Rwanda 71 -8.4 0.0 67 -29.0 73 -3.8 61
 Malawi 72 -8.5 5.6 20 -23.2 72 -8.0 67
 Mozambique 73 -9.3 5.4 21 -19.6 71 -11.4 73
 Zambia 74 -9.7 13.1 5 -33.0 74 -11.5 74
 Algeria n/a n/a 3.4 38 n/a n/a -0.4 32
 Egypt n/a n/a 0.2 65 n/a n/a -11.7 75
 Jordan n/a n/a -5.1 76 n/a n/a 0.8 24
 Yemen n/a n/a 0.5 59 n/a n/a -15.2 78
 Zimbabwe n/a n/a 15.1 2 n/a n/a 0.4 26
Developing Economies (cont’d.)
INTERGENERATIONAL 
EQUITY
RANK IDI  
TREND
ECONOMY
INCLUSIONGROWTH
 5 YEAR TREND  
(%)
5 YEAR TREND  
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RANK 5 YEAR TREND  
(%)
RANK 5 YEAR TREND  
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RANK
 Lesotho 1 7.8 13.0 6 10.9 3 5.2 6
 Nepal 2 7.1 1.6 50 14.7 1 6.5 4
 Georgia 3 6.8 10.2 11 7.3 5 4.6 7
 Mongolia 4 5.6 14.8 4 -0.5 39 6.0 5
South Africa 5 5.5 21.2 1 8.1 4 -1.7 45
 Romania 6 5.2 5.0 26 2.1 24 7.8 2
 Kazakhstan 7 4.4 8.6 13 1.4 29 3.6 12
 Uruguay 8 4.2 2.8 41 11.4 2 -0.6 37
Sierra Leone 9 4.1 -6.0 77 -1.2 42 14.2 1
 Paraguay 10 4.0 3.2 39 3.9 12 4.5 9
 Latvia 11 3.7 14.8 3 -0.6 41 0.9 23
 Hungary 12 3.1 7.0 15 -0.6 40 4.5 8
 Nicaragua 13 2.8 -2.2 73 6.0 8 3.8 10
 Macedonia, FYR 14 2.7 5.8 19 1.7 28 2.1 16
 Turkey 15 2.6 1.0 55 3.2 17 3.1 13
 India 16 2.5 4.8 29 3.3 16 0.9 22
 Chile 17 2.1 6.1 18 1.9 25 -0.5 34
 Lithuania 18 2.0 12.3 7 -0.3 35 -1.9 46
 Malaysia 19 1.9 4.7 30 2.2 22 -0.2 29
 China 20 1.7 4.9 27 2.6 21 -1.0 40
 Venezuela 21 1.6 -0.1 68 6.5 6 -0.5 33
 Guatemala 22 1.6 1.6 51 1.0 30 1.9 18
 Moldova 23 1.4 11.2 9 1.9 26 -2.7 49
 Peru 24 1.3 -2.8 74 6.5 7 1.1 21
 Russian Federation 25 1.2 6.8 16 -0.5 38 -1.0 41
 Thailand 26 1.1 2.7 43 2.9 19 -1.3 42
 Poland 27 1.1 4.7 31 -2.0 48 1.5 19
 El Salvador 28 1.1 0.4 60 5.2 11 -1.6 44
 Namibia 29 1.1 12.1 8 -8.6 63 0.1 27
 Bolivia 30 1.1 0.3 64 3.9 14 -0.4 31
 Panama 31 1.0 5.2 23 3.9 13 -3.4 58
 Mali 32 0.8 0.3 62 -0.4 36 1.9 17
 Indonesia 33 0.8 2.7 44 -1.6 46 1.2 20
 Bangladesh 34 0.8 5.1 24 -6.9 58 2.6 15
 Morocco 35 0.7 4.0 36 5.3 10 -3.8 62
 Cambodia 36 0.3 -0.9 69 0.7 33 0.7 25
 Colombia 37 0.2 0.3 63 5.4 9 -3.1 54
 Pakistan 38 0.0 5.3 22 -7.7 60 3.8 11
 Tanzania 39 -0.1 1.6 52 -1.4 45 -0.3 30
Table 7: The Inclusive Development Index: Trend
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 Norway 1 1 0
 Switzerland 2 2 0
 Luxembourg 3 3 0
 Iceland 4 4 0
 Denmark 5 5 0
 Sweden 6 6 0
 Netherlands 7 7 0
 Australia 8 10 -2
 New Zealand 9 n/a n/a
 Austria 10 9 1
 Finland 11 8 3
 Ireland 12 12 0
 Canada 13 13 0
 Germany 14 11 3
 Korea, Rep. 15 n/a n/a
 Czech Republic 16 16 0
 Belgium 17 15 2
 Slovak Republic 18 17 1
 France 19 14 5
 Slovenia 20 18 2
 United Kingdom 21 19 2
 Estonia 22 21 1
 United States 23 20 3
 Japan 24 22 2
 Israel 25 25 0
 Spain 26 24 2
 Italy 27 23 4
 Portugal 28 26 2
 Greece 29 27 2
 Singapore n/a n/a n/a
Table 8: Alternative Weighting of IDI Indicators and Pillars 
DIFFERENCE 
IN RANK
Alternative Rankings
ADVANCED ECONOMIES DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
2X MEDIAN 
INCOME AND 
2X POVERTY
ECONOMY
 Lithuania 1 1 0
 Azerbaijan 2 2 0
 Hungary 3 3 0
 Poland 4 4 0
 Panama 5 6 -1
 Romania 6 9 -3
 Uruguay 7 5 2
 Latvia 8 7 1
 Malaysia 9 8 1
 Costa Rica 10 12 -2
 Chile 11 11 0
 Argentina 12 n/a n/a
 Thailand 13 13 0
 Russian Federation 14 10 4
 Peru 15 16 -1
 China 16 19 -3
 Kazakhstan 17 14 3
 Bulgaria 18 15 3
 Paraguay 19 20 -1
 Turkey 20 18 2
 Iran, Islamic Rep. 21 n/a n/a
 Indonesia 22 n/a n/a
 Croatia 23 17 6
 Macedonia, FYR 24 21 3
 Vietnam 25 22 3
 Venezuela 26 23 3
 Nepal 27 35 -8
 Dominican Republic 28 24 4
 Mexico 29 27 2
 Brazil 30 25 5
 Georgia 31 36 -5
 Nicaragua 32 31 1
 Colombia 33 28 5
 Moldova 34 26 8
 Mongolia 35 29 6
 Bangladesh 36 44 -8
 Bolivia 37 33 4
 Albania 38 32 6
 Sri Lanka 39 37 2
 Philippines 40 41 -1
 El Salvador 41 34 7
 Serbia 42 30 12
 Cambodia 43 39 4
 Tunisia 44 38 6
Morocco 45 40 5
Guatemala 46 42 4
Ukraine 47 43 4
Honduras 48 46 2
 Lao PDR 49 48 1
 Armenia 50 45 5
 Tanzania 51 54 -3
 Pakistan 52 49 3
 Tajikistan 53 52 1
 Jordan 54 n/a n/a
 Ghana 55 51 4
 Cameroon 56 50 6
 Kyrgyz Republic 57 47 10
 Senegal 58 55 3
 Mali 59 56 3
 India 60 n/a n/a
 Zimbabwe 61 n/a n/a
 Namibia 62 53 9
 Chad 63 60 3
 Uganda 64 57 7
 Kenya 65 59 6
 Burundi 66 64 2
 Sierra Leone 67 62 5
 Rwanda 68 63 5
 Lesotho 69 65 4
 South Africa 70 58 12
 Nigeria 71 66 5
 Madagascar 72 67 5
Egypt 73 n/a n/a
Mauritania 74 61 13
 Yemen 75 n/a n/a
 Zambia 76 68 8
 Malawi 77 69 8
Mozambique 78 70 8
 Algeria n/a n/a n/a
ORIGINAL  
IDI RANK
DIFFERENCE 
IN RANK
2X MEDIAN 
INCOME AND 
2X POVERTY
ECONOMY ORIGINAL  
IDI RANK
DIFFERENCE 
IN RANK
2X MEDIAN 
INCOME AND 
2X POVERTY
ECONOMY ORIGINAL  
IDI RANK
DIFFERENCE IN RANK <-6 -2 TO -5 -1 TO 1 2 TO 5 >6
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Norway 0.5 0.9 1.4 -0.7 -1.2 0.3 2.0 5.8 5.1 -0.2 -0.9 1.2
Switzerland 0.3 0.3 1.4 0.2 -0.4 -0.9 -8.1 3.0 -6.6 -0.6 -0.4 1.6
Luxembourg 0.6 0.5 1.2 -0.6 1.1 0.3 5.9 -2.2 -7.1 -3.8 2.3 -2.0
Iceland 1.8 0.7 0.2 1.2 -1.2 -1.6 4.2 -9.0 11.7 -5.4 -27.5 1.9
Denmark 0.2 0.6 1.7 -1.2 0.1 -1.0 0.7 -0.1 2.0 -5.2 -0.9 2.4
Sweden 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.9 -0.1 0.1 3.9 2.3 0.3 -2.5 6.5 5.5
Netherlands 0.2 0.2 1.7 -2.0 -0.4 1.2 2.0 -1.4 2.2 -1.4 3.5 3.6
Australia 1.1 1.9 0.7 -1.0 -1.3 -1.6 4.2 0.6 1.3 -10.4 13.4 2.3
New Zealand 1.6 1.3 1.3 0.6 0.5 -1.1 -2.6 n/a 5.8 -3.0 -1.6 3.0
Austria 0.4 0.8 1.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 0.9 -0.1 -1.4 -3.5 4.0 0.8
Finland -0.4 0.1 1.3 -0.9 -1.1 -0.4 5.1 2.3 -3.7 -6.0 14.0 6.6
Ireland 3.1 -0.1 0.7 0.9 -0.3 0.0 8.4 -4.8 7.2 -3.9 -30.9 5.5
Canada 1.1 1.0 1.5 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 0.5 1.6 2.1 -0.7 10.0 2.7
Germany 1.6 0.7 1.2 1.8 0.9 0.1 1.9 0.7 1.8 -6.7 -7.3 0.0
Korea, Rep. 2.5 1.8 2.0 0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.6 n/a -1.4 2.3 6.4 -0.2
Czech Republic 1.2 -0.4 1.2 1.8 -0.9 -0.1 0.4 0.3 1.9 -8.4 0.5 6.1
Belgium 0.2 0.6 1.2 -0.6 -0.7 0.0 1.3 1.5 -2.5 -3.3 3.7 2.5
Slovak Republic 2.3 1.4 1.4 1.1 -0.1 0.5 4.3 1.5 -0.8 -9.3 9.6 2.4
France 0.3 0.4 1.4 -0.7 -1.8 0.5 3.1 0.6 -0.6 -3.4 10.9 4.5
Slovenia 0.4 0.8 1.3 -2.9 2.2 1.1 4.8 -1.5 3.8 -1.9 36.7 3.7
United Kingdom 1.3 0.5 1.0 1.2 -0.8 -0.8 5.4 -0.5 -0.5 -4.8 7.7 3.1
Estonia 4.0 1.3 2.0 6.3 2.0 5.1 -2.5 -0.8 5.7 -1.0 3.8 4.1
United States 1.3 0.7 1.2 1.1 0.3 0.1 1.5 -0.7 3.6 -4.9 6.2 2.0
Japan 0.8 0.9 1.3 -0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.4 n/a -1.3 0.0 16.3 6.2
Israel 1.3 -0.1 1.4 5.6 -0.8 -2.3 0.4 0.8 2.7 8.3 -4.7 3.1
Spain -0.1 0.8 0.5 -2.8 0.7 1.0 1.7 -4.8 -0.2 -2.3 29.8 3.3
Italy -1.2 -0.6 1.1 -1.1 0.2 1.3 3.5 -3.0 0.2 -4.8 16.2 3.2
Portugal -0.5 0.2 1.6 -3.5 0.8 2.0 1.4 -1.6 4.6 0.5 17.6 2.2
Greece -3.3 0.2 1.2 -8.2 0.3 2.2 0.8 -10.7 1.6 -1.2 4.8 4.8
Singapore 2.2 1.0 0.7 0.5 -1.3 n/a 2.3 n/a -4.6 -5.8 3.7 1.6
 
Table 10: Dashboard of National Key Performance Indicators: 5 Year Trend
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Norway 89741 124555 72.0 62.6 22.9 7.8 79.8 60.4 21.1 16.3 27.9 52.2
Switzerland 75551 93491 73.1 65.0 29.7 8.6 72.1 56.1 15.0 11.8 45.7 48.8
Luxembourg 106409 201748 71.8 53.9 28.4 8.4 75.4 58.8 12.8 32.5 21.5 43.7
Iceland 45411 70671 72.7 70.1 23.4 4.6 72.0 41.9 11.4 21.2 67.6 51.6
Denmark 58208 87167 71.2 58.3 24.9 5.4 89.3 43.4 14.6 18.2 45.5 55.9
Sweden 54989 87961 72.0 58.9 25.5 8.8 83.2 45.2 18.9 14.2 43.4 59.3
Netherlands 50925 85121 72.2 59.7 25.3 8.4 74.3 44.0 17.1 38.9 65.1 53.3
Australia 54718 86972 71.9 61.2 31.8 12.8 68.2 44.3 8.8 57.1 37.6 50.9
New Zealand 36464 65440 71.6 63.9 36.0 9.9 69.1 n/a 14.0 36.2 29.9 54.0
Austria 47668 87198 72.0 57.9 28.8 9.0 78.5 47.5 11.9 22.6 86.2 49.2
Finland 45289 82025 71.0 54.3 25.0 6.8 76.6 43.5 6.5 27.6 62.5 58.3
Ireland 56054 103880 71.5 53.4 29.1 8.9 80.0 34.7 16.3 19.5 78.7 53.7
Canada 50001 82524 72.3 61.5 31.4 12.6 73.2 47.6 7.3 54.5 91.5 47.3
Germany 45270 84050 71.3 56.9 29.5 9.1 78.9 45.9 13.5 58.9 71.0 51.8
Korea, Rep. 25023 68416 73.2 58.8 29.8 14.4 71.9 n/a 19.2 68.8 37.9 37.2
Czech Republic 20956 55940 69.4 55.9 24.5 6.0 76.0 23.8 6.3 69.5 40.3 49.5
Belgium 44863 98644 71.1 48.8 24.4 10.0 64.1 43.6 10.0 40.1 106.1 54.2
Slovak Republic 18508 59746 68.1 51.6 25.7 8.4 49.0 26.5 1.7 49.5 52.9 40.8
France 41330 89701 72.6 50.2 26.8 8.0 72.0 43.8 6.8 17.7 96.1 60.3
Slovenia 23896 61022 71.1 52.1 26.7 9.5 58.5 30.3 11.1 49.3 83.1 48.7
United Kingdom 40933 76161 71.4 58.2 32.7 10.4 73.2 38.4 3.8 21.8 89.0 55.1
Estonia 17762 53118 69.0 57.3 34.3 16.3 65.6 19.2 17.3 48.6 9.7 53.5
United States 51486 109314 69.1 58.5 37.0 17.5 86.2 48.9 6.8 46.4 105.2 50.9
Japan 44657 72523 74.9 56.9 30.8 16.1 63.1 34.8 3.6 31.9 248.0 64.5
Israel 32828 76834 72.8 59.1 36.6 18.6 77.2 24.0 15.5 68.9 64.1 64.1
Spain 30588 82548 72.4 44.4 34.1 15.9 68.0 31.3 6.8 29.7 99.3 50.8
Italy 33705 87013 72.8 43.1 32.7 13.3 68.7 34.1 3.7 24.0 132.7 56.5
Portugal 21961 56078 71.4 51.7 33.2 13.6 71.3 20.5 2.6 33.2 129.0 53.5
Greece 22648 72824 71.9 39.1 33.7 15.1 67.0 19.5 -5.5 46.6 176.9 56.2
Singapore 51855 138815 73.9 65.6 40.9 n/a 74.0 n/a 37.0 129.5 104.7 37.4
 
Table 9: Dashboard of National Key Performance Indicators: Levels
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Lithuania 4.9 1.5 1.3 6.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5 -2.2 0.5 0.8 5.5 2.1
Azerbaijan 0.9 0.9 2.7 2.3 11.8 2.2 3.8 0.6 7.9 9.7 16.9 -1.2
Hungary 2.0 -0.5 1.8 3.0 1.3 0.4 -2.1 -1.4 4.8 -10.8 -5.4 1.8
Poland 3.0 2.4 1.5 0.7 0.7 -0.7 -1.4 -4.9 2.0 -16.9 -3.1 3.6
Panama 6.1 6.1 0.4 1.4 -0.3 -2.3 -0.9 2.3 -11.8 -39.7 1.5 -1.5
Romania 2.8 2.0 1.7 0.8 0.5 -5.8 -0.9 -0.7 16.7 -3.7 5.4 2.1
Uruguay 3.2 3.7 0.3 0.5 -3.5 -0.3 -6.7 4.2 -0.1 -10.2 6.2 -1.1
Latvia 4.7 1.7 2.1 6.9 -0.4 0.2 -0.9 -2.8 1.2 -13.7 -2.7 3.3
Malaysia 3.7 2.3 0.9 1.3 -1.0 0.4 -1.0 0.9 -2.0 -20.4 4.8 -2.2
Costa Rica 2.7 2.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.4 0.0 -2.4 1.1 -1.4 -3.6 12.5 -1.4
Chile 2.7 1.8 1.1 2.6 -1.7 -2.1 3.1 2.5 -2.2 -8.4 6.4 -0.6
Argentina 0.4 1.5 0.5 0.1 -2.3 -0.7 0.2 n/a 0.1 -4.6 14.1 -0.2
Thailand 2.5 1.9 1.5 -0.2 -4.6 -1.7 4.7 1.6 -1.1 -7.8 4.0 0.3
Russian Federation 0.7 2.0 2.4 2.1 -1.0 0.0 4.5 3.2 -0.3 -13.8 5.5 3.9
Peru 3.4 3.5 -2.9 0.2 -2.0 -4.0 -1.0 1.5 0.1 -12.3 1.0 -1.4
China 7.3 7.2 2.1 0.2 -1.5 -21.9 11.5 n/a 0.0 -37.7 9.8 2.1
Kazakhstan 3.1 4.2 3.0 2.3 -1.0 -2.3 2.9 2.9 7.3 -13.7 12.1 4.6
Bulgaria 2.1 2.5 1.2 -0.7 1.9 1.9 -0.8 -0.6 1.2 -6.3 11.8 4.2
Paraguay 3.6 2.3 0.6 1.3 -0.8 -6.5 2.3 2.8 4.5 -15.0 11.2 -3.8
Turkey 2.7 1.4 -2.0 2.1 -1.3 -2.0 0.2 1.8 1.6 -1.9 -6.2 -1.2
Iran, Islamic Rep. -1.4 -1.7 2.5 1.4 -3.8 -2.4 10.5 n/a n/a 33.5 7.0 0.7
Indonesia 4.2 3.9 0.6 0.5 3.7 -9.9 1.7 n/a 1.6 -13.3 4.2 -1.6
Croatia 0.5 1.1 1.9 -3.3 3.7 2.1 -1.5 -6.9 -2.6 4.3 23.0 1.4
Macedonia, FYR 2.2 0.5 0.9 2.1 -2.6 2.2 -0.7 -0.8 7.3 -7.6 10.2 0.1
Vietnam 4.8 3.8 0.7 1.3 0.4 -6.0 9.6 1.1 2.2 -21.9 12.5 -0.2
Venezuela -1.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 -1.4 -12.9 4.0 3.1 -6.1 -2.6 -9.1 -1.4
Nepal 3.0 2.0 1.0 -0.3 -7.7 -25.3 11.8 1.2 3.4 -4.4 -3.7 -8.8
Dominican Republic 3.6 3.5 -0.2 -1.7 0.0 -2.4 n/a 0.1 -1.4 -1.9 9.2 -1.6
Mexico 1.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.5 -1.0 2.3 -0.1 -1.0 -8.1 10.8 -3.3
Brazil 0.1 -0.1 1.4 0.5 -0.4 -5.9 1.5 2.0 -3.1 5.0 12.5 -1.8
Georgia 6.2 4.5 2.4 3.1 -5.0 -13.3 7.0 1.2 8.3 -14.5 5.0 0.1
Nicaragua 4.0 1.3 -4.0 2.7 -4.9 -8.0 5.4 1.2 2.9 -1.9 0.1 -4.6
Colombia 3.6 2.4 -2.0 1.6 0.1 -7.2 -0.7 1.6 0.0 -1.9 14.8 -1.4
Moldova 3.9 3.7 2.5 1.9 0.0 -4.2 0.0 0.7 3.2 11.9 17.3 -1.3
Jordan -0.4 -1.6 -2.2 0.1 -1.7 n/a 6.9 n/a 5.0 -40.6 22.7 -2.6
Mongolia 8.4 9.8 4.1 3.0 -1.1 -6.0 7.2 2.2 5.0 -27.7 n/a 2.8
Bangladesh 5.1 4.1 2.8 0.3 -0.4 -6.2 10.8 0.3 0.6 -1.5 -1.4 -4.6
Bolivia 3.7 3.0 -0.4 0.7 -2.7 -6.5 3.6 0.9 -3.2 -4.7 1.5 -3.9
Algeria 1.4 0.8 0.3 1.2 -1.1 n/a 4.9 n/a -0.7 -22.8 -0.4 3.4
Table 12: Dashboard of National Key Performance Indicators: 5 Year Trend
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Lithuania 15228 54296 66.1 54.3 34.6 2.0 66.5 16.5 20.4 63.7 42.8 50.1
Azerbaijan 6116 34886 64.7 63.2 30.9 2.5 68.3 8.5 18.4 145.4 28.3 38.0
Hungary 14375 56301 67.4 47.9 29.3 0.5 62.5 16.7 11.3 48.3 75.3 47.9
Poland 14581 53737 68.7 51.3 31.6 0.3 73.0 14.2 10.6 82.9 51.3 43.8
Panama 10751 43690 68.1 62.6 46.8 8.4 76.6 13.5 24.6 65.0 38.8 53.4
Romania 9527 37818 66.8 52.8 32.1 4.1 73.0 7.9 22.1 81.8 39.3 48.9
Uruguay 13944 40529 67.9 61.2 36.9 1.3 69.9 19.2 8.3 33.9 64.3 55.9
Latvia 14244 48647 67.1 54.8 35.6 2.6 67.0 14.9 0.5 49.6 34.9 52.2
Malaysia 10877 54169 66.5 58.4 38.4 2.7 80.0 14.1 12.9 113.8 57.4 44.7
Costa Rica 9130 30871 69.8 57.8 46.2 3.9 73.4 14.3 14.8 31.6 42.4 45.4
Chile 14626 47811 70.5 58.0 47.1 2.1 80.5 14.4 4.4 57.3 17.5 45.2
Argentina 10515 31735 67.6 55.9 38.9 4.3 78.7 n/a 10.5 75.4 52.1 56.5
Thailand 5775 23853 66.8 71.5 37.0 0.9 85.9 11.2 12.9 163.1 43.1 39.2
Russian Federation 11039 46903 63.4 60.5 32.8 0.5 92.3 18.8 13.1 213.5 16.4 43.1
Peru 5974 22259 65.7 73.1 45.1 9.0 80.7 10.3 13.6 40.9 24.0 53.2
China 6416 21630 68.5 68.0 50.0 11.1 81.9 6.6 35.7 201.1 42.9 36.6
Kazakhstan 10547 46769 63.3 69.7 27.2 0.3 89.2 10.6 4.6 285.1 21.9 50.3
Bulgaria 7502 40287 66.4 47.2 33.7 4.7 65.8 13.2 11.7 164.3 26.3 51.9
Paraguay 3825 17444 65.2 67.2 46.1 7.0 77.4 11.7 10.2 34.9 24.2 56.6
Turkey 11525 56666 66.2 44.8 36.4 2.6 83.2 13.0 11.2 57.5 32.9 49.7
Iran, Islamic Rep. 5937 50217 66.5 39.6 36.0 0.7 77.9 n/a 8.9 313.4 15.9 40.2
Indonesia 3834 21183 62.1 63.5 42.3 36.4 84.0 n/a 27.1 126.6 27.3 49.0
Croatia 13807 53602 69.4 42.7 30.7 2.2 64.5 15.0 3.4 55.3 86.7 51.1
Macedonia, FYR 5094 37182 67.5 39.9 32.8 8.7 68.2 8.3 14.4 123.9 38.0 41.4
Vietnam 1685 8914 66.6 75.9 37.9 12.0 74.8 6.6 16.2 196.2 58.3 42.5
Venezuela 12794 39440 65.2 59.5 36.4 14.9 83.7 8.5 15.1 120.7 41.5 52.4
Nepal 690 4229 61.2 81.0 33.8 48.4 80.4 3.2 33.0 39.5 28.0 61.8
Dominican Republic 6494 30509 65.1 55.1 47.1 9.1 n/a 8.2 15.0 49.6 34.9 57.8
Mexico 9517 39053 67.4 58.6 46.1 11.0 77.9 6.9 8.3 48.9 54.0 51.7
Brazil 11159 29170 65.5 65.0 46.0 7.6 82.9 12.0 7.5 57.0 73.7 44.7
Georgia 4010 16292 66.4 56.6 38.8 25.3 75.0 5.1 9.9 82.7 41.5 45.7
Nicaragua 1849 11122 63.8 60.3 42.1 17.1 76.7 6.5 12.2 76.1 29.4 54.1
Colombia 7448 28119 65.2 60.7 48.5 13.2 76.2 8.8 3.6 43.5 50.6 45.6
Moldova 1971 14230 64.9 39.9 31.8 1.0 68.0 8.2 14.5 249.9 41.5 34.6
Jordan 3976 41085 65.0 37.2 35.8 n/a 73.0 12.2 16.4 111.6 93.4 64.8
Mongolia 3944 22450 62.1 60.3 33.4 2.7 71.5 8.9 10.6 270.1 n/a 47.6
Bangladesh 973 5433 62.4 67.8 40.4 56.8 78.6 2.9 25.6 71.7 33.9 52.5
Bolivia 2373 13276 62.5 70.6 44.5 12.7 77.9 9.5 8.9 137.1 36.2 63.7
Algeria 4794 45664 66.3 40.0 34.2 n/a 71.7 n/a 27.5 167.0 9.1 52.6
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Table 12: Dashboard of National Key Performance Indicators: 5 Year Trend
Developing Economies (cont’d.)
Albania 2.1 1.3 1.0 -1.0 7.7 0.7 -1.8 -0.1 -9.0 3.5 13.9 -1.9
Sri Lanka 5.3 6.3 1.2 0.1 -1.0 -2.1 13.8 0.3 -0.9 -3.9 -2.4 2.0
Philippines 4.2 3.3 -0.1 0.6 0.0 1.2 1.6 0.4 -7.7 -3.2 -6.6 -2.4
El Salvador 1.7 -0.2 -0.7 0.9 -1.4 -7.3 0.4 0.9 -2.3 -0.1 8.8 -5.2
Serbia 0.9 1.4 1.6 -1.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.4 n/a 4.1 30.8 2.1
Cambodia 5.5 5.1 -0.8 0.0 -2.7 -16.1 12.2 0.9 1.0 6.0 2.2 -2.4
Tunisia 0.3 1.0 -0.3 0.3 1.6 -4.9 0.4 1.1 -8.6 0.6 12.6 0.6
Morocco 2.5 2.3 1.7 0.0 0.3 -10.2 0.0 1.0 -4.7 -21.0 11.5 -1.1
Guatemala 1.7 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.7 -2.4 n/a 0.4 -0.2 2.0 0.5 -4.9
Ukraine -0.9 0.5 1.9 1.1 -3.0 -0.1 1.4 1.0 -3.6 -37.2 43.2 0.6
Honduras 2.0 0.0 1.4 1.2 1.5 2.1 n/a -0.3 -2.6 20.1 14.7 -7.6
Lao PDR 6.0 5.0 1.5 0.2 1.7 -7.9 10.9 0.4 -5.5 -8.4 6.1 -4.4
Armenia 4.0 2.9 2.6 3.0 -0.6 -7.0 10.2 0.8 -7.7 3.0 11.2 -2.4
Tanzania 3.5 3.8 0.8 -0.3 -4.6 -1.8 8.6 0.2 4.3 5.5 8.7 0.5
Pakistan 2.0 1.4 1.8 0.5 5.9 -16.0 10.2 0.3 4.3 -11.8 4.6 -2.5
Egypt 0.3 1.0 1.3 -1.4 2.6 n/a 1.9 n/a -4.4 15.3 16.1 3.7
Tajikistan 4.3 3.9 0.1 1.3 -1.5 33.2 8.1 0.3 6.8 -221.7 -1.4 -2.0
Yemen -5.3 -5.4 -0.5 1.0 3.8 n/a 8.0 n/a -12.2 16.6 20.9 -4.6
Ghana 5.2 5.2 0.0 2.6 -0.7 n/a 8.2 -0.6 -1.1 -19.2 28.2 -0.9
Cameroon 2.7 1.8 0.1 0.3 -3.0 -10.7 10.6 0.8 -5.3 -10.9 15.8 -2.7
Kyrgyz Republic 3.0 3.2 3.8 1.8 -2.4 -3.9 7.0 0.0 -10.9 23.3 16.7 2.7
Senegal 0.9 0.6 2.1 -0.4 1.7 -0.1 9.3 0.0 1.9 0.3 16.1 -0.1
Mali 5.1 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 -6.1 1.6 7.7 0.0 5.8 0.2 6.9 0.2
India 5.4 4.3 3.2 -1.3 0.1 -15.5 6.3 n/a -2.0 -9.3 -0.6 -3.1
Zimbabwe 4.1 1.6 9.2 0.5 -0.5 n/a -1.4 n/a n/a -31.3 7.1 -0.3
Namibia 3.2 2.1 4.3 0.7 -6.0 -9.0 10.9 0.6 2.8 0.2 10.5 -2.7
Chad 1.3 2.1 -2.2 0.0 -0.3 -19.7 10.9 0.9 n/a -0.6 12.1 -3.9
Uganda 2.1 1.6 3.5 0.0 3.1 -4.4 12.7 0.2 -1.7 -16.4 10.7 -3.3
Kenya 2.7 1.4 1.6 0.9 -1.5 n/a 12.2 0.3 -2.7 -8.6 8.3 -1.6
Burundi -0.4 1.2 -1.2 0.6 -3.2 n/a 10.7 0.0 32.4 7.4 2.7 2.0
Sierra Leone 2.9 9.7 -3.5 0.2 -5.4 -0.9 8.9 0.2 16.2 11.6 -1.0 -3.2
Rwanda 4.5 2.4 -0.1 -0.5 3.5 -0.1 17.2 0.0 -3.2 -5.2 14.2 -4.1
Lesotho 3.0 2.2 6.2 1.8 -10.7 -1.6 8.2 0.0 12.5 -21.8 20.3 -3.9
South Africa 0.5 1.0 7.0 0.7 -2.3 -12.2 1.9 0.2 -2.1 -19.1 11.6 -3.6
Nigeria 1.9 2.4 -4.7 0.6 -1.0 -2.1 4.3 0.0 -0.5 9.1 1.3 -0.1
Madagascar -0.2 -1.1 2.8 -0.6 0.9 0.6 9.3 0.0 -6.8 41.8 3.4 -4.6
Mauritania 2.6 3.0 -4.1 0.4 -0.2 -10.4 7.8 0.6 -10.0 4.3 19.6 -2.5
Zambia 2.1 3.3 7.2 -0.4 -2.4 2.0 24.5 -0.1 n/a 2.8 35.5 -2.5
Malawi 1.0 0.9 3.1 0.0 3.8 -2.4 14.5 0.0 -12.4 21.5 -6.4 -2.7
Mozambique 4.1 5.0 2.9 -0.4 1.9 -4.5 13.4 0.3 4.6 3.4 48.0 -2.0
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Table 11: Dashboard of National Key Performance Indicators: Levels
Developing Economies (cont’d.)
Albania 4541 25434 68.8 46.3 38.4 6.8 65.0 6.5 -1.2 47.7 73.3 44.8
Sri Lanka 3638 24561 67.0 52.4 37.1 14.6 80.7 5.5 17.5 44.8 76.0 51.2
Philippines 2635 16456 61.1 60.6 41.7 37.6 83.4 4.5 29.0 70.8 34.8 57.6
El Salvador 3853 18405 64.1 58.4 39.8 11.3 72.6 7.3 0.8 40.3 58.7 54.3
Serbia 5659 26574 67.7 40.9 32.8 1.3 65.4 11.3 n/a 235.2 77.4 50.1
Cambodia 1021 5476 58.1 82.2 39.5 21.6 79.5 4.5 3.5 66.3 32.5 55.6
Tunisia 4235 34056 66.7 41.3 36.7 8.4 73.1 7.7 -2.0 60.4 55.7 44.8
Morocco 3238 22028 65.1 45.5 39.6 15.5 79.0 5.7 17.2 57.9 64.1 50.1
Guatemala 3052 18030 62.2 65.9 49.5 24.1 n/a 5.6 2.9 43.3 24.2 70.9
Ukraine 2824 17157 64.1 55.0 25.5 0.1 91.7 11.4 -0.5 347.0 80.1 43.3
Honduras 2329 11394 64.9 60.4 52.0 31.2 n/a 5.0 11.0 101.6 46.8 57.8
Lao PDR 1538 9804 57.9 76.7 37.4 46.9 75.2 3.3 -4.0 39.0 63.0 62.8
Armenia 3793 18376 66.9 52.9 34.9 14.6 74.3 5.4 0.9 899.3 46.9 41.3
Tanzania 842 3640 54.2 86.3 31.7 76.1 73.1 2.0 15.3 41.0 36.5 93.8
Pakistan 1152 13513 57.8 51.7 37.6 36.9 72.7 3.7 14.9 126.4 63.6 65.3
Egypt 2707 36557 62.2 42.8 46.4 n/a 81.1 7.2 3.2 206.5 89.0 62.3
Tajikistan 917 6466 62.1 60.7 31.1 56.7 71.0 2.9 14.7 1104.6 34.1 60.9
Yemen 1097 15608 57.7 40.5 38.5 n/a 73.6 4.3 -10.8 159.3 66.7 75.6
Ghana 1696 9399 55.3 67.8 37.3 49.0 75.0 2.6 2.0 60.0 70.8 73.0
Cameroon 1309 6974 50.3 67.3 37.8 43.5 78.0 3.6 -2.1 27.0 29.0 84.3
Kyrgyz Republic 1017 7610 63.9 62.4 32.4 17.5 71.6 4.6 -4.7 469.2 66.0 55.3
Senegal 1044 5715 58.3 69.0 37.4 66.3 76.4 2.4 13.0 76.9 56.8 87.6
Mali 903 5117 51.1 60.7 31.6 77.7 74.0 2.0 14.9 12.7 30.9 100.2
India 1806 14681 59.6 52.2 47.9 58.0 87.6 n/a 20.3 162.9 69.1 52.4
Zimbabwe 819 3289 52.1 82.0 51.6 45.5 79.4 n/a n/a 179.6 58.9 80.4
Namibia 6014 30734 57.5 48.4 58.0 45.7 92.5 3.5 17.2 43.5 33.7 67.3
Chad 952 6206 46.1 66.6 38.3 64.8 77.4 2.4 n/a 3.2 42.6 100.7
Uganda 673 3623 54.0 74.5 41.4 65.0 81.4 2.5 3.3 22.4 34.4 102.3
Kenya 1133 6336 55.6 61.2 42.7 58.9 82.7 3.0 4.2 57.9 51.3 80.9
Burundi 210 1779 52.2 77.0 32.2 92.2 74.5 1.2 -8.5 25.3 42.4 89.7
Sierra Leone 498 5163 44.4 65.1 34.4 80.0 75.1 1.9 5.0 50.2 43.8 81.9
Rwanda 690 2938 56.6 85.2 49.4 80.6 89.4 1.6 4.9 19.6 37.3 78.1
Lesotho 1227 8257 46.6 48.9 47.8 77.3 81.5 1.5 30.2 17.4 58.3 67.3
South Africa 7575 44047 54.4 39.4 57.3 34.7 83.0 4.7 3.7 180.3 49.8 52.1
Nigeria 2548 19511 47.7 52.0 42.2 76.5 83.7 1.8 11.2 48.6 11.5 87.7
Madagascar 409 2739 56.9 85.2 42.5 90.5 77.8 1.1 -5.0 215.6 35.5 80.3
Mauritania 1338 10504 55.1 37.3 39.2 22.1 74.8 4.9 -16.4 89.0 91.2 76.1
Zambia 1619 8623 53.7 68.7 50.9 78.9 95.9 1.4 3.7 22.6 56.3 95.4
Malawi 494 1837 51.2 76.8 43.6 87.6 81.7 1.3 2.2 53.0 82.0 94.5
Mozambique 510 3003 49.6 65.1 42.7 87.5 83.5 1.4 8.7 38.8 86.0 94.8
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Note: For Tables 13-16,the traffic light shading indicates performance relative to peer countries belonging to the same income group. Red corresponds to the lowest  
quintile of performance within the group, orange to the fourth quintile, yellow to the median or middle quintile, light green to the second quintile, and dark green to
the best quintile of performers. For low-income countries, a single color calibration has been performed based on the range in scores of the lower-middle income
countries.This has been done to highlight the still significant room for improvement even for the best performers within the low income group. Since this color scheme 
ranks countries only within each comparator group, colors are not comparable across income groups. Pillar and sub-pillar scores are based on 1 to 7 scale,
with 1 representing the worst and 7 the best, and are largely comparable across the entire sample of 109 countries.
Table 13: Policy and Institutional Indicators (PIIs)
Advanced Economies
CORRUPTION AND RENTSBASIC SERVICES AND  
INFRASTRUCTURE
EDUCATION AND SKILLS
LABOR  BASIC AND 
DIGITAL 
INFRA- 
STRUCTURE
HEALTH 
SERVICES AND 
QUALITY  
OF LIFE
LABOR  ACCESS QUALITY EQUITY
PILLAR SUB-PILLAR PILLAR SUB-PILLAR
LABOR  BUSINESS 
AND  
POLITICAL 
ETHICS
CONCENTRATION 
OF RENTS
PILLAR SUB-PILLAR
Australia 5.73 6.72 5.19 5.28 5.68 5.43 5.93 4.83 5.46 4.21 5.39 5.72 5.07 5.76 5.66 5.86 4.36 4.58 4.13 4.45 4.03 4.88
Austria 5.56 6.66 5.05 4.98 5.61 5.41 5.82 4.91 4.99 4.84 4.74 5.89 3.59 4.91 5.10 4.72 5.27 5.41 5.12 4.16 2.65 5.67
Belgium 5.67 6.64 5.39 4.97 5.30 4.80 5.80 4.94 5.32 4.56 4.65 5.59 3.71 4.73 5.03 4.43 5.17 5.34 5.00 5.08 4.40 5.75
Canada 5.62 5.68 5.37 5.82 5.53 5.35 5.71 4.89 5.27 4.51 5.13 5.63 4.62 5.28 4.90 5.67 4.40 4.66 4.13 4.55 3.86 5.24
Czech Republic 5.29 6.55 4.47 4.84 5.24 5.13 5.34 3.76 3.44 4.08 3.62 4.74 2.50 4.21 4.13 4.29 4.50 4.87 4.14 3.72 2.60 4.84
Denmark 5.88 6.52 5.65 5.48 5.72 5.68 5.76 5.27 5.89 4.64 4.59 5.32 3.86 5.48 5.63 5.34 5.86 5.83 5.90 4.84 3.67 6.00
Estonia 5.72 6.17 4.98 6.01 5.30 5.12 5.49 4.51 5.06 3.97 3.78 4.89 2.67 4.82 5.24 4.41 4.78 5.21 4.36 3.39 2.17 4.60
Finland 6.13 6.54 5.80 6.04 5.88 5.76 6.01 5.42 6.29 4.56 4.91 5.45 4.36 5.93 5.61 6.25 5.57 5.49 5.64 4.34 3.35 5.32
France 5.47 6.27 4.90 5.25 5.48 5.37 5.58 4.75 4.85 4.65 4.51 5.19 3.83 4.86 5.03 4.70 5.06 5.19 4.93 4.78 4.02 5.54
Germany 5.68 6.47 5.20 5.37 5.46 5.31 5.62 4.84 5.08 4.60 4.73 5.91 3.55 4.73 5.41 4.06 5.04 5.51 4.57 3.93 2.57 5.30
Greece 4.85 5.88 3.81 4.86 4.75 4.44 5.06 3.53 3.20 3.87 3.50 3.57 3.43 3.61 3.96 3.27 3.66 3.56 3.77 3.58 3.09 4.06
Iceland 5.68 6.27 5.42 5.36 5.65 5.51 5.80 5.00 5.42 4.57 4.41 4.11 4.70 5.36 5.73 4.98 5.57 5.35 5.78 4.53 3.87 5.19
Ireland 5.66 6.23 5.29 5.47 5.18 5.01 5.36 5.22 5.81 4.64 4.33 5.13 3.53 5.10 5.16 5.04 4.23 4.57 3.90 4.99 4.49 5.48
Israel 5.30 6.29 4.82 4.80 5.14 4.89 5.40 4.27 4.65 3.89 4.67 4.69 4.64 5.06 5.18 4.94 4.47 4.64 4.30 4.58 4.09 5.08
Italy 5.27 6.33 4.32 5.16 4.89 4.56 5.22 3.75 3.18 4.31 3.26 3.88 2.64 3.78 4.15 3.40 4.33 3.77 4.88 4.09 3.34 4.83
Japan 5.57 5.91 4.87 5.94 5.68 5.50 5.86 5.57 5.51 5.63 4.53 5.23 3.83 4.90 5.22 4.59 4.29 4.79 3.80 4.23 3.65 4.82
Korea, Rep. 5.46 5.93 4.78 5.67 5.31 5.16 5.46 4.04 3.56 4.51 4.73 4.75 4.71 4.84 5.46 4.21 4.17 4.55 3.79 4.42 4.24 4.59
Luxembourg 5.02 5.82 4.53 4.71 5.59 5.48 5.69 5.62 5.94 5.30 5.09 5.93 4.24 5.22 5.24 5.20 5.19 5.69 4.69 4.91 4.31 5.51
Netherlands 5.83 6.71 5.44 5.33 5.61 5.46 5.75 5.25 5.88 4.62 4.48 5.41 3.54 5.70 5.68 5.72 5.10 5.46 4.74 4.37 3.11 5.64
New Zealand 5.74 6.39 5.41 5.43 5.45 5.05 5.84 5.36 6.27 4.44 5.62 6.03 5.22 5.51 5.85 5.18 4.51 4.87 4.15 4.59 3.95 5.24
Norway 5.99 6.61 5.69 5.66 5.72 5.46 5.99 5.39 6.01 4.76 5.40 5.92 4.89 5.19 5.86 4.52 6.12 6.10 6.14 4.52 3.44 5.60
Portugal 5.35 5.93 4.75 5.38 5.30 5.03 5.57 3.93 4.09 3.78 3.66 4.33 2.98 4.30 4.60 4.00 4.54 4.38 4.69 4.18 3.27 5.08
Singapore 5.73 5.93 5.52 5.74 6.03 5.84 6.22 5.27 6.21 4.33 5.50 5.23 5.78 5.67 5.82 5.52 5.20 5.62 4.79 4.16 4.07 4.24
Slovak Republic 4.79 5.98 3.88 4.51 4.91 4.93 4.89 3.37 2.68 4.06 n/a 4.55 n/a 3.93 3.99 3.87 4.26 4.30 4.21 3.31 2.31 4.32
Slovenia 5.61 6.57 4.88 5.39 4.98 4.70 5.26 4.22 3.73 4.71 3.94 4.53 3.35 4.50 4.78 4.22 4.64 4.81 4.46 3.86 2.73 4.99
Spain 5.27 6.11 4.38 5.33 5.57 5.40 5.74 4.06 3.55 4.57 3.94 5.29 2.60 4.46 4.54 4.39 4.07 3.94 4.19 4.18 3.27 5.08
Sweden 5.70 6.30 5.41 5.38 5.77 5.69 5.85 5.50 6.14 4.86 5.39 5.43 5.36 5.39 5.62 5.17 5.59 5.18 5.99 4.11 3.20 5.03
Switzerland 5.82 6.53 5.58 5.34 6.06 5.99 6.12 5.32 5.94 4.71 4.85 5.91 3.80 5.53 5.36 5.69 5.05 5.61 4.48 4.68 3.91 5.46
United Kingdom 5.62 6.22 5.07 5.57 5.53 5.39 5.66 5.21 5.58 4.84 4.77 5.66 3.88 5.43 5.54 5.32 4.45 4.88 4.02 4.76 4.58 4.94
United States 5.56 6.40 5.07 5.21 5.50 5.51 5.50 4.86 4.73 4.98 4.45 5.71 3.18 5.77 5.97 5.57 4.06 4.80 3.33 4.21 3.73 4.69
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Table 14: Policy and Institutional Indicators (PIIs)
Upper Middle Income Economies
CORRUPTION AND RENTSBASIC SERVICES AND  
INFRASTRUCTURE
EDUCATION AND SKILLS
LABOR  BASIC AND 
DIGITAL 
INFRA- 
STRUCTURE
HEALTH 
SERVICES AND 
QUALITY  
OF LIFE
LABOR  ACCESS QUALITY EQUITY
PILLAR SUB-PILLAR PILLAR SUB-PILLAR
LABOR  BUSINESS 
AND  
POLITICAL 
ETHICS
CONCENTRATION 
OF RENTS
PILLAR SUB-PILLAR
Argentina 4.35 6.12 3.84 3.08 5.08 4.75 5.41 3.25 2.44 4.05 2.55 3.36 1.74 3.52 3.98 3.07 4.60 4.66 4.53 3.89 3.67 4.11
Azerbaijan n/a 5.10 3.59 n/a 5.31 5.10 5.51 3.78 3.78 3.78 2.80 3.51 2.09 4.55 4.47 4.62 4.71 4.95 4.47 3.62 3.58 3.66
Brazil 4.12 4.86 3.28 4.21 4.98 4.79 5.16 3.03 2.46 3.60 3.15 3.60 2.70 3.31 3.15 3.47 4.81 4.97 4.65 3.54 3.20 3.88
Bulgaria 4.62 6.01 3.56 4.30 4.88 4.63 5.13 3.59 3.17 4.02 3.25 3.99 2.52 4.16 4.49 3.84 4.46 4.60 4.33 3.82 3.21 4.42
Chile 4.72 6.07 4.05 4.05 5.34 4.91 5.77 3.82 4.22 3.42 3.66 4.18 3.14 4.46 4.53 4.40 4.75 5.32 4.17 3.71 3.41 4.02
China 4.93 5.41 4.36 5.02 4.95 5.05 4.84 4.38 4.19 4.57 4.38 4.28 4.48 4.26 4.75 3.77 4.78 5.10 4.46 3.53 3.22 3.84
Colombia 4.23 4.93 3.65 4.11 4.68 4.50 4.87 3.23 2.72 3.74 2.80 3.40 2.19 3.44 3.86 3.03 4.36 4.48 4.24 3.54 4.00 3.08
Costa Rica 4.67 5.37 4.43 4.20 5.37 5.00 5.74 3.91 3.71 4.11 2.96 3.77 2.14 3.63 3.94 3.31 4.62 4.83 4.42 3.70 3.53 3.87
Croatia 4.97 5.83 3.90 5.17 5.32 5.18 5.46 3.33 3.10 3.56 3.40 4.30 2.50 3.85 4.28 3.43 4.37 4.01 4.72 3.71 3.21 4.20
Hungary 4.50 5.46 3.70 4.33 5.19 5.11 5.28 2.97 2.77 3.17 3.31 4.38 2.23 4.21 4.35 4.07 4.37 4.73 4.02 4.14 3.37 4.91
Kazakhstan 4.27 5.31 3.80 3.69 5.14 4.77 5.50 3.97 3.93 4.02 3.09 4.06 2.13 4.43 4.52 4.34 5.25 5.36 5.14 3.23 3.09 3.37
Latvia 5.32 6.05 4.37 5.55 5.39 5.38 5.39 3.87 3.54 4.20 3.36 4.27 2.45 4.16 4.92 3.41 4.51 5.04 3.97 3.58 2.79 4.37
Lithuania 5.15 6.03 4.41 5.02 5.51 5.46 5.56 3.81 3.93 3.69 3.25 4.23 2.27 4.06 4.62 3.51 4.67 5.13 4.20 3.67 2.82 4.53
Malaysia 4.42 5.22 4.77 3.27 5.53 5.07 5.99 4.69 4.63 4.75 4.79 4.76 4.81 4.69 4.54 4.84 4.77 5.60 3.94 3.96 4.40 3.53
Mexico 4.24 4.75 3.68 4.30 5.00 4.78 5.22 3.37 2.69 4.05 2.97 3.65 2.30 3.75 3.99 3.51 4.30 4.64 3.97 3.41 3.42 3.40
Namibia n/a 3.78 4.13 n/a 3.73 3.44 4.01 3.84 3.92 3.75 3.53 4.24 2.82 4.42 3.79 5.05 4.36 4.26 4.47 4.23 4.55 3.9
Panama n/a 5.03 3.64 n/a 4.94 4.57 5.30 3.74 3.17 4.30 3.86 4.26 3.46 4.24 4.54 3.94 4.77 5.24 4.31 4.22 5.15 3.28
Peru 4.00 5.48 3.14 3.37 4.27 3.86 4.69 3.32 3.06 3.58 3.06 3.37 2.76 3.94 4.15 3.73 4.27 4.84 3.70 3.39 4.05 2.72
Poland 5.41 6.19 4.45 5.58 5.21 5.14 5.29 4.08 3.72 4.44 3.65 4.21 3.08 4.02 3.97 4.07 4.22 4.82 3.63 3.69 2.44 4.94
Romania 4.49 5.72 3.42 4.34 4.86 4.48 5.25 3.47 3.06 3.88 2.71 3.40 2.02 4.25 4.25 4.24 4.28 4.32 4.25 3.63 2.76 4.51
Russian Federation 5.33 6.27 4.36 5.37 5.12 5.22 5.03 4.08 3.38 4.77 3.04 3.73 2.36 4.00 4.67 3.34 5.00 5.25 4.75 3.80 3.09 4.51
Serbia n/a 5.68 3.45 n/a 4.87 4.56 5.19 3.46 2.99 3.93 3.03 4.15 1.92 3.34 3.86 2.81 3.99 3.25 4.74 3.74 3.10 4.38
South Africa n/a 5.01 3.56 n/a 4.66 4.54 4.78 3.87 3.70 4.03 3.57 4.42 2.72 4.41 4.34 4.47 3.88 3.94 3.81 4.67 5.07 4.26
Turkey 4.53 5.31 3.29 4.99 5.27 5.21 5.32 3.98 3.66 4.30 3.19 3.76 2.62 3.74 3.96 3.52 3.83 4.24 3.42 3.70 3.37 4.04
Uruguay 4.58 5.52 3.90 4.34 5.19 4.80 5.58 4.15 4.93 3.36 3.00 3.71 2.28 4.13 4.17 4.10 4.94 5.10 4.78 3.77 3.45 4.09
Venezuela n/a 5.23 3.92 n/a 4.55 4.08 5.02 2.18 1.86 2.49 2.75 3.79 1.71 3.26 2.81 3.70 4.37 4.17 4.58 3.57 3.57 3.5
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Table 15: Policy and Institutional Indicators (PIIs)
Lower Middle Income Economies
CORRUPTION AND RENTSBASIC SERVICES AND  
INFRASTRUCTURE
EDUCATION AND SKILLS
LABOR  BASIC AND 
DIGITAL 
INFRA- 
STRUCTURE
HEALTH 
SERVICES AND 
QUALITY  
OF LIFE
LABOR  ACCESS QUALITY EQUITY
PILLAR SUB-PILLAR PILLAR SUB-PILLAR
LABOR  BUSINESS 
AND  
POLITICAL 
ETHICS
CONCENTRATION 
OF RENTS
PILLAR SUB-PILLAR
Albania 4.60 5.45 4.28 4.09 4.81 4.44 5.17 3.27 3.43 3.11 2.89 3.16 2.62 3.50 3.90 3.10 4.27 3.80 4.73 3.22 3.24 3.20
Algeria n/a 4.87 3.78 n/a 4.29 3.67 4.92 3.09 3.14 3.05 2.44 3.07 1.80 3.44 4.05 2.83 3.80 3.76 3.85 4.09 4.43 3.75
Armenia 5.13 4.92 3.97 6.49 5.19 4.89 5.49 3.88 3.49 4.27 2.88 3.15 2.61 4.28 4.43 4.12 3.97 3.90 4.04 3.80 3.49 4.12
Bolivia 4.41 5.03 4.03 4.16 4.00 3.77 4.24 2.83 2.05 3.62 3.02 3.88 2.16 3.21 3.28 3.15 4.42 4.55 4.28 3.23 3.13 3.33
Cameroon 3.47 3.73 3.77 2.90 3.25 2.61 3.89 3.14 2.78 3.50 2.74 2.78 2.70 3.19 3.38 3.00 4.09 4.52 3.65 2.91 3.53 2.29
Dominican Republic 4.31 4.21 3.77 4.97 4.74 4.69 4.79 2.89 2.35 3.43 3.18 3.89 2.48 3.48 3.54 3.43 4.08 3.93 4.24 2.78 3.19 2.38
Egypt 4.39 4.56 3.17 5.44 4.71 4.64 4.78 3.65 3.72 3.58 2.28 2.64 1.92 3.22 3.61 2.83 3.51 3.53 3.50 3.27 3.17 3.37
El Salvador 4.62 4.86 3.66 5.33 4.12 3.71 4.52 3.15 2.76 3.53 2.69 3.31 2.06 3.20 3.61 2.79 4.03 4.41 3.66 2.94 3.49 2.39
Georgia 5.23 5.07 4.28 6.36 5.07 4.67 5.46 3.69 4.23 3.16 3.50 3.72 3.28 3.73 4.53 2.92 4.28 4.11 4.45 3.82 3.98 3.67
Ghana 3.95 4.37 4.18 3.28 3.88 3.56 4.20 3.87 3.29 4.45 2.99 3.37 2.60 3.18 3.89 2.47 4.66 4.78 4.54 3.45 3.90 3.00
Guatemala 4.05 4.60 4.03 3.52 3.90 3.48 4.32 3.35 2.82 3.89 3.04 3.74 2.34 3.47 3.70 3.24 4.29 4.72 3.87 3.08 3.69 2.47
Honduras 4.27 4.61 4.67 3.55 4.10 3.70 4.49 3.49 2.96 4.03 3.42 3.31 3.53 3.84 3.91 3.77 4.10 4.60 3.59 2.84 3.54 2.14
India 3.94 3.53 3.67 4.62 4.32 4.22 4.42 4.56 4.35 4.77 3.78 3.83 3.73 3.40 3.51 3.29 3.70 4.31 3.08 2.85 3.46 2.25
Indonesia 4.79 4.84 4.72 4.80 4.62 4.24 4.99 4.18 3.82 4.54 3.46 3.95 2.97 3.60 3.61 3.59 3.93 4.50 3.37 3.44 3.84 3.05
Iran, Islamic Rep. 4.85 5.04 3.99 5.52 4.96 4.48 5.44 3.66 3.39 3.93 2.95 4.14 1.76 4.38 4.34 4.41 3.53 3.48 3.57 4.28 4.68 3.88
Jordan 4.81 4.55 4.37 5.49 5.04 4.57 5.51 3.97 4.53 3.40 3.52 3.29 3.75 3.62 3.73 3.51 4.20 4.22 4.18 3.56 3.34 3.78
Kyrgyz Republic 5.05 4.78 4.02 6.34 4.40 3.88 4.92 2.76 2.93 2.59 2.78 3.31 2.25 3.98 4.12 3.84 3.96 4.32 3.61 3.57 3.25 3.8
Lao PDR 3.15 3.53 3.95 1.97 3.90 3.60 4.20 3.70 3.76 3.63 3.76 3.67 3.86 3.03 3.60 2.46 4.24 4.66 3.82 3.16 3.94 2.38
Lesotho 3.69 3.18 4.28 3.62 3.65 2.76 4.53 3.61 3.36 3.86 2.27 2.56 1.98 3.21 3.77 2.66 3.84 3.91 3.77 n/a 5.43 n/a
Macedonia, FYR 4.76 4.73 4.52 5.01 5.05 4.97 5.13 3.84 3.81 3.87 3.59 4.17 3.00 3.35 4.41 2.29 4.21 3.43 4.99 3.85 3.59 4.10
Mauritania 2.29 2.24 2.33 2.31 2.55 1.76 3.34 2.78 2.82 2.75 2.70 2.50 2.90 3.25 4.17 2.32 3.01 2.46 3.56 2.96 3.17 2.76
Moldova 5.18 5.15 4.90 5.49 4.62 4.40 4.84 2.91 2.40 3.41 2.62 3.13 2.12 3.10 4.09 2.11 4.70 4.75 4.65 3.57 3.44 3.70
Mongolia 4.68 5.33 3.91 4.80 4.12 4.13 4.10 2.81 2.80 2.82 3.22 4.08 2.36 3.49 4.28 2.71 4.52 4.55 4.49 3.69 3.43 3.94
Morocco 3.53 4.03 3.53 3.02 5.02 4.86 5.17 3.64 3.68 3.60 2.88 3.19 2.57 3.81 3.93 3.69 3.89 3.88 3.91 3.99 4.73 3.25
Nicaragua 4.11 4.01 3.83 4.48 3.68 2.86 4.50 2.62 2.45 2.80 2.96 2.65 3.26 3.81 4.03 3.58 3.89 4.40 3.39 2.74 3.10 2.38
Nigeria 2.56 2.58 3.30 1.82 3.38 3.06 3.70 3.32 2.52 4.13 2.26 2.78 1.74 2.97 3.38 2.56 4.26 4.81 3.71 2.87 3.90 1.84
Pakistan 3.20 3.05 3.28 3.26 3.95 3.83 4.06 3.58 3.14 4.02 2.23 2.35 2.11 3.56 3.87 3.26 3.49 4.00 2.97 2.88 3.36 2.40
Paraguay 4.62 4.21 3.86 5.78 4.26 3.72 4.79 3.00 2.29 3.72 3.02 3.61 2.43 3.41 3.96 2.86 4.17 4.76 3.57 3.48 4.45 2.50
Philippines 4.35 5.17 3.75 4.12 4.17 3.64 4.71 3.50 3.05 3.96 3.48 3.75 3.21 3.31 3.55 3.07 4.09 4.63 3.55 3.47 3.83 3.10
Senegal 2.98 2.67 3.80 2.45 3.56 2.94 4.18 3.69 3.48 3.89 2.78 2.62 2.95 2.89 3.20 2.59 4.11 4.21 4.02 2.79 3.29 2.30
Sri Lanka n/a 5.26 3.97 n/a 4.55 4.09 5.02 3.77 3.42 4.11 3.71 4.40 3.02 3.68 3.83 3.54 4.24 4.43 4.05 3.23 3.19 3.26
Thailand 4.85 5.10 4.45 4.99 4.81 4.54 5.08 3.75 3.29 4.21 4.59 4.53 4.65 3.75 3.90 3.59 4.38 4.95 3.80 3.87 3.70 4.04
Tunisia 4.12 4.36 3.88 4.12 5.07 4.81 5.33 3.67 3.51 3.84 3.45 3.27 3.63 3.78 4.30 3.26 3.59 3.63 3.55 3.64 4.19 3.09
Ukraine 5.86 6.10 5.02 6.46 4.75 4.34 5.15 2.81 2.76 2.87 2.71 3.41 2.02 3.29 3.85 2.74 4.78 4.52 5.03 3.84 3.06 4.62
Vietnam 4.57 5.04 4.32 4.35 4.72 4.55 4.88 3.84 3.41 4.27 3.08 3.55 2.61 3.93 4.11 3.74 4.84 4.99 4.70 3.27 3.59 2.94
Yemen 2.70 2.47 2.56 3.08 3.11 2.72 3.51 2.40 2.15 2.66 1.67 1.70 1.65 2.91 3.73 2.09 3.27 3.21 3.34 3.12 3.88 2.36
Zambia n/a n/a 3.23 3.43 2.78 2.45 3.12 3.63 3.34 3.93 2.72 3.26 2.19 3.19 3.85 2.52 3.83 3.90 3.77 3.40 4.19 2.61
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Table 16: Policy and Institutional Indicators (PIIs)
Low Income Economies
CORRUPTION AND RENTSBASIC SERVICES AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE
EDUCATION AND SKILLS
LABOR  BASIC AND 
DIGITAL 
INFRA- 
STRUCTURE
HEALTH 
SERVICES AND 
QUALITY  
OF LIFE
LABOR  ACCESS QUALITY EQUITY
PILLAR SUB-PILLAR PILLAR SUB-PILLAR
LABOR  BUSINESS 
AND  
POLITICAL 
ETHICS
CONCENTRATION 
OF RENTS
PILLAR SUB-PILLAR
Bangladesh 3.30 3.39 3.03 3.47 3.45 3.12 3.78 3.35 2.42 4.29 3.10 3.18 3.02 3.46 3.38 3.54 3.78 4.38 3.19 2.90 3.54 2.25
Burundi 3.31 3.03 3.24 3.65 2.62 1.98 3.26 3.10 2.53 3.67 2.38 2.84 1.91 2.72 3.56 1.88 3.78 3.87 3.69 2.68 3.41 1.95
Cambodia 3.05 3.30 2.95 2.92 3.35 2.86 3.83 3.48 3.17 3.80 3.56 3.11 4.00 3.23 2.74 3.73 4.26 4.83 3.68 2.88 3.63 2.13
Chad 2.39 2.25 2.35 2.55 2.23 1.45 3.01 2.42 2.12 2.73 2.30 2.10 2.50 2.68 2.89 2.47 3.77 4.00 3.55 n/a 3.74 n/a
Kenya 4.37 3.89 4.39 4.84 3.50 3.15 3.85 3.84 3.16 4.52 3.16 3.82 2.50 2.78 3.46 2.09 4.46 4.70 4.21 3.31 4.01 2.61
Madagascar 2.80 2.78 3.25 2.37 2.23 1.55 2.90 2.70 2.61 2.79 2.45 2.93 1.97 2.68 3.48 1.88 4.55 4.40 4.69 3.42 4.54 2.31
Malawi 3.51 3.64 3.27 3.61 2.73 1.89 3.58 2.90 2.88 2.91 2.48 2.50 2.46 3.06 3.14 2.98 4.17 4.94 3.41 3.14 4.35 1.94
Mali 2.65 2.58 3.58 1.80 3.02 2.25 3.79 3.34 3.19 3.50 2.63 2.82 2.44 2.99 3.55 2.42 3.90 4.04 3.76 2.92 3.72 2.12
Mozambique 3.11 2.88 3.51 2.94 2.48 2.11 2.84 2.85 2.73 2.97 2.72 3.20 2.25 3.14 3.88 2.40 3.91 3.70 4.11 3.34 4.04 2.63
Nepal 4.07 3.90 3.77 4.56 3.64 3.33 3.95 3.65 2.92 4.37 3.36 3.52 3.20 3.55 3.75 3.34 4.23 5.06 3.40 3.05 3.92 2.17
Rwanda 3.14 3.46 3.66 2.29 3.55 2.91 4.19 4.71 5.54 3.88 3.60 3.39 3.82 3.41 3.48 3.35 5.00 5.41 4.58 3.39 3.86 2.93
Sierra Leone 2.73 2.65 2.99 2.54 2.55 1.92 3.17 2.62 2.59 2.66 2.48 2.51 2.44 2.75 3.23 2.27 4.43 4.78 4.08 3.22 4.63 1.81
Tajikistan 4.82 4.28 4.22 5.94 4.13 3.55 4.71 3.78 4.24 3.33 2.63 3.17 2.09 3.52 4.28 2.76 4.83 4.68 4.97 2.87 2.89 2.84
Tanzania 3.82 3.57 4.02 3.87 2.81 2.26 3.37 3.65 3.26 4.03 2.86 3.18 2.54 3.98 4.33 3.63 4.35 4.74 3.96 2.85 3.47 2.22
Uganda 3.31 3.29 3.45 3.19 2.93 2.50 3.35 3.33 2.86 3.80 2.90 3.24 2.57 2.75 3.57 1.94 3.99 4.65 3.34 2.85 3.66 2.04
Zimbabwe 4.00 3.74 3.83 4.42 3.34 3.13 3.56 3.07 2.71 3.42 2.78 2.78 2.77 2.64 3.40 1.88 4.15 4.42 3.88 3.36 4.51 2.22
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At the same time, to ensure that apples are compared 
with apples: the color of the leaf shows the 
rank of the economy within its peer group.
Ireland's performance is compared to other advanced economies. For 
low-income countries, shading is based on the range in scores of  
lower-middle income countries. This has been done to highlight the still 
significant room for improvement even for the best performers within the 
low income group. Since this color scheme is relative, colors are not 
comparable across income groups.  
Ireland is the top scorer in fiscal transfers, resulting in a dark green leaf. 
Its score in Basic Services is actually higher, but as the level of scores in 
this pillar are very high in general (Switzerland leads with 6.27), Ireland 
lands only in the bottom 40%, resulting in an orange tint.
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Based on various indicators, each economy is  
assigned a score from 1 to 7 on each dimension. 
Higher scores result in bigger leaves. 
For instance, Ireland on the left scores high in Basic Services, 
but lower in Employment. 
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The Country/Economy Profiles section presents a profile of 
each of the 109 economies covered in The Inclusive Growth 
and Development Report 2017.1 
 1   National Key Performance Indicators
To provide added context, the first section presents a selection 
of key performance indicators for the economy under review. 
Countries are evaluated within their income groups on each 
of the 12 indicators that collectively convey a more complete 
picture of how well their economies are achieving strong, 
broad-based progress in living standards rather than GDP 
growth per se. 
  Both the most recent value (level) and trend (or growth 
rate) and overall aggregated score are presented. Ranks are 
based on the value (for the most recent year available) relative 
to peer countries. Trends are based on the direction and 
degree of movement of each indicator over the last five years 
depending on data availability. Most trends represent the  
absolute net differences while those denoted with a percentage 
represent the annual average percentage growth over the five 
year period. A selection of these indicators, sub-pillar scores 
and cross-country comparisons can be found in Part 2 of this 
Report. See technical notes for more information on each 
indicator and the time period covered.
2   Benchmarking Inclusive Growth
This section details the economy’s performance on the main 
components of the Inclusive Growth Benchmarking Tool.  
The first column shows the country’s score on the seven 
pillars and fifteen sub-pillars included in the Framework, while 
the second column presents the country’s rank among its 
peer economies. For more information on the methodology 
refer to Part 3.
3   The Inclusive Growth and Development Profiles  
in More Detail 
This page details the country’s performance on each of the 
indicators composing the benchmarking tool. Indicators are 
organized by sub-pillar. Indicators are not presented where 
data is unavailable “N/A”. Indicators with an asterix are not 
included in the final pillar aggregation and are meant for  
contextual purposes.
• INDICATOR, UNITS: This column contains the title of 
each indicator and, where relevant, the unit in which it is 
measured—for example, “days” or “% GDP.” Indicators 
derived from the World Economic Forum’s Executive 
Opinion Survey are always expressed as scores on a 
1–7 scale, with 7 being the most desirable outcome. 
• VALUE: This column reports the country’s aggregated 
score or value on each of the variables that compose 
each pillar.
• RANK: This column reports the country’s position among 
the peer economies covered by the Report. Please 
note the shading for the low income group is based on 
the lower middle income range. This has been done to 
highlight the still significant room for improvement even 
for the best performers within the low income group.
Online Data Portal
In addition to the analysis presented in this Report, an interactive 
data platform can be accessed via www.wef.ch/igd17. The 
platform offers a number of analytical and visualization tools, 
including sortable rankings per pillar and sub-pillar, scatter 
plots, bar charts, and maps.
1 Ireland is used as an illustrative example for the print edition of the Report.  
All of the 109 profiles can be found online at the following address:  
http://wef.ch/igd17.
1
2
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Country Profile
PILLAR VALUE RANK WITHIN ECONOMY GROUP
Education and Skills 5.66 14 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceLuxembourgItalySpainCzech RepublicIsraelPortugalKor a, Rep.FranceUnited StatesA striaJa nSloveniUnit d KingdomC adaIr l ndB lgiumGerma yIc l ndSwedenEsto iaA str liaSi gap reNew ZealandSw tzerlandN h sD m rkNorw yFinland
Access 6.23 19 / 30 CanadaLuxembourgGreeceJapanPortugalSingapo eKor a, Rep.Slov k RepublicSp inEst niaUn ted KingdomIrelandFr cIc l ndIsra lSw enIt lyN w ZealandU it d StatesGermanyDe m rkSwitze l ndFi l dCz ch RepublicSloveniaN rwayBelgiumAustriaN th rlandsAustralia
Quality 5.29 12 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicItalySp inCzech RepublicLuxembourgPortugalKorea, Rep.Is aelJap nSloveniaFr nceEsto iAustriaU i d StatesUnit d KingdomA straliaG manyIr l ndC n daBelg umNew Z alandSwed nI el ndN th rl si gap rewitzerlandDenm kNorwayF land
Equity 5.47 10 / 30 Slovak RepublicLuxembourgIsraelCz ch RepublicGr ecB giumAustriaItalyUnit d StatesFranceA straliaN therl ndsSpainSwitzer andIc landG rmanySwPortugalS ove iaN w ZealandI lanDe markU ited Ki gdomNorw yKor , Rep.SingaporeCan daJ panEsto iaFinl
Basic Services and Infrastructure 5.18 25 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicSlov niaIsra lIrela dCzech RepublicPortugalB lgiumEstoniaKor , Rep.New ZealandGer anyFrancU ited StatesU it d KingdomC nadSp inL x mbourgN therlandsAustrIc lJ aAustraliaD markNorw ywe enFi landSing poreS tzerland
Basic and Digital Infrastructure 5.01 24 / 30 GreeceItalySloveniaB lgiumIsra lS ovak RepublicI elandPortugalNew Z alandEstoniaCzech RepublicK re , Rep.G rm nyCanadaFr ncU ited KingdomSp iAustriaAustr l aNorwayNetherlandsL xembourgJUn ted StatesIc l nD markSwe enFi andSi g poreSwitzerland
Health Services and Infrastructure 5.36 25 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceItalySloveniaCzech RepublicIr la dIsr elKore , Rep.EstoniaU ted StatesPortugalFr nceG rm nyU ited KingdomL x mbourgC nadaSp iN therlandsD markIcel ndBelgiumAustriaN w ZealandSwed nJ p nA straliNo w yFi la dSwitzerlandSi gapore
Corruption and Rents 5.22 11 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceItalyCz h RepublicPortugalKor a, Rep.SpainSlov niaIsra lEsto iFr cAustraliaGermanyU t d StatesCan daAustriB lg umIcel ndUnite  KingdomIrelandNetherlandsDe markSi gaporeSwitzerlandNew ZealandNo wayF nS d nJap nLux mbourg
Business and Political Ethics 5.81 10 / 30 Slovak RepublicItalyGreeceCz h RepublicSpainKorea, Rep.SloveniaP rtug lIsra lU ited StatesFra cA striaEstoniaG rm nyCa daBe giumI l dAustraliaJ p nUnited KingdomIrel ndNe herlandsDe markSw tze landLuxembourgNorwaySw deSing poreNew ZealandFinland
Concentration of Rents 4.64 11 / 30 PortugalGreeceIs aelEstoniaSlov k RepublicCzech liAustraliaItalySingaporeNew ZealandC nadaKorea, Rep.Fi l ndBelgiumS inIc l ndG r anyN th rlandsDe markIr lFran eS ove iaSwitzerlandNorwayAustriaUni ed KingdomS enUn ted StatesLux mbourgJap
Financial Intermediation of Real Economy Investment 4.33 22 / 29 ItalyGreeceCz h RepublicPortugalEstoniSloveniaSpaiIrela dI l ndU it  StatesNe herlandsFr nceJ panD nmarkBelgiumIsraelKore , Rep.G r anyAustriaUni ed Kingdomwi zerlandFi l dLuxembourgC adaAu tr liaSw enNo waySing poreNe  Zealand
Financial System Inclusion 5.13 20 / 30 GreeceItalyIcelandPortugalSloveniaSlovak RepublicIsraelCz ch RepublicKore , Rep.EstoniaIr la dFr cSing oreJ p nS iDenmarkN therlandsSw d nFi landB lgiumCanadaUnited KingdomU ited StatesAustraliaA striaSwitzerl ndG rm nyNorwayLux mb urgNe  Z aland
Intermediation of Business Investment 3.53 21 / 29 Czech RepublicSpainItalyEstoniaPortugalU ited StatesSloveniaGr ceIrel dN th rl ndsG rmanyAust iBe g umSwi zerlandJapFranceDe rkU it d KingdomL x mbourgFi landCana aIs elI elandKo e , Rep.NorwayAustraliaN Z alandS edenSi apore
Asset Building and Entrepreneurship 5.10 15 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicCzech liPortugalSpainSloveniaB l iumGerm nyEstoniaKor , Rep.F ceJap nA striaIsr lIrelandNorwayLuxembourgCan daIcel ndS e enUn ted KingdomD markN w ZealandSwitzerlandSing poreN th rl sAust iaU i ed StatesFinland
Small Business Ownership 5.16 19 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicCz h liItalySpainPortugalSloveniaCa adFranceBel iumAustriaIr l ndIsr elJa nEsto iaL xembourgSwitzerlandGer anyKore , Rep.Un ted KingdomFinl dSwedenD nmarkAustr liaN th landsIcela dSingaporeN w ZealandNorwayU ite  States
Home and Financial Asset Ownership 5.04 13 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicP rtugalGermanyKore , Rep.Slove iaCzech RepublicSp iEstoniaB lgiumN rwayJ p nFranceAustriaIsr lIc landI lSwe enN w ZealandLuxembourgU it d Ki domDen rkS gaporeU ited StatesCa daSwitze l ndN h sAustraliaF nl
Employment and Labor Compensation 4.23 26 / 30 GreeceUnited StatesSpainKorea, Rep.Ir landSlovak R publicJap nIt lyAustr liaC dUnited KingdomI ra lCz ch RepublicNew Zea andPortugalSloveniaEsto iGerm nySwitzerlandFra ceNeth rlandsB l iumLux mbourgSing poreAustriaIF nSwe enDe markNorw y
Productive Employment 4.57 24 / 30 GreeceItalySpainSlovak RepublicP rtugalKorea, Rep.IrelandAustraliaIsraelC n daJ p nU it d StatesSlov niaNew Ze landCz ch RepublicU ited Ki gdomS enFranceEstoniB lgiumI l dAustriaN therlandsFi lGerm ySwitzerlandSin poreLuxembourgDen kNorw y
Wage and non-wage compensation 3.90 26 / 30 United StatesGre ceKorea, Rep.Jap nIr la dUnited KingdomC adaAustr liaCzech RepublicN w ZealandSp inlovak RepublicIsra lEstoniaSloveniaSwitzerlandG rm nyPortugLux mbourgN ther andsSi p reIt lyFr ceB lg umAustriaFinIcelandDen arkSwe enNorway
Fiscal Transfers 4.99 2 / 30 Slovak RepublicEstoniaGreeceCz h RepublicSloveniaG rmanyItalySw d nSing poreAustriaSp inPort galUn ted StatesJ anFi l dNeth rl ndsK rea, R p.Aust aliaNorw yIc andCan aI r elNew Zealandw zerlandU it d Ki gdomFr nceDe m rkLux mbourgIr landB lgium
Tax Code 4.49 2 / 30 EstoniaSlovak RepublicGermanyCzech RepublicAustriaSloveniaGre ceN th rlandsSwed nSp inPortugalI lyFinla dNorwayJ anDe markU ited StatesC adaIce ndSwitzerl ndN w ZealandFr ncAust liaS gaporeI elKo , Rep.LuxembourgB giumIr l ndUnited Kingdom
Social Protection 5.48 8 / 30 GreeceSingaporeSlovak RepublicK rea, Rep.EstoniaUnited StatesJ anI lyCzech RepublicAustraliaUni d KingdomSloveniaSw d nI r elSpainPortugalIc a dNew ZealandC adaG rm nyFi l ndSwitzerlandIrelandL xembourgFr eNorw yN therlandsAustriaBe g umDe mark
Ireland
Advanced Economies
Inclusive Growth and Development Index (IDI)
Value Rank Trend
Overall 1-7 (best) 5.01 12 / 30 + 2.3 % ▲
National Key Performance Indicators
Value Rank Trend
Growth and Development 1-7 (best) 5.26 12 / 30 + 3.3 % ▲
GDP per capita $ 56,054 5 / 30 + 3.1 % ▲
Labor productivity $ 103,880 5 / 30 - 0.1 % ▼
Healthy life expectancy years 71.5 19 / 30 + 0.7 ▲
Employment % 53.4 22 / 30 + 0.9 ▲
Inclusion 1-7 (best) 4.63 19 / 30 - 7.5 % ▼
Net income inequality Gini 29.1 14 / 30 - 0.3 ▼
Poverty rate % 8.9 12 / 30 0 •
Wealth inequality Gini 80 27 / 30 + 8.4 ▲
Median income $/day (PPP) per capita 34.7 18 / 30 - 4.8 ▼
Intergenerational Equity 1-7 (best) 5.13 15 / 30 + 11.8 % ▲
Adjusted net savings* % GNI 16.3 7 / 30 + 7.2 ▲
Carbon intensity of GDP KtCO2/$bn GDP 19.5 6 / 30 - 3.9 ▼
Public debt % GDP 78.7 17 / 30 - 30.9 ▼
Dependency ratio % working age population 53.7 19 / 30 + 5.5 ▲
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Corruption and Rents 5.22 11 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceItalyCz h RepublicPortugalKor a, Rep.SpainSlov niaIsra lEsto iFr cAustraliaGermanyU t d StatesCan daAustriB lg umIcel ndUnite  KingdomIrelandNetherlandsDe markSi gaporeSwitzerlandNew ZealandNo wayF nS d nJap nLux mbourg
Business and Political Ethics 5.81 10 / 30 Slovak RepublicItalyGreeceCz h RepublicSpainKorea, Rep.SloveniaP rtug lIsra lU ited StatesFra cA striaEstoniaG rm nyCa daBe giumI l dAustraliaJ p nUnited KingdomIrel ndNe herlandsDe markSw tze landLuxembourgNorwaySw deSing poreNew ZealandFinland
Judicial Independence (1-7 scale) 6.39 6 / 30 Slovak RepublicSloveniaItalyKorea, Rep.Gr ecSpainCzech RepublicPortugalUnited StatesF anceA striaG rmanySing poreIcel ndEsto iaB lgiumJ anIsr elC nadaDe m rkL xembourgAu traliaUni ed KingdomN therla dsIrel ndSw eSw tzerlandNo wayNe  ZealandFinland
Diversion of public funds (1-7 scale) 5.96 8 / 30 Slovak RepublicCzech epublicSp inItalyGreecSloveniaK r a, Rep.PortugalIsra lAustriaEstoniaUnited StatesGermanyF nceC n dJ paIcelandBelgiumAustraliaU ed KingdomDen rkNe herlandsIr landSw tzerlandNorwayLux mb urgSw deSing p reFinlandNew Zealand
Irregular payments in tax collection (1-7 scale) 6.64 5 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicItalyCzech RepublicKorea, Rep.SpainPortugalUnit d StatesGermanyIsra lSlov iB lgi mFr nceJ anA striaCanadaUn t d KingdomN herla dsEstoniSwitzerlandAu tr iLux mbourgNo w yIcelandSwe enI elSi gaporeDe markNew ZealandFi land
Ethical behavior of firms (1-7 scale) 5.55 14 / 30 Slovak RepublicItalyKorea, Rep.Gr eceCz h RepublicSp inSlov niaP rtug lIsraelEstoniaUnit d StatesFra ceGermanyIc l ndAustriaC adaIrel dBelgiumUnited KingdomAus raliaJ panLuxembourgN therlandsNorwaySw tzerlandDenmarkFi l nSi poreNew ZealandSwe n
Public trust of politicians (1-7 scale) 4.95 10 / 30 ItalySlovak RepublicGreeceSp inKorea, Rep.Cz ch RepublicSloveniaP rtug lIsra lUnited StatesFranceEstoniaAustriJapanIc landAus raliaC dU ited KingdomGermanyBelgiumI elandDen arkSwitze landNe h rl sSwedenLuxembourgFinlandN w ZealandNorwaySi g pore
Irregular Payments in Public Contracts (1-7 scale) 6.00 9 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceCz h RepublicItalySpainSloveniaK r a, Rep.PortugalU it d StatesIsr lFr ncG rmanyAustr aCan daBelgiumEstoniaAustr liaUni d KingdomNe herla dsSwitzerlanJ panI l dNo w ySwedenLuxembourgIc lDenmarkSi gapo eN w ZealandFi l nd
Favoritism in decisions of government officials (1-7 scale) 5.16 7 / 30 Slovak RepublicItalyCzech RepublicGreeceSloveniaK r a, Rep.SpainPortugalIsr lU ted StatesA striaC nadaFranceIcel ndEstoniaA s r liaBelgiumG m nyU t d KingdomDen arkJ pL xembourgNorwayIrel ndN therlandsS tzerlandNew ZealandSwe nFi landSing pore
Concentration of Rents 4.64 11 / 30 PortugalGreeceIs aelEstoniaSlov k RepublicCzech liAustraliaItalySingaporeNew ZealandC nadaKorea, Rep.Fi l ndBelgiumS inIc l ndG r anyN th rlandsDe markIr lFran eS ove iaSwitzerlandNorwayAustriaUni ed KingdomS enUn ted StatesLux mbourgJap
Regulatory protection of incumbents (0-6 scale) 1.07 8 / 29 United StatesIsra lAustraliaKore , R p.No w yJapanIcelandS tzerlandC adGermanyBelgiumNew ZealandLuxe bourgFranceGr eceFi landNeth rlandsD m rkPortugalSpaiSl ve iaI elanI lySwe enSlov k RepublicAustriaCzech RepublicE oniaUn ted Kingdom
Extent of market dominance (1-7 scale) 4.60 15 / 30 Korea, Rep.IsraelSlovak RepublicIc l ndGreecAustraliaFinlandSp inPortugalEs oniC nadaSl veniaNew ZealandFr ncCze h RepublicIr ndSw enNorw yLuxembourgIt lySingap reUnite  K ngdomNetherla dsB lgiumAust iUn ed StatesD n arkGe nySwitzerlandJap
Intensity of competition (1-7 scale) 5.19 25 / 30 FinlandIcelandGreeceNorwayIsraelIr landPortugalSloveniaIt lLuxembourgSwitzerlandCan dD nm rkNew ZealandSlovak RepublicAustriaSwedenSing poreSpainEsto iaCz ch RepublicF cBelgi mN th rlandsGe manyKore , Rep.AustraliaUni ed StatesUnited KingdomJapan
Land inequality gini (0-100 scale) 44.00 4 / 18 Czech RepublicItalyEstoniaUnited StatesP rtugalUnited KingdomG rmanyA striaGr eceFranNeth rlandsB lgiumDenm rkL x bourgIr landSwe enFinlandNorway
Effectiveness of antitrust policy (1-7 scale) 5.00 15 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicItalyPortugalSloveniaCzech RepublicSpainIsr eAustraliaI l ndKo ea, Rep.EstoniaCan daAustrFr ncI l ndGermanyBelgiumSwitzerlandD n arkLux mbourgU ited Kin domNorwayU ited StatesN therlan sJ panSingaporFi l dN w ZealandSwe n
Concentration of Banking Sector Assets (C5 ratio) 87.67 14 / 29 EstoniaFinlandN rwaySi g poreNew ZealandS ed nPortugalGreecIsra lBel iumSl vak RepublicNetherlandsSwitzerlandD nm rkA str liaIrelandGe m nyC aCz ch RepublicSpaiU ited KingdomF ceKorea, Rep.A striaIt lySlove iaJap nUnited StatesLuxembourg
Financial Intermediation of Real Economy Investment 4.33 22 / 29 ItalyGreeceCz h RepublicPortugalEstoniSloveniaSpaiIrela dI l ndU it  StatesNe herlandsFr nceJ panD nmarkBelgiumIsraelKore , Rep.G r anyAustriaUni ed Kingdomwi zerlandFi l dLuxembourgC adaAu tr liaSw enNo waySing poreNe  Zealand
Financial System Inclusion 5.13 20 / 30 GreeceItalyIcelandPortugalSloveniaSlovak RepublicIsraelCz ch RepublicKore , Rep.EstoniaIr la dFr cSing oreJ p nS iDenmarkN therlandsSw d nFi landB lgiumCanadaUnited KingdomU ited StatesAustraliaA striaSwitzerl ndG rm nyNorwayLux mb urgNe  Z aland
Affordability of financial services for businesses (1-7 scale) 3.59 26 / 30 GreeceItalyIcelandSloveniaIrelandPortugalSpainIsr elKore , Rep.A straliaSlov k RepublicD nm rkFrancCan daCzech RepublicN th rlandsEstoniN w Z alandGermanyUnited StatesNorwSw denB lgi mUnit d KingdomLux bourgAus riaJ p nF nl ndwi zerlandSingapore
Gender Gap in Financial Access (female to male ratio) 1.00 11 / 29 ItalyCzech RepublicPortugalSwitzerlandF anceGre ceKorea, Rep.New Zea andSingaporeUnite  Ki gdomSlov niEsto iN therlan sS inFinlandD markNo w ySwe enI l dIsraelC nadaAustraliaJapanLuxembourgAustriaG r anyU ited StatesBelgiumSlovak Republic
Account at a formal financial institution (% of respondents in bottom 40%) 90.85 22 / 29 Slovak RepublicP rtugalCzech RepublicGreeceIt lyIsraeUnit d StatesIrelandKorea, Rep.Luxem ourgF anceJ panAus r aSingaporeSlov niap iSw tzerlandG rmanyEst niU ted KingdomBel iumC n daAustraliaN herlandsNew ZealandSw dFi landNo w yDe m rk
Account used for business purposes (% of respondents in bottom 40%) 35.64 4 / 27 SingaporeEstoniaI raelIt lySlovak RepublicP rtugalGreeceJ panCz ch RepublicFinl ndSw denS oveniaK r a, Rep.FranceB lg umD markNetherlandsU it d StatesC nadaA str liaU i ed KingdomN w ZealandLuxembourgI el ndG r nyAustriap
Ease of Access to Loans (1-7 scale) 3.50 26 / 30 GreeceItalySlov niaK r a, Rep.Irela dSpainPortugalDe m rkNeth rlandsFr nceUnited KingdomCz ch RepublicIc landEsto iaI elC adaSlovak RepublicAustriaBelg umGe manyAustraliaSwitz rlandNo w yFinlandL xem ourgUnited StatesJSwedenSingaporN w Zealand
Financing of SMEs (1-7 scale) 3.62 26 / 30 GreeceItalySlov niaSpaiIrela dKore , Rep.PortugalF anceSlovak RepublicDenmarkNeth rlandsC n dUnited KingdomEs oniaI r elAustriaIc landCzech RepublicJ nAustraliaGermanyBel umSwe enLux bourgFinl ndSwitzerlandUnited StatesN w ZealandSi gaporeNorway
Intermediation of Business Investment 3.53 21 / 29 Czech RepublicSpainItalyEstoniaPortugalU ited StatesSloveniaGr ceIrel dN th rl ndsG rmanyAust iBe g umSwi zerlandJapFranceDe rkU it d KingdomL x mbourgFi landCana aIs elI elandKo e , Rep.NorwayAustraliaN Z alandS edenSi apore
Local capital market access (1-7 scale) 3.82 23 / 30 GreeceSloveniaP rtug lItalySlovak RepublicSpainCzech RepublicIrel ndEstoniaKorea, Rep.De markIc l ndIsr lAustriaF nlandB lgiumNetherlandsF anceLux mbourgA str liaCan dJ pG rmanyNew ZealandSwed nNorwayS ng poreUnited KingdomS itze landU ited States
Venture capital availability (1-7 scale) 3.23 20 / 30 GreeceItalyKorea, Rep.SloveniaP rtug lD nm rkSlovak RepublicA striaA str liaSp inIrelandCzech RepublicC daF anceIcelandJapanEsto iaNetherlandsG rmanyBelg mSwitzerlandN w ZealandSwed nUnite  Ki gdomNorw yLux mbourgFi lUnite  StatesSingapo eIsrael
Bank lending to Non-financial Corporations (% GDP) 54.40 24 / 26 Czech RepublicUnited StatesIr landBelgiumIsraelGermanyNorw yA s riaItalyUnited KingdomLuxembourgF nceFi landCana aNetherlandsGr ceSpainJ p nPo tu alSi gaporeKo ea, Rep.Swe enA straliaN w Z alandSwitz rlandDenm rk
Small Cap IPOs to NFCs (weighted per $100 Billion USD GDP) 1.26 17 / 27 EstoniaNetherlandsSwitzerlandAust iGermanyPo tugalBe giumUnite  StatesGreeceSpainI l ndCzech RepublicIt lyDenmarkFrancNorwayU it d KingdomFinlandJ panN w ZealandIs elC adaSwe enKor , Rep.A str liaIc dSingapore
Large Cap IPOs to NFCs (weighted per $100 Billion USD GDP) 2.93 12 / 27 LuxembourgCz ch RepublicAustriaGermanyItalySpainJapaPort galFr ceBelgi mSwitzerlandNe h l sGr ceD nmarkFi landIr lKorea, Rep.NorwayU ited StatesUnited KingdomS nSingaporAu traliaCan dIsr elN w ZealandIc l nd
Private R&D Expenditure (% GDP) 0.84 20 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicNew ZealandItalySpainPortug lLux mbourgCz ch RepublicNorwayUnited KingdomIrelCana aN th lan sEstonSing poreFra eA striaIceBel iumI raelA straliaU i d StatesSloveniaDen rkG rm nySwedenSwitzerlandFi l dJ pKo ea, Rep.
Follow on (secondary equity to NFCs) (% GDP) 29.32 9 / 29 Czech RepublicSloveniaAustriaEstoniaItalyNeth rlandsSp inBelgiumSwitzerlandFranceGer anyJapanPortugalL xembourgD arkFi landUnite  StatesIcel ndKorea, Rep.Gr eceIr l ndSwe enIsra lN w ZealandUnit d KingdomNorwaySing poreCan dAustr lia
Corporate bond activity (issuances to NFCs) (% GDP) 28.49 20 / 30 SloveniaSlovak RepublicItalyCzech RepublicIsr elSpainEstoniaGreeceAustriaNe h rlandsIr l ndDenm rkG r anyB lgiumJ pAustraliaFr eUnited KingdomU it d StatesPortugalI l ndFinlandSwitzerlandC adNew Z alandNorw yLuxembourgingap reS denKorea, Rep.
Share turnover ratio (% of market capitalization) 16.35 5 / 25 ItalyUnited StatesKor a, Rep.United KingdomSpainJapanG rm yPortugalCzech RepublicCanadaA s raliaSwitzerlandNe h l sFr nceNorw yGr eceAustriaS ngaporeB lgiumI raelIrel ndN w ZealandSloveniSlovak RepublicLux mbourg
Asset Building and Entrepreneurship 5.10 15 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicCzech liPortugalSpainSloveniaB l iumGerm nyEstoniaKor , Rep.F ceJap nA striaIsr lIrelandNorwayLuxembourgCan daIcel ndS e enUn ted KingdomD markN w ZealandSwitzerlandSing poreN th rl sAust iaU i ed StatesFinland
Small Business Ownership 5.16 19 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicCz h liItalySpainPortugalSloveniaCa adFranceBel iumAustriaIr l ndIsr elJa nEsto iaL xembourgSwitzerlandGer anyKore , Rep.Un ted KingdomFinl dSwedenD nmarkAustr liaN th landsIcela dSingaporeN w ZealandNorwayU ite  States
New businesses registered (per 1,000 working age individuals) 5.78 10 / 29 JapanAustriaGreeceC daGerm nyB lgiumF nceKorea, Rep.ItalySwitzerlandSp inSlovak RepublicIsraelCz ch RepublicFi landD nmarkS oveniaP rtug lNe h rlandsIr l ndLuxem ourgSw denNo wayIceSingaporeUnited KingdomA straliaEstoniN w Zealand
Attitudes towards entrepreneurial failure (1-7 scale) 4.84 6 / 30 SloveniaSpaiSlovak RepublicP rtugalAustriJap nCzech RepublicB lgiumGreeceFr nKorea, Rep.Lux mbourgItalyFinlandC na aA straliaEstoniDenm rkGer anySwitzerlandSwedenSingaporeNorw yNetherlandsI la dIc lUnite  KingdomN w ZealandUnit d StatesIsr el
Number of PCT patent applications filed (per million population) 83.76 20 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicP rtugalEs oniCz ch RepublicSpainI alySlov niaAustraliaNew ZealandIr landCan daU t d KingdomIc l ndBelg umLuxe bourgFranceSi gap reNorwayA striaUni e  StatesN the landsDenm rkG r yK , Rep.Is aelFinSwitzerlandSwe nJ pan
Time to start a business (total number of days) 6.00 17 / 30 AustriaLuxembourgCz ch RepublicSpainFinlandIsr elGr eceSlovak RepublicGermanyJapanSwitzerlandSwed nSloveniaIrelandUnited StatesIt lU ite  KingdomIc l ndNetherlandsNorw yKor , Rep.F anB lgiumEsto iaDe arkP rtugalA straliaSing poreCan daN w Zealand
Cost required of starting a business (% GNI per capita) 0.20 3 / 30 Korea, Rep.ItalyJapanCzech RepublicSpainB lgiumNetherlandsIsra lGr ecePortugalIc landSwitzerlandLuxembourgGer anySlovak RepublicEstoniaUnited StatesFinNorwayFr ceAust aliaSing poreSw denC n daN w Z alandAus riaIrel dD markUn t d KingdomSlovenia
Time to resolve insolvency (total number of years) 0.40 1 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceEstoniaSwitzerlandCzech RepublicIsra lLuxembo rgSw denPo tugaFranceIt lyS ainKor a, Rep.U ited StatesN w ZealandGermanyAustriaNe h r sUnit d KingdomI el ndD markAustr liaNorwayFi l ndBelg umSi g poreSloveniaC nadJ p nI el d
Cost of resolving insolvency (% of estate's value) 9.00 18 / 30 IsraelIt lySlovak RepublicCzech epublicLuxembourgSpainAustriaSwed nGr eceFranI l ndEstoniaPort alU ited StatesA str iaGermanyCanadUn ted KingdomSwitzerlandDenmarkSloveniaFi l dNetherlandsIc la dNew ZealandKo e , Rep.B l iumJ pSing poreNorw y
Cost of enforcing a contract (% of debt value) 26.90 24 / 30 United KingdomCzech RepublicUnited StatesSw eSlovak RepublicN w ZealandIr l dSingaporeIsra lSwitz landN h sJ anDenmarkI lyC aEsto iAustr liaSpainAustrBelg umF nceF l ndGer anyGre cePortugalSlov niaK r a, Rep.Norw yL xembourgI land
Time required to enforce a contract (total number of days) 650.00 25 / 30 GreeceSloveniaItalyIsra lSlovak RepublicIr landCzech RepublicC adaPortugalNe h rlandsSpainBel iumUnit d KingdomG manyEsto iaUnite  StatesIcel dDenmarkAustriaA str liaFra ceSwitzerlandFi landJ panLuxe bourgSw denNo wayK re , Rep.New ZealandSingapore
Time spent paying taxes (total number of hours per year) 82.00 4 / 30 Czech RepublicJapanPortugalItalySloveniaIsra lGerm nyGreeceSlov k RepublicK rea, Rep.Unit d StatesAustriaB lg umSpainNew ZealandIcelandFr nceC daD nm rkNetherlandsSw denUnited KingdomAustr liaF nla dSingaporeNorw yI l ndEsto iaS tzerlandLuxembourg
Home and Financial Asset Ownership 5.04 13 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicP rtugalGermanyKore , Rep.Slove iaCzech RepublicSp iEstoniaB lgiumN rwayJ p nFranceAustriaIsr lIc landI lSwe enN w ZealandLuxembourgU it d Ki domDen rkS gaporeU ited StatesCa daSwitze l ndN h sAustraliaF nl
Protection of property rights (1-7 scale) 6.19 7 / 30 ItalyGreeceSlovak RepublicSlov niaP rtug lCz ch RepublicSpainKorea, Rep.IsraeF ncEstoniaU it d StatesB lgiumDenmarkG r nyIcelandA str liaC adA strNew ZealandJapanNorwayNether sI landU ited KingdomSing poreLuxembourgSw deFinlandSwitzerland
Home ownership rate (% of population) 68.60 16 / 30 SwitzerlandGermanyAustriaKore , Rep.JapaUn ted StatesD markUnite  KingdomN w ZealandFrancAustr liaNe her sIsra lC n daIrel dSw enBe iumLuxe bourgFinla dIt lyGreecePortugalSlov niaIc la dCz ch RepublicSpainEstoniaNo w ySl v k RepublicS ga ore
Housing Loan Penetration (% of adult population) 39.20 7 / 27 GreeceSlovak RepublicCzech epublicSloveniaItalyIsraelJapanEsto iaSi gaporeGermanyKore , Rep.Port galAustriF anceFinlandCana aU t d KingdomSp inU ited StatesIr landBelgiumLuxe bourgNew ZealandAustr liN h rlandsDenm rkSw e
Affordability Gap, Urban housing 0.00 6 / 25 AustraliaSing poreKo ea, Rep.United KingdomN w Z alandSw tzerlanFr ncUnit d StatesIt lyNetherlandJapCaGerm nyS inSwe nAustriaIsr elCz ch RepublicFi l ndIrPortugalLuxembourgGr eceBel iumD nmark
Employee stock ownership (% of respondents) 6.50 10 / 20 GreeceSlovak RepublicItalyG rmanyPortugalIcelandCzech RepublicSp inB lgiumDe markIrelandAustriaNe herlandsSlov niaEsto iF an eUn ted KingdomSw enLux mbourgFinland
Profit sharing (% of respondents) 23.60 16 / 20 GreeceItalyBelgiumPort galIrelandSpainUnited KingdomL xembourgGer anyIc landN therlandsDe m rkSw deFr ceEstoniaAust iCz ch RepublicFinlandSlovak RepublicS ovenia
Private pension assets (% GDP) 48.25 12 / 30 GreeceFranLuxembourgSloveniaBelgiumItalySwedenKorea, Rep.A striaCzech RepublicN wayEstoniaSp inSl v k RepublicPortugalGerm nyN w Z alandJ aI el dIsr elSing poreC n daU ited StatesDenmarkFAust aliUni ed KingdomSwitzerlandIcelandN therlan s
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The Inclusive Growth and Development Report 2017
Country Profile
PILLAR VALUE RANK WITHIN ECONOMY GROUP
Education and Skills 5.66 14 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceLuxembourgItalySpainCzech RepublicIsraelPortugalKor a, Rep.FranceUnited StatesA striaJa nSloveniUnit d KingdomC adaIr l ndB lgiumGerma yIc l ndSwedenEsto iaA str liaSi gap reNew ZealandSw tzerlandN h sD m rkNorw yFinland
Access 6.23 19 / 30 CanadaLuxembourgGreeceJapanPortugalSingapo eKor a, Rep.Slov k RepublicSp inEst niaUn ted KingdomIrelandFr cIc l ndIsra lSw enIt lyN w ZealandU it d StatesGermanyDe m rkSwitze l ndFi l dCz ch RepublicSloveniaN rwayBelgiumAustriaN th rlandsAustralia
Quality 5.29 12 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicItalySp inCzech RepublicLuxembourgPortugalKorea, Rep.Is aelJap nSloveniaFr nceEsto iAustriaU i d StatesUnit d KingdomA straliaG manyIr l ndC n daBelg umNew Z alandSwed nI el ndN th rl si gap rewitzerlandDenm kNorwayF land
Equity 5.47 10 / 30 Slovak RepublicLuxembourgIsraelCz ch RepublicGr ecB giumAustriaItalyUnit d StatesFranceA straliaN therl ndsSpainSwitzer andIc landG rmanySwPortugalS ove iaN w ZealandI lanDe markU ited Ki gdomNorw yKor , Rep.SingaporeCan daJ panEsto iaFinl
Basic Services and Infrastructure 5.18 25 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicSlov niaIsra lIrela dCzech RepublicPortugalB lgiumEstoniaKor , Rep.New ZealandGer anyFrancU ited StatesU it d KingdomC nadSp inL x mbourgN therlandsAustrIc lJ aAustraliaD markNorw ywe enFi landSing poreS tzerland
Basic and Digital Infrastructure 5.01 24 / 30 GreeceItalySloveniaB lgiumIsra lS ovak RepublicI elandPortugalNew Z alandEstoniaCzech RepublicK re , Rep.G rm nyCanadaFr ncU ited KingdomSp iAustriaAustr l aNorwayNetherlandsL xembourgJUn ted StatesIc l nD markSwe enFi andSi g poreSwitzerland
Health Services and Infrastructure 5.36 25 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceItalySloveniaCzech RepublicIr la dIsr elKore , Rep.EstoniaU ted StatesPortugalFr nceG rm nyU ited KingdomL x mbourgC nadaSp iN therlandsD markIcel ndBelgiumAustriaN w ZealandSwed nJ p nA straliNo w yFi la dSwitzerlandSi gapore
Corruption and Rents 5.22 11 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceItalyCz h RepublicPortugalKor a, Rep.SpainSlov niaIsra lEsto iFr cAustraliaGermanyU t d StatesCan daAustriB lg umIcel ndUnite  KingdomIrelandNetherlandsDe markSi gaporeSwitzerlandNew ZealandNo wayF nS d nJap nLux mbourg
Business and Political Ethics 5.81 10 / 30 Slovak RepublicItalyGreeceCz h RepublicSpainKorea, Rep.SloveniaP rtug lIsra lU ited StatesFra cA striaEstoniaG rm nyCa daBe giumI l dAustraliaJ p nUnited KingdomIrel ndNe herlandsDe markSw tze landLuxembourgNorwaySw deSing poreNew ZealandFinland
Concentration of Rents 4.64 11 / 30 PortugalGreeceIs aelEstoniaSlov k RepublicCzech liAustraliaItalySingaporeNew ZealandC nadaKorea, Rep.Fi l ndBelgiumS inIc l ndG r anyN th rlandsDe markIr lFran eS ove iaSwitzerlandNorwayAustriaUni ed KingdomS enUn ted StatesLux mbourgJap
Financial Intermediation of Real Economy Investment 4.33 22 / 29 ItalyGreeceCz h RepublicPortugalEstoniSloveniaSpaiIrela dI l ndU it  StatesNe herlandsFr nceJ panD nmarkBelgiumIsraelKore , Rep.G r anyAustriaUni ed Kingdomwi zerlandFi l dLuxembourgC adaAu tr liaSw enNo waySing poreNe  Zealand
Financial System Inclusion 5.13 20 / 30 GreeceItalyIcelandPortugalSloveniaSlovak RepublicIsraelCz ch RepublicKore , Rep.EstoniaIr la dFr cSing oreJ p nS iDenmarkN therlandsSw d nFi landB lgiumCanadaUnited KingdomU ited StatesAustraliaA striaSwitzerl ndG rm nyNorwayLux mb urgNe  Z aland
Intermediation of Business Investment 3.53 21 / 29 Czech RepublicSpainItalyEstoniaPortugalU ited StatesSloveniaGr ceIrel dN th rl ndsG rmanyAust iBe g umSwi zerlandJapFranceDe rkU it d KingdomL x mbourgFi landCana aIs elI elandKo e , Rep.NorwayAustraliaN Z alandS edenSi apore
Asset Building and Entrepreneurship 5.10 15 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicCzech liPortugalSpainSloveniaB l iumGerm nyEstoniaKor , Rep.F ceJap nA striaIsr lIrelandNorwayLuxembourgCan daIcel ndS e enUn ted KingdomD markN w ZealandSwitzerlandSing poreN th rl sAust iaU i ed StatesFinland
Small Business Ownership 5.16 19 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicCz h liItalySpainPortugalSloveniaCa adFranceBel iumAustriaIr l ndIsr elJa nEsto iaL xembourgSwitzerlandGer anyKore , Rep.Un ted KingdomFinl dSwedenD nmarkAustr liaN th landsIcela dSingaporeN w ZealandNorwayU ite  States
Home and Financial Asset Ownership 5.04 13 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicP rtugalGermanyKore , Rep.Slove iaCzech RepublicSp iEstoniaB lgiumN rwayJ p nFranceAustriaIsr lIc landI lSwe enN w ZealandLuxembourgU it d Ki domDen rkS gaporeU ited StatesCa daSwitze l ndN h sAustraliaF nl
Employment and Labor Compensation 4.23 26 / 30 GreeceUnited StatesSpainKorea, Rep.Ir landSlovak R publicJap nIt lyAustr liaC dUnited KingdomI ra lCz ch RepublicNew Zea andPortugalSloveniaEsto iGerm nySwitzerlandFra ceNeth rlandsB l iumLux mbourgSing poreAustriaIF nSwe enDe markNorw y
Productive Employment 4.57 24 / 30 GreeceItalySpainSlovak RepublicP rtugalKorea, Rep.IrelandAustraliaIsraelC n daJ p nU it d StatesSlov niaNew Ze landCz ch RepublicU ited Ki gdomS enFranceEstoniB lgiumI l dAustriaN therlandsFi lGerm ySwitzerlandSin poreLuxembourgDen kNorw y
Wage and non-wage compensation 3.90 26 / 30 United StatesGre ceKorea, Rep.Jap nIr la dUnited KingdomC adaAustr liaCzech RepublicN w ZealandSp inlovak RepublicIsra lEstoniaSloveniaSwitzerlandG rm nyPortugLux mbourgN ther andsSi p reIt lyFr ceB lg umAustriaFinIcelandDen arkSwe enNorway
Fiscal Transfers 4.99 2 / 30 Slovak RepublicEstoniaGreeceCz h RepublicSloveniaG rmanyItalySw d nSing poreAustriaSp inPort galUn ted StatesJ anFi l dNeth rl ndsK rea, R p.Aust aliaNorw yIc andCan aI r elNew Zealandw zerlandU it d Ki gdomFr nceDe m rkLux mbourgIr landB lgium
Tax Code 4.49 2 / 30 EstoniaSlovak RepublicGermanyCzech RepublicAustriaSloveniaGre ceN th rlandsSwed nSp inPortugalI lyFinla dNorwayJ anDe markU ited StatesC adaIce ndSwitzerl ndN w ZealandFr ncAust liaS gaporeI elKo , Rep.LuxembourgB giumIr l ndUnited Kingdom
Social Protection 5.48 8 / 30 GreeceSingaporeSlovak RepublicK rea, Rep.EstoniaUnited StatesJ anI lyCzech RepublicAustraliaUni d KingdomSloveniaSw d nI r elSpainPortugalIc a dNew ZealandC adaG rm nyFi l ndSwitzerlandIrelandL xembourgFr eNorw yN therlandsAustriaBe g umDe mark
Ireland
Advanced Economies
Inclusive Growth and Development Index (IDI)
Value Rank Trend
Overall 1-7 (best) 5.01 12 / 30 + 2.3 % ▲
National Key Performance Indicators
Value Rank Trend
Growth and Development 1-7 (best) 5.26 12 / 30 + 3.3 % ▲
GDP per capita $ 56,054 5 / 30 + 3.1 % ▲
Labor productivity $ 103,880 5 / 30 - 0.1 % ▼
Healthy life expectancy years 71.5 19 / 30 + 0.7 ▲
Employment % 53.4 22 / 30 + 0.9 ▲
Inclusion 1-7 (best) 4.63 19 / 30 - 7.5 % ▼
Net income inequality Gini 29.1 14 / 30 - 0.3 ▼
Poverty rate % 8.9 12 / 30 0 •
Wealth inequality Gini 80 27 / 30 + 8.4 ▲
Median income $/day (PPP) per capita 34.7 18 / 30 - 4.8 ▼
Intergenerational Equity 1-7 (best) 5.13 15 / 30 + 11.8 % ▲
Adjusted net savings* % GNI 16.3 7 / 30 + 7.2 ▲
Carbon intensity of GDP KtCO2/$bn GDP 19.5 6 / 30 - 3.9 ▼
Public debt % GDP 78.7 17 / 30 - 30.9 ▼
Dependency ratio % working age population 53.7 19 / 30 + 5.5 ▲
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Pillars In Detail
PILLAR VALUE RANK WITHIN ECONOMY GROUP
Education and Skills 5.66 14 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceLuxembourgItalySpainCzech RepublicIsraelPortugalKor a, Rep.FranceUnited StatesA striaJa nSloveniUnit d KingdomC adaIr l ndB lgiumGerma yIc l ndSwedenEsto iaA str liaSi gap reNew ZealandSw tzerlandN h sD m rkNorw yFinland
Access 6.23 19 / 30 CanadaLuxembourgGreeceJapanPortugalSingapo eKor a, Rep.Slov k RepublicSp inEst niaUn ted KingdomIrelandFr cIc l ndIsra lSw enIt lyN w ZealandU it d StatesGermanyDe m rkSwitze l ndFi l dCz ch RepublicSloveniaN rwayBelgiumAustriaN th rlandsAustralia
Mean years of schooling (years) 11.60 17 / 30 PortugalSpainItalySin poreGreeceFi landIcelandAustriaBelg umFranceLux bourgJapanI el dSlovak RepublicSwedenKorea, Rep.N the landsSlov niaEsto iD m rkSwitze landCz ch RepublicU t  KingdomC adaN w Z alandIsr eNorwayAu tr liGermanyUnited States
Gross preprimary enrollment (% of population of preprimary age) 107.99 6 / 29 United StatesCanadaGr eceFi landUnite  KingdomEs oniaJ panK re , Rep.N w ZealandPor ug lSlovak RepublicSlov niLux mbourgNetherlandsSw nDe m rkIcSp iNorwayIt lyAust iaCzech RepublicSwitzerlandIr landF eAust liaIsraelG m nyBe g um
Net primary enrollment (% of population of primary age) 94.92 26 / 30 LuxembourgUnited StatesSwitzerlandSlovak RepublicIrelandKorea, Rep.Isr elGr ecEsto iaAustr liaIt lySlov niaD nm rkAustrCzech RepublicN w ZealandPortug lIcelandGerm nyBel iumF anceSp iFi landC a aSwe enN th rlandsU it d KingdomNorw yJapanSing pore
Gross secondary enrollment (% of population of secondary age) 126.09 9 / 30 Slovak RepublicUnited StatesKor a, Rep.AustriaSwitz rlandIsr elJap nIt lyLuxem ourgG anyCz ch RepublicSing po eGr eceEstoniaC adaFra cSl v niaIcel dN w yPort galNew ZealandI landUnited Ki gdomDe markSp inN therlan sSwedenAust liaFiB lgium
Gross tertiary enrollment (% of population of tertiary age) 73.17 16 / 30 LuxembourgSlovak RepublicUnited KingdomSwitzerlandC nadSweJapanI alyFr ceGermanyPo t galCzech RepublicIs aelEstoniaIr la dB lgiumNorwayNetherlandsAustriaNew ZealandD nmarkIc l ndSlov niAustraliaSi g poreU ited StatesFi landSp iKorea, R p.Gr ece
Vocational enrollment (% of total upper-secondary school students) 31.95 25 / 29 CanadaSi gaporeKore , Rep.JapanIrel dGreecN w ZealandIcelandSp inEstoniaI ra lD markFranceU ited KingdomSw enPortugalG rm yAustr iaNorwaI alyBelg umLuxe bourgSw tzerlandSlov niN therlandsSlovak RepublicAust iFinlandCzech Republic
Availability of high quality training services (1-7 scale) 5.79 10 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicSpainPortugalKorea, Rep.SloveniaItalyIsr eLux mbourgEstoniaCzech RepublicJa anIcelandFr ceUnited StatesSw enAust aliaG rmanyN w ZealandNorwI la dC n daDe m rkA s riU ited KingdomSingaporeF nN therlan sBelgiumSwitzerland
Gender gap in education (female to male ratio) 1.00 1 / 30 Korea, Rep.GermanySing poreAustriaGreecJ panPortugalSwitz rlandNe h l sIt lyEstoniaS inN w ZealandSwed nU ite  Ki gdomNorw ySloveniaLux mbourgFinl ndFra ceB giumCana aIcel nSlovak RepublicIrelandIsr elCz ch RepublicDen arkAustr liaU i d States
Quality 5.29 12 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicItalySp inCzech RepublicLuxembourgPortugalKorea, Rep.Is aelJap nSloveniaFr nceEsto iAustriaU i d StatesUnit d KingdomA straliaG manyIr l ndC n daBelg umNew Z alandSwed nI el ndN th rl si gap rewitzerlandDenm kNorwayF land
Quality of education system (1-7 scale) 5.47 5 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceKorea, Rep.SpainIt lyCz ch RepublicSlov niaP rtug lJapanF a cA striaL x mbourgE oniaI raelSw denUn ted KingdomU it d StatesDenmarkC nadaAust aliGermanyIcel dNew Z alandNorwayNeth rlandsIr landBelgiuFi landSi g poreSwitzerland
Internet access in schools (1-7 scale) 5.05 24 / 30 GreeceItalySpainFr nceJ panGermanyIr landPortugalSlovak RepublicLuxembourgIsr elA striaCzech RepublicB lgiumSlov niaK r a, Rep.FinlandUnite  StatesC daU ted K ngdomD nmarkEstoniSwitzerlandNew Z alandN therl ndsA st liaNorw ySw denIc lSing pore
Expenditure on education (% of GDP) 5.77 9 / 30 SingaporeLuxembourgJapanGr eceSlovak RepublicIt lyCzech RepublicSpainKorea, Rep.EstoniaG rm nySwitzerlandPortugU it d StatesAust liaC adFranceA striaNe herlandsSlov niaUn ed KingdomIrel dIsr elB giumNew ZealandIc landF nla dNorw ySw enDenmark
PISA Reading Score 520.81 4 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceIsr elLuxembo rgIc landIta yAustriaCzech RepublicSwitze landSpainUnit d StatesUnited KingdomP rtugalB lg umF an eDe arkSwe enA straliaN h rlandslov niaGerm yN w ZealandNo waJapKorea, Rep.EstoniIrel dFi l ndC n aSi gapore
PISA Math Score 503.72 13 / 30 GreeceUnited StatesIsra lSlovak RepublicLuxembourgSp inI landIt lyPortugalCzech RepublicU it d KingdomFr nceA st aliaSwedNew ZealandAustr aNorwayI la dG rmanyBel iumSlove iaFinl dDen rkN therlandsC dEstoniaSwitzerlandK e , Rep.J pSingapore
Ease of finding skilled employees (1-7 scale) 5.51 4 / 30 Slovak RepublicCzech epublicEstoniaLuxembo rgSl veniaItalyGr eceSpainJ p nKor a, Rep.Port galU ited KingdomN w Z alandSwed nSin aporeAustr liAustriaC n daD m rkF a ceBe iumGe manyNetherlandsSwitzerlandIsra lUnit d StatesIrelandIceFi landNorway
Quality of Vocational Training (1-7 scale) 4.90 16 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceKorea, Rep.SpainSloveniaIsr lPortugalIt lyCz ch RepublicFranceEstoniaU it d KingdomJ anL xembourgIrel ndAustraliaSwedenU ited StatesIc lanCa aN w ZealandN rw yDenm rkBelgiumNetherlandsSingaporeG r yFinlandA striaSwitzerland
Equity 5.47 10 / 30 Slovak RepublicLuxembourgIsraelCz ch RepublicGr ecB giumAustriaItalyUnit d StatesFranceA straliaN therl ndsSpainSwitzer andIc landG rmanySwPortugalS ove iaN w ZealandI lanDe markU ited Ki gdomNorw yKor , Rep.SingaporeCan daJ panEsto iaFinl
Resilient students (%) 29.59 16 / 30 IsraelIcelandSlovak RepublicGreeceLuxembourgSw denCzech RepublicAustriaNorwayItalyF a cB lgiumDenmarkSwitze landIrelandN w ZealandNetherl ndsU t d StatesAust liGermanySlove iUnited KingdomPortugalC a aSp inKore , Rep.Fi l ndEsto iaJ panSi g p re
Social Inclusion 82.30 8 / 29 Slovak RepublicSpainCzech RepublicB lgiumUnited StatesAustriaPortugalLux mbourgSlov niaA str liaS ng po eIt lyGreeceG rmanyNe h rlandsJ pIsraelK , Rep.E toniaUnited KingdomSwitzerlandI elandN w ZealandC adDenm rkSwedenFi lIc lanNorway
Gap in PISA reading scores by quartile (q1/q4) 0.86 8 / 30 LuxembourgFranceSlovak RepublicCzech epublicB lgiumSingaporeAustriaGreeceIsr elSwitzerlandN w ZealandPort g lG m yN ther sAustraliaSw deI alySp inUnited StatesU ite  KingdomSloveniaJ paIr l dKore , Rep.D markFi l dCan aEstoniNorw yIceland
Gap in PISA math scores by quartile (q1/q4) 0.86 9 / 30 LuxembourgFranceCze h RepublicB lgiumSlovak RepublicIsraelPortugalUnited StatesSw nA striaN w ZealandKo a, Rep.SingaporeG rm nySwitze landA str iGre cS ainUnited KingdomIt yN therlandsIr landJapanSlove iaFi la dDe m rkNorwayEstoniaCan daIcel nd
Basic Services and Infrastructure 5.18 25 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicSlov niaIsra lIrela dCzech RepublicPortugalB lgiumEstoniaKor , Rep.New ZealandGer anyFrancU ited StatesU it d KingdomC nadSp inL x mbourgN therlandsAustrIc lJ aAustraliaD markNorw ywe enFi landSing poreS tzerland
Basic and Digital Infrastructure 5.01 24 / 30 GreeceItalySloveniaB lgiumIsra lS ovak RepublicI elandPortugalNew Z alandEstoniaCzech RepublicK re , Rep.G rm nyCanadaFr ncU ited KingdomSp iAustriaAustr l aNorwayNetherlandsL xembourgJUn ted StatesIc l nD markSwe enFi andSi g poreSwitzerland
Quality of overall infrastructure (1-7 scale) 4.68 25 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicSloveniaIsr lIrela dCzech RepublicN w ZealandAustraliNorwayBelgi mUnited KingdomEs oniaC nadaSwe eSp iPortugalLux mb urgKorea, Rep.G r anyUnite  StatesI elandDenmarkAustriaFr ceFi l ndJap nN therlandsS aporewi zerland
Efficiency of ground transportation (1-7 scale) 4.42 26 / 30 ItalyIsraelGr eceNew ZealandIr andSlovak RepublicSlov niBelgiumAustr liaNorwayPo tugalLuxembourgCan aCz ch RepublicFranceIcelandU it  KingdomDe markUnited StatesSpainEston aG m nyK re , Rep.AustriN herlandsSwe nSingaporeFin ndSwitze landJ p
Transportation infrastructure expenditure (% GDP) 0.90 11 / 28 Korea, Rep.BelgiumIc l ndItalyUnited StatesNeth rlandsDenm rkG r ySloveniaN w ZealandFinUni e  Ki gdomAustriw denLux mbourgFr nceI landNorwayGre ceJap nPortugalSlovak RepublicCz ch epublicSp inC nadaSwitz rlandEstoniaAustr lia
Dwellings without basic facilities (% of population) 0.20 6 / 29 EstoniaJapanK re , Rep.Isr elBelgiumAustraliaSlov k RepublicAustrGer anyPo tugalCz ch RepublicLuxembourgFinlandGr cFrIt lDenmarkIcelandSloveniaUnited KingdomNorw yCa adaIr landNew ZealandSwitz rlandU ited StatesSp inSw deN th rl nds
Internet users (% of population) 79.69 24 / 30 ItalyGreecePortugalIsraelSloveniaSpaiIr a dCzech RepublicSlov k RepublicAustriaSingaporeFr ncEstoniaKorea, Rep.AustraliaBelgi mN w Z alandG manyS itzerC n daUnit d StatesJap nUnited KingdomFinl ndSwedenN th rlan sLuxembourgDen rkNorwayIc lan
Fixed broadband Internet subscriptions (per 100 population) 27.71 25 / 30 Slovak RepublicItalySingaporeIsr elSloveniaIrelandAustr liaCzech RepublicS ainAustriaEstoniaPo tugalJ p nGre eU ited StatesNew ZealandF landS denC adLux mbourgBelgiumIc ndG rmanyUnit d KingdomNorwaKore , Rep.F anceN th rlandsD nm rkSwitz land
Active mobile broadband subscriptions (per 100 population) 95.05 12 / 30 GreeceSloveniaP rtug lIsra lC adaB l iumSlovak RepublicAustriaCzech RepublicN therlandsFr ncGerm ySpainIt lyLux m ourgUnite  K n domNorwayIc landIr lS itze landUnited StatesKor a, Rep.Aust liaN w ZealandE oniDenm rkSwedenJap nSi gaporeFi l d
Affordability of mobile-cellular internet (PPP $) 0.54 29 / 30 GreeceIrelandFr ceSwitzerlandU it d KingdomJapanN therlandsEstoniN w ZealandBe giumSlove iaIsra lUnite  StatesIt lyCz ch RepublicSlov k R publicC naS gaporeLuxembo rgIcelandSp inKor a, Rep.PortugalG rm nyN w yA traliaA st iaS edenFin andD nmark
Affordability of fixed-broadband (PPP $) 21.41 4 / 30 AustraliaSing poreGe m nyNew ZealandNethe l ndsC nadaPortug lS inK a, Rep.NorwayDenmarkSwe enLuxembourgSlov iaIsra lB lgiumSlovak RepublicIta yFi l ndEstoniaGreecIc landCzech RepublicFr ceSwitzerlandAustriaIr landJapanUn t d StatesU ited K ngdom
Health Services and Infrastructure 5.36 25 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceItalySloveniaCzech RepublicIr la dIsr elKore , Rep.EstoniaU ted StatesPortugalFr nceG rm nyU ited KingdomL x mbourgC nadaSp iN therlandsD markIcel ndBelgiumAustriaN w ZealandSwed nJ p nA straliNo w yFi la dSwitzerlandSi gapore
Quality of healthcare services (1-7 scale) 4.69 28 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceIrel ndSlov niaEsto iItalyP rtugalUnited StatesIsra lCz ch RepublicC nadDenm rkU ited KingdomKor , Rep.Swed nIc l ndG rmanyNew ZealandLuxemb urgAustraliaSing p reNo w yFi landF nceS ainAust iaNe h rlandsJ panB lgiumSwitzerland
Accessibility of healthcare services (1-7 scale) 4.79 30 / 30 IrelandGreeceSlovak RepublicU ited StatesEs oniaSloveniaK r , R p.PortugalG rm nyIsr lSi poreI alyCzech RepublicAustriaFrancA st aliaI el ndFinl ndNew Zea andCa dLuxembourgD n arkSpainSwedeSwitzerlandB lgiumNethe landsJ panN rw yUnited Kingdom
Particulate matter (2.5) concentration 9.50 11 / 30 Korea, Rep.Cz ch RepublicSlovak RepublicIsr elSloveniaIt lySinga oreLux mbourgAustriaB lg mN ther andsG rmanyJ anGr ceUnited KingdomF anceSwitzerlanD markSpainIr landPortu alNo wayE to iaUnite  StatesIcel ndCan aFi l ndSwedenAustr liaN w Z aland
Out of pocket (% of total health expenditure) 85.50 19 / 30 NetherlandsFranceUnited KingdomNew ZealandUnited StatesLuxembourgG r nyS ove iD nm rkNorw yCa aIr lCzech RepublicAus iaJ p nSwedenI l ndEstoniaBelgiumFinlandSp inAustraliaIt lyIsraelSwitzerlandSlov k RepublicP rtugalGreeceKore , Rep.Sin pore
Inequality-adjusted life expectancy 0.90 19 / 30 EstoniaUnited StatesCzech RepublicD nmarkSloveniP rtugalUnited KingdomN w Z alandB l iumGreeceFinlandIr lG r yL xembourgNetherlandsSlovak RepublicCana aAustriKo e , Rep.Fr ncNorwayIs aelSpainA straliaSwedenSwitzerlandItalyIc la dSingaporeJap n
Gender gap health (female to male ratio) 0.98 7 / 30 SingaporeCanadaDenm rkIcelandNew ZealandNeth rl ndsS inSl vak RepublicKo , Rep.Slove iaP rtug lSwitz rlandAustra iIt lyL x mbourgSw denNo wayIsraelBelgiumUnited KingdomUn ted StatesIr landGr eceG rmanyCzech RepublicJapAus riaFra cFinl ndEstonia
Stringency of Environmental Regulations (1-7 scale) 5.23 21 / 30 ItalyGreeceKorea, Rep.IsraelSpainSlovak RepublicC adaFranceCze h RepublicIrelandPortugalIc landU ite  StatesEs oniaUnit d KingdomSl venBelgi mLuxe bourgSing p reNew ZealandAustraliNe h landsDe m rkJ panG rm yN wayAustriaFiS e enSwitzerland
Reliability of police services (1-7 scale) 6.11 14 / 30 Slovak RepublicItalyCzech RepublicGreeceIsraelKorea, Rep.G rmanySloveniaP rtugSw d nF a ceB l iumDenmarkU ted StatesU ited KingdomEs oniaIr l dJapanAustriSp inNetherlandsLux mbourgAus liaC nadIc l ndNorw ySing poreSw tzerlandNew ZealandFi land
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Corruption and Rents 5.22 11 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceItalyCz h RepublicPortugalKor a, Rep.SpainSlov niaIsra lEsto iFr cAustraliaGermanyU t d StatesCan daAustriB lg umIcel ndUnite  KingdomIrelandNetherlandsDe markSi gaporeSwitzerlandNew ZealandNo wayF nS d nJap nLux mbourg
Business and Political Ethics 5.81 10 / 30 Slovak RepublicItalyGreeceCz h RepublicSpainKorea, Rep.SloveniaP rtug lIsra lU ited StatesFra cA striaEstoniaG rm nyCa daBe giumI l dAustraliaJ p nUnited KingdomIrel ndNe herlandsDe markSw tze landLuxembourgNorwaySw deSing poreNew ZealandFinland
Judicial Independence (1-7 scale) 6.39 6 / 30 Slovak RepublicSloveniaItalyKorea, Rep.Gr ecSpainCzech RepublicPortugalUnited StatesF anceA striaG rmanySing poreIcel ndEsto iaB lgiumJ anIsr elC nadaDe m rkL xembourgAu traliaUni ed KingdomN therla dsIrel ndSw eSw tzerlandNo wayNe  ZealandFinland
Diversion of public funds (1-7 scale) 5.96 8 / 30 Slovak RepublicCzech epublicSp inItalyGreecSloveniaK r a, Rep.PortugalIsra lAustriaEstoniaUnited StatesGermanyF nceC n dJ paIcelandBelgiumAustraliaU ed KingdomDen rkNe herlandsIr landSw tzerlandNorwayLux mb urgSw deSing p reFinlandNew Zealand
Irregular payments in tax collection (1-7 scale) 6.64 5 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicItalyCzech RepublicKorea, Rep.SpainPortugalUnit d StatesGermanyIsra lSlov iB lgi mFr nceJ anA striaCanadaUn t d KingdomN herla dsEstoniSwitzerlandAu tra iLux mbourgNo w yIcelanSwe enI elSi gaporeDe markNew ZealandFi land
Ethical behavior of firms (1-7 scale) 5.55 14 / 30 Slovak RepublicItalyKorea, Rep.Gr eceCz h RepublicSp inSlov niaP rtug lIsraelEstoniaUnit d StatesFra ceGermanyIc l ndAustriaC adaIrel dBelgiumUnited KingdomAus raliaJ panLuxembourgN therlandsNorwaySw tzerlandDenmarkFi l nSi poreNew ZealandSwe n
Public trust of politicians (1-7 scale) 4.95 10 / 30 ItalySlovak RepublicGreeceSp inKorea, Rep.Cz ch RepublicSloveniaP rtug lIsra lUnited StatesFranceEstoniaAustriJapanIc landAus raliaC dU ited KingdomGermanyBelgiumI elandDen arkSwitze landNe h rl sSwedenLuxembourgFinlandN w ZealandNorwaySi g pore
Irregular Payments in Public Contracts (1-7 scale) 6.00 9 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceCz h RepublicItalySpainSloveniaK r a, Rep.PortugalU it d StatesIsr lFr ncG rmanyAustr aCan daBelgiumEstoniaAustr liaUni d KingdomNe herla dsSwitzerlanJ panI l dNo w ySwedenLuxembourgIc lDenmarkSi gapo eN w ZealandFi l nd
Favoritism in decisions of government officials (1-7 scale) 5.16 7 / 30 Slovak RepublicItalyCzech RepublicGreeceSloveniaK r a, Rep.SpainPortugalIsr lU ted StatesA striaC nadaFranceIcel ndEstoniaA s r liaBelgiumG m nyU t d KingdomDen arkJ pL xembourgNorwayIrel ndN therlandsS tzerlandNew ZealandSwe nFi landSing pore
Concentration of Rents 4.64 11 / 30 PortugalGreeceIs aelEstoniaSlov k RepublicCzech liAustraliaItalySingaporeNew ZealandC nadaKorea, Rep.Fi l ndBelgiumS inIc l ndG r anyN th rlandsDe markIr lFran eS ove iaSwitzerlandNorwayAustriaUni ed KingdomS enUn ted StatesLux mbourgJap
Regulatory protection of incumbents (0-6 scale) 1.07 8 / 29 United StatesIsra lAustraliaKore , R p.No w yJapanIcelandS tzerlandC adGermanyBelgiumNew ZealandLuxe bourgFranceGr eceFi landNeth rlandsD m rkPortugalSpaiSl ve iaI elanI lySwe enSlov k RepublicAustriaCzech RepublicE oniaUn ted Kingdom
Extent of market dominance (1-7 scale) 4.60 15 / 30 Korea, Rep.IsraelSlovak RepublicIc l ndGreecAustraliaFinlandSp inPortugalEs oniC nadaSl veniaNew ZealandFr ncCze h RepublicIr ndSw enNorw yLuxembourgIt lySingap reUnite  K ngdomNetherla dsB lgiumAust iUn ed StatesD n arkGe nySwitzerlandJap
Intensity of competition (1-7 scale) 5.19 25 / 30 FinlandIcelandGreeceNorwayIsraelIr landPortugalSloveniaIt lLuxembourgSwitzerlandCan dD nm rkNew ZealandSlovak RepublicAustriaSwedenSing poreSpainEsto iaCz ch RepublicF cBelgi mN th rlandsGe manyKore , Rep.AustraliaUni ed StatesUnited KingdomJapan
Land inequality gini (0-100 scale) 44.00 4 / 18 Czech RepublicItalyEstoniaUnited StatesP rtugalUnited KingdomG rmanyA striaGr eceFranNeth rlandsB lgiumDenm rkL x bourgIr landSwe enFinlandNorway
Effectiveness of antitrust policy (1-7 scale) 5.00 15 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicItalyPortugalSloveniaCzech RepublicSpainIsr eAustraliaI l ndKo ea, Rep.EstoniaCan daAustrFr ncI l ndGermanyBelgiumSwitzerlandD n arkLux mbourgU ited Kin domNorwayU ited StatesN therlan sJ panSingaporFi l dN w ZealandSwe n
Concentration of Banking Sector Assets (C5 ratio) 87.67 14 / 29 EstoniaFinlandN rwaySi g poreNew ZealandS ed nPortugalGreecIsra lBel iumSl vak RepublicNetherlandsSwitzerlandD nm rkA straliaIrelandGe m nyC aCz ch RepublicSpaiU ited KingdomF ceKorea, Rep.A striaIt lySlove iaJap nUnited StatesLuxembourg
Financial Intermediation of Real Economy Investment 4.33 22 / 29 ItalyGreeceCz h RepublicPortugalEstoniSloveniaSpaiIrela dI l ndU it  StatesNe herlandsFr nceJ panD nmarkBelgiumIsraelKore , Rep.G r anyAustriaUni ed Kingdomwi zerlandFi l dLuxembourgC adaAu tr liaSw enNo waySing poreNe  Zealand
Financial System Inclusion 5.13 20 / 30 GreeceItalyIcelandPortugalSloveniaSlovak RepublicIsraelCz ch RepublicKore , Rep.EstoniaIr la dFr cSing oreJ p nS iDenmarkN therlandsSw d nFi landB lgiumCanadaUnited KingdomU ited StatesAustraliaA striaSwitzerl ndG rm nyNorwayLux mb urgNe  Z aland
Affordability of financial services for businesses (1-7 scale) 3.59 26 / 30 GreeceItalyIcelandSloveniaIrelandPortugalSpainIsr elKore , Rep.A straliaSlov k RepublicD nm rkFrancCan daCzech RepublicN th rlandsEstoniN w Z alandGermanyUnited StatesNorwSw denB lgi mUnit d KingdomLux bourgAus riaJ p nF nl ndwi zerlandSingapore
Gender Gap in Financial Access (female to male ratio) 1.00 11 / 29 ItalyCzech RepublicPortugalSwitzerlandF anceGre ceKorea, Rep.New Zea andSingaporeUnite  Ki gdomSlov niEsto iN therlan sS inFinlandD markNo w ySwe enI l dIsraelC nadaAustraliaJapanLuxembourgAustriaG r anyU ited StatesBelgiumSlovak Republic
Account at a formal financial institution (% of respondents in bottom 40%) 90.85 22 / 29 Slovak RepublicP rtugalCzech RepublicGreeceIt lyIsraeUnit d StatesIrelandKorea, Rep.Luxem ourgF anceJ panAus r aSingaporeSlov niap iSw tzerlandG rmanyEst niU ted KingdomBel iumC n daAustraliaN herlandsNew ZealandSw dFi landNo w yDe m rk
Account used for business purposes (% of respondents in bottom 40%) 35.64 4 / 27 SingaporeEstoniaI raelIt lySlovak RepublicP rtugalGreeceJ panCz ch RepublicFinl ndSw denS oveniaK r a, Rep.FranceB lg umD markNetherlandsU it d StatesC nadaA straliaU i ed KingdomN w ZealandLuxembourgI el ndG r nyAustriap
Ease of Access to Loans (1-7 scale) 3.50 26 / 30 GreeceItalySlov niaK r a, Rep.Irela dSpainPortugalDe m rkNeth rlandsFr nceUnited KingdomCz ch RepublicIc landEsto iaI elC adaSlovak RepublicAustriaBelg umGe manyAustraliaSwitz rlandNo w yFinlandL xem ourgUnited StatesJSwedenSingaporN w Zealand
Financing of SMEs (1-7 scale) 3.62 26 / 30 GreeceItalySlov niaSpaiIrela dKore , Rep.PortugalF anceSlovak RepublicDenmarkNeth rlandsC n dUnited KingdomEs oniaI r elAustriaIc landCzech RepublicJ nAustraliaGermanyBel umSwe enLux bourgFinl ndSwitzerlandUnited StatesN w ZealandSi gaporeNorway
Intermediation of Business Investment 3.53 21 / 29 Czech RepublicSpainItalyEstoniaPortugalU ited StatesSloveniaGr ceIrel dN th rl ndsG rmanyAust iBe g umSwi zerlandJapFranceDe rkU it d KingdomL x mbourgFi landCana aIs elI elandKo e , Rep.NorwayAustraliaN Z alandS edenSi apore
Local capital market access (1-7 scale) 3.82 23 / 30 GreeceSloveniaP rtug lItalySlovak RepublicSpainCzech RepublicIrel ndEstoniaKorea, Rep.De markIc l ndIsr lAustriaF nlandB lgiumNetherlandsF anceLux mbourgA straliaCan dJ pG rmanyNew ZealandSwed nNorwayS ng poreUnited KingdomS itze landU ited States
Venture capital availability (1-7 scale) 3.23 20 / 30 GreeceItalyKorea, Rep.SloveniaP rtug lD nm rkSlovak RepublicA striaA str liaSp inIrelandCzech RepublicC daF anceIcelandJapanEsto iaNetherlandsG rmanyBelg mSwitzerlandN w ZealandSwed nUnite  Ki gdomNorw yLux mbourgFi lUnite  StatesSingapo eIsrael
Bank lending to Non-financial Corporations (% GDP) 54.40 24 / 26 Czech RepublicUnited StatesIr landBelgiumIsraelGermanyNorw yA s riaItalyUnited KingdomLuxembourgF nceFi landCana aNetherlandsGr ceSpainJ p nPo tu alSi gaporeKo ea, Rep.Swe enA straliaN w Z alandSwitz rlandDenm rk
Small Cap IPOs to NFCs (weighted per $100 Billion USD GDP) 1.26 17 / 27 EstoniaNetherlandsSwitzerlandAust iGermanyPo tugalBe giumUnite  StatesGreeceSpainI l ndCzech RepublicIt lyDenmarkFrancNorwayU it d KingdomFinlandJ panN w ZealandIs elC adaSwe enKor , Rep.A str liaIc dSingapore
Large Cap IPOs to NFCs (weighted per $100 Billion USD GDP) 2.93 12 / 27 LuxembourgCz ch RepublicAustriaGermanyItalySpainJapaPort galFr ceBelgi mSwitzerlandNe h l sGr ceD nmarkFi landIr lKorea, Rep.NorwayU ited StatesUnited KingdomS nSingaporAu traliaCan dIsr elN w ZealandIc l n
Private R&D Expenditure (% GDP) 0.84 20 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicNew ZealandItalySpainPortug lLux mbourgCz ch RepublicNorwayUnited KingdomIrelCana aN th lan sEstonSing poreFra eA striaIceBel iumI raelA straliaU i d StatesSloveniaDen rkG rm nySwedenSwitzerlandFi l dJ pKo ea, Rep.
Follow on (secondary equity to NFCs) (% GDP) 29.32 9 / 29 Czech RepublicSloveniaAustriaEstoniaItalyNeth rlandsSp inBelgiumSwitzerlandFranceGer anyJapanPortugalL xembourgD arkFi landUnite  StatesIcel ndKorea, Rep.Gr eceIr l ndSwe enIsra lN w ZealandUnit d KingdomNorwaySing poreCan dAustr lia
Corporate bond activity (issuances to NFCs) (% GDP) 28.49 20 / 30 SloveniaSlovak RepublicItalyCzech RepublicIsraelSpainEstoniaGreeceAustriaNe h rlandsIr l ndDenm rkG r anyB lgiumJ pAustraliaFr eUnited KingdomU it d StatesPortugalI l ndFinlandSwitzerlandC adNew Z alandNorw yLuxembourgingap reS denKorea, Rep.
Share turnover ratio (% of market capitalization) 16.35 5 / 25 ItalyUnited StatesKor a, Rep.United KingdomSpainJapanG rm yPortugalCzech RepublicCanadaA s raliaSwitzerlandNe h l sFr nceNorw yGr eceAustriaS ngaporeB lgiumI raelIrel ndN w ZealandSloveniSlovak RepublicLux mbourg
Asset Building and Entrepreneurship 5.10 15 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicCzech liPortugalSpainSloveniaB l iumGerm nyEstoniaKor , Rep.F ceJap nA striaIsr lIrelandNorwayLuxembourgCan daIcel ndS e enUn ted KingdomD markN w ZealandSwitzerlandSing poreN th rl sAust iaU i ed StatesFinland
Small Business Ownership 5.16 19 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicCz h liItalySpainPortugalSloveniaCa adFranceBel iumAustriaIr l ndIsr elJa nEsto iaL xembourgSwitzerlandGer anyKore , Rep.Un ted KingdomFinl dSwedenD nmarkAustr liaN th landsIcela dSingaporeN w ZealandNorwayU ite  States
New businesses registered (per 1,000 working age individuals) 5.78 10 / 29 JapanAustriaGreeceC daGerm nyB lgiumF nceKorea, Rep.ItalySwitzerlandSp inSlovak RepublicIsraelCz ch RepublicFi landD nmarkS oveniaP rtug lNe h rlandsIr l ndLuxem ourgSw denNo wayIceSingaporeUnited KingdomA straliaEstoniN w Zealand
Attitudes towards entrepreneurial failure (1-7 scale) 4.84 6 / 30 SloveniaSpaiSlovak RepublicP rtugalAustriJap nCzech RepublicB lgiumGreeceFr nKorea, Rep.Lux mbourgItalyFinlandC na aA straliaEstoniDenm rkGer anySwitzerlandSwedenSingaporeNorw yNetherlandsI la dIc lUnite  KingdomN w ZealandUnit d StatesIsr el
Number of PCT patent applications filed (per million population) 83.76 20 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicP rtugalEs oniCz ch RepublicSpainI alySlov niaAustraliaNew ZealandIr landCan daU t d KingdomIc l ndBelg umLuxe bourgFranceSi gap reNorwayA striaUni e  StatesN the landsDenm rkG r yK , Rep.Is aelFinSwitzerlandSwe nJ pan
Time to start a business (total number of days) 6.00 17 / 30 AustriaLuxembourgCz ch RepublicSpainFinlandIsr elGr eceSlovak RepublicGermanyJapanSwitzerlandSwed nSloveniaIrelandUnited StatesIt lU ite  KingdomIc l ndNetherlandsNorw yKor , Rep.F anB lgiumEsto iaDe arkP rtugalA straliaSing poreCan daN w Zealand
Cost required of starting a business (% GNI per capita) 0.20 3 / 30 Korea, Rep.ItalyJapanCzech RepublicSpainB lgiumNetherlandsIsra lGr ecePortugalIc landSwitzerlandLuxembourgGer anySlovak RepublicEstoniaUnited StatesFinNorwayFr ceAust aliaSing poreSw denC n daN w Z alandAus riaIrel dD markUn t d KingdomSlovenia
Time to resolve insolvency (total number of years) 0.40 1 / 30 Slovak RepublicGreeceEstoniaSwitzerlandCzech RepublicIsra lLuxembo rgSw denPo tugaFranceIt lyS ainKor a, Rep.U ited StatesN w ZealandGermanyAustriaNe h r sUnit d KingdomI el ndD markAustr liaNorwayFi l ndBelg umSi g poreSloveniaC nadJ p nI el d
Cost of resolving insolvency (% of estate's value) 9.00 18 / 30 IsraelIt lySlovak RepublicCzech epublicLuxembourgSpainAustriaSwed nGr eceFranI l ndEstoniaPort alU ited StatesA str iaGermanyCanadUn ted KingdomSwitzerlandDenmarkSloveniaFi l dNetherlandsIc la dNew ZealandKo e , Rep.B l iumJ pSing poreNorw y
Cost of enforcing a contract (% of debt value) 26.90 24 / 30 United KingdomCzech RepublicUnited StatesSw eSlovak RepublicN w ZealandIr l dSingaporeIsra lSwitz landN h sJ anDenmarkI lyC aEsto iAustr liaSpainAustrBelg umF nceF l ndGer anyGre cePortugalSlov niaK r a, Rep.Norw yL xembourgI land
Time required to enforce a contract (total number of days) 650.00 25 / 30 GreeceSloveniaItalyIsra lSlovak RepublicIr landCzech RepublicC adaPortugalNe h rlandsSpainBel iumUnit d KingdomG manyEsto iaUnite  StatesIcel dDenmarkAustriaA str liaFra ceSwitzerlandFi landJ panLuxe bourgSw denNo wayK re , Rep.New ZealandSingapore
Time spent paying taxes (total number of hours per year) 82.00 4 / 30 Czech RepublicJapanPortugalItalySloveniaIsra lGerm nyGreeceSlov k RepublicK rea, Rep.Unit d StatesAustriaB lg umSpainNew ZealandIcelandFr nceC daD nm rkNetherlandsSw denUnited KingdomAustraliaF nla dSingaporeNorw yI l ndEsto iaS tzerlandLuxembourg
Home and Financial Asset Ownership 5.04 13 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicP rtugalGermanyKore , Rep.Slove iaCzech RepublicSp iEstoniaB lgiumN rwayJ p nFranceAustriaIsr lIc landI lSwe enN w ZealandLuxembourgU it d Ki domDen rkS gaporeU ited StatesCa daSwitze l ndN h sAustraliaF nl
Protection of property rights (1-7 scale) 6.19 7 / 30 ItalyGreeceSlovak RepublicSlov niaP rtug lCz ch RepublicSpainKorea, Rep.IsraeF ncEstoniaU it d StatesB lgiumDenmarkG r nyIcelandA str liaC adA strNew ZealandJapanNorwayNether sI landU ited KingdomSing poreLuxembourgSw deFinlandSwitzerland
Home ownership rate (% of population) 68.60 16 / 30 SwitzerlandGermanyAustriaKore , Rep.JapaUn ted StatesD markUnite  KingdomN w ZealandFrancAustr liaNe her sIsra lC n daIrel dSw enBe iumLuxe bourgFinla dIt lyGreecePortugalSlov niaIc la dCz ch RepublicSpainEstoniaNo w ySl v k RepublicS ga ore
Housing Loan Penetration (% of adult population) 39.20 7 / 27 GreeceSlovak RepublicCzech epublicSloveniaItalyIsraelJapanEsto iaSi gaporeGermanyKore , Rep.Port galAustriF anceFinlandCana aU t d KingdomSp inU ited StatesIr landBelgiumLuxe bourgNew ZealandAustr liN h rlandsDenm rkSw e
Affordability Gap, Urban housing 0.00 6 / 25 AustraliaSing poreKo ea, Rep.United KingdomN w Z alandSw tzerlanFr ncUnit d StatesIt lyNetherlandJapCaGerm nyS inSwe nAustriaIsr elCz ch RepublicFi l ndIrPortugalLuxembourgGr eceBel iumD nmark
Employee stock ownership (% of respondents) 6.50 10 / 20 GreeceSlovak RepublicItalyG rmanyPortugalIcelandCzech RepublicSp inB lgiumDe markIrelandAustriaNe herlandsSlov niaEsto iF an eUn ted KingdomSw enLux mbourgFinland
Profit sharing (% of respondents) 23.60 16 / 20 GreeceItalyBelgiumPort galIrelandSpainUnited KingdomL xembourgGer anyIc landN therlandsDe m rkSw deFr ceEstoniaAust iCz ch RepublicFinlandSlovak RepublicS ovenia
Private pension assets (% GDP) 48.25 12 / 30 GreeceFranLuxembourgSloveniaBelgiumItalySwedenKorea, Rep.A striaCzech RepublicN wayEstoniaSp inSl v k RepublicPortugalGerm nyN w Z alandJ aI el dIsr elSing poreC n daU ited StatesDenmarkFAust aliUni ed KingdomSwitzerlandIcelandN therlan s
Ireland — Country Profile — The Inclusive Growth and Development Report 2017 Page 3 of 4
Employment and Labor Compensation 4.23 26 / 30 GreeceUnited StatesSpainKorea, Rep.Ir landSlovak R publicJap nIt lyAustr liaC dUnited KingdomI ra lCz ch RepublicNew Zea andPortugalSloveniaEsto iGerm nySwitzerlandFra ceNeth rlandsB l iumLux mbourgSing poreAustriaIF nSwe enDe markNorw y
Productive Employment 4.57 24 / 30 GreeceItalySpainSlovak RepublicP rtugalKorea, Rep.IrelandAustraliaIsraelC n daJ p nU it d StatesSlov niaNew Ze landCz ch RepublicU ited Ki gdomS enFranceEstoniB lgiumI l dAustriaN therlandsFi lGerm ySwitzerlandSin poreLuxembourgDen kNorw y
Female labor force participation (female to male ratio) 0.81 25 / 30 Korea, Rep.ItalyJapanGreeceSingaporeIr landCzech RepublicSlovak RepublicLuxembo rgUnited StatesAustraliaS ainUnit d KingdomBelg umN the landsG rma yN w ZealandA striai z rFr n eI lEstoniaS oveniaP tug lC n aD rkNorw ySwedenIcel ndF nland
Unemployment rate (% of labor force) 11.60 25 / 30 GreeceSpainPortugalSlovak RepublicItalyI el ndFr ceSloveniaFi la dBelgiumSw enEstoniaN therlandsCa adDenm rkU ited KingdomCzech RepublicU ited StatesIsr lLuxembourgAustraliNew ZealandAustrIcelanGe m nySw tz rlandJKor , Rep.Norw ySing pore
Youth unemployment rate (% of labor force) 23.90 25 / 30 SpainGreeceIt lyPortugalSlovak RepublicIrelandFr ceB lgiumSwed nLux bourgFinlandSloveniaUnited KingdomCz ch RepublicN w ZealandEst niaCanadaUnit d StatesAustr liaDenmarkIsr lNetherlandsAustriKor , Rep.IcelandSwitz rlandNorwayGermanySi g poreJ p
Vulnerable employment (% of employment) 12.70 16 / 23 GreeceItalySlov niaCzech RepublicPortugalNe erlandsIr landU ted KingdomSp inSlov k RepublicB giumFinlandSwitzerlandSi gaporeA striaIcelanFr n eSwe nLuxembourgG r anyEst iaD n arkN rw y
Extent of Informal economy (1-7 scale) 5.70 13 / 30 GreeceSpainItalyCzech RepublicSlovak RepublicP rtugalIsr elSloveniaK r , Rep.Icel ndBelg umEstoniaU ted StatesCa adaA straliaFranceUnited KingdomIrel ndGermanySwedD nmarkN w ZealandAustriaNe h rlandsJ panLux mbourgNorw yS ng p reSwitzerlandFin
Country capacity to retain talent (1-7 scale) 4.74 13 / 30 GreeceSlovak RepublicItalySloveniaFr nceEstoniaSpainP rtugalCz ch RepublicJapanN w ZealandKorea, Rep.AustraliaIsr eA strBelg umD nmarkI landGer anyC a aI l ndSwedenLuxembourgFinl ndNetherlandsU it d KingdomSi gaporeNorwayU ited StatesSwitzerland
Social mobility (1-7 scale) 5.42 17 / 30 Korea, Rep.Gr eceItalyPortugalSlovak RepublicSloveniaSp iIsraFr cCze h RepublicJ nUnited KingdomGermanyIr landB lgiumUnit d StatesEs oniaA striSwedenCaD nmarkLux mbourgIcelandN th rlandsAus raliaSi g poreN w yN  ZealandSwitz rlandFinl nd
Strictness of employment protection (0-6 scale) 0.63 25 / 29 United StatesCanadaUnited KingdomIrel ndIcelandSwedeIsraelAustraliaJ panN therlandsN w ZealandSwitz rlandG rmanyAu triDenm rkCz ch RepublicS ve iaFinlSlovak RepublicP rtugalIt lyKorea, Rep.Gr ecBelgi mSp inNorwayEston aF anceL x mbourg
Unusual hours of work (per year) 1819.54 23 / 30 SingaporeKorea, Rep.Gr eceIc l ndPortugalIsra lEstoniaI ela dUnited StatesCz ch RepublicN w Ze landSlovak R publicIt lyJ panC nadSpainSloveniaU it d KingdomAustr liaF landAustrSwe enSwitzerlandB giumL x bourgFr eD arkNo w yNetherlandsGermany
Share in Temporary Employment (% of employed persons) 9.30 12 / 27 SpainKorea, Rep.NetherlandsPortug lSw deSloveniaFranceFinItalyC daIc l ndSwitzerlandGermanyGre ceCz h RepublicI la dAustriaSlovak RepublicBelgiumD markLux bo rgNorwayJ p nUnit d KingdomAustraliaUni ed StatesE ni
Underemployment rate (% of labor force) 7.06 25 / 28 ItalyAustraliaSpainIrelandFr ceSwedenGr eceCanadaJ pPortugalN w ZealandUnited KingdomN th rla dsF nl ndD nm rkS ov k RepublicG manyIceAustriaSwitz rlandIsr elLuxembourgBelgiuU ited StatesNo wayEsto iaSloveniCzech Republic
Active Labour Market Expenditure (% of GDP) 0.86 5 / 27 United StatesIsra lJapanEsto iaSlovak RepublicC adaU ited KingdomAustr liaNew ZealandIt lySlov niaCz ch RepublicKor , Rep.Sp inNorwaySwitz rlandPortug lL x mbourgGer yBel i mA striaN herlandsIr landFr ceFi landSwedenDe mark
Wage and non-wage compensation 3.90 26 / 30 United StatesGre ceKorea, Rep.Jap nIr la dUnited KingdomC adaAustr liaCzech RepublicN w ZealandSp inlovak RepublicIsra lEstoniaSloveniaSwitzerlandG rm nyPortugLux mbourgN ther andsSi p reIt lyFr ceB lg umAustriaFinIcelandDen arkSwe enNorway
Low pay rate (% of employment) 20.10 19 / 26 United StatesKor a, Rep.Can daIsraelSlovak RepublicUnited KingdomGermanyIr l ndLux mbourgCz ch RepublicAustriaAustr liaN herlandsJap nDenm rkGr ceSpainBe g mN w ZealandSwitz rlandP tug lI landItalyFr ceFinl ndSweden
Gender Gap in Estimated Earned Income (female to male ratio) 0.59 23 / 30 Korea, Rep.NetherlandsJapanItalyAustriaUni ed KingdomGreeceIrelIs elSlovak RepublicCz ch epublicN w ZealandEstoniaAustr liaSpainU it d StatesBelg uCan daD n rkG r anyP rtugalFinl ndSwitzerlandIcel ndFr ceSw eNorwaySlov iaSingaporeLuxembourg
Pay linked to productivity (1-7 scale) 5.26 3 / 30 ItalySpainGreeceSloveniaP rtug lFranceSlovak RepublicA striaSw denIsr elAustraliaNe h rlandsJap nB lg umCz ch RepublicLuxe bourgU ited Kin domFinlandKorea, Rep.NorwayIc l ndCan aEsto iD nmarkGer nyNew ZealandU ited StatesI el dSingaporeSwitzerland
Wage dispersion (minimum relative to median wage) 0.44 16 / 21 United StatesSpainCz ch RepublicJ panEsto iIrelandC adaNeth rlandsSlovak RepublicGreeceG rmanyKo e , Rep.Unit d KingdomB lgiumAustraliaL x bourgPo tugaI raelNew ZealandSloveniFra ce
Trade union density (% of employment) 29.60 9 / 30 EstoniaFranceK re , Rep.U it d StatesCzech RepublicSlovak RepublicSwitz rlandAustra iSpainNeth rlandsGermanyJapPor ugalSing poreN w ZealandGreecS oveniaIsraU ited KingdomC daAu triIr landLuxembourgIt lyNorwayB lgiumDe markS e enFi landIc l nd
Collective bargaining coverage rate (% of employment) 32.40 20 / 30 Korea, Rep.United StatesN w ZealandJapanSingaporEstoniSlovak RepublicIsr lC n daU ited KingdomIrGr ceCz h RepublicSwitzerlandGermanyLux mb urgAust liaSloveniaP tug lNorw ySpainItaDe arkNetherlandsSwedenI el ndFin andB lgiumFr ceAustria
Cooperation in labour-employer relations (1-7 scale) 5.31 13 / 30 Korea, Rep.ItalyF anceGreeceSlovak RepublicSpainSlov niaAustraliaPortug lCzech RepublicB lg umIs lUnited StatesG r anyEstoniaFinlandCa aIrel dU ited KingdomIcelandLuxembourgN w ZealandA striaJ paN ther sSw denDe markS poreSwitzerlandNorway
Workers' Rights (violations) 12.00 14 / 28 GreeceKorea, Rep.United StatesAustraliaSing poreUnited KingdomSp inIs elN w Z alandCan dCzech RepublicP u lSw tzerlandJ p nI l dB lgiuGermanyFranceIcelIt lyEstoniaAustriN herlandsNo waySw deFinlandD nmarkS ovak Republic
Availability of formal child care (%) 28.75 17 / 26 Slovak RepublicCzech epublicGreeceAustriaGermanyE oniaItalyJapaFinlandIrelAustraliaNew ZealandBelgiumSp inSlov niUn ted KingdomUnited StatesL xembourgPortugalSwedenF anceKore , Rep.NorwayIc lanN th rlandsD m rk
Cost of child care (% of average wage) 53.50 23 / 28 SwitzerlandLuxembourgNetherlandsNew ZealandSloveniIr landUnit  KingdomJ pAustr liaU ed StatesCan daBe g umPort lSpainGer nyFr ceCze h RepublicIsraelKor a, Rep.De arkFinl ndN rwayIcel ndSlovak RepublicEstoniaGre ceSwedenAustria
Paid maternity leave (total number of days) 74.62 20 / 25 SwedenCanadaD nm rkJapaIcelandIr lFinlandSwitzerlandU ited KingdomBelgiumKorea, Rep.G rma yIsraelNew Z alandSloveniAustriaNe her sFra ceSingaporeSp inGre ceIt lyCzech RepublicEst niaSlovak Republic
Parental leave (total number of days) 0.00 18 / 24 IrelandUnited StatesSpainNew Ze landIsraelGr eceFranIcelandB lgiumPort galAus raliaJapanFinl ndDe markAu triaC n daSloveniaItalyNorw yG rmanyEstoniaS edenSl v k RepublicCzech epublic
Fiscal Transfers 4.99 2 / 30 Slovak RepublicEstoniaGreeceCz h RepublicSloveniaG rmanyItalySw d nSing poreAustriaSp inPort galUn ted StatesJ anFi l dNeth rl ndsK rea, R p.Aust aliaNorw yIc andCan aI r elNew Zealandw zerlandU it d Ki gdomFr nceDe m rkLux mbourgIr landB lgium
Tax Code 4.49 2 / 30 EstoniaSlovak RepublicGermanyCzech RepublicAustriaSloveniaGre ceN th rlandsSwed nSp inPortugalI lyFinla dNorwayJ anDe markU ited StatesC adaIce ndSwitzerl ndN w ZealandFr ncAust liaS gaporeI elKo , Rep.LuxembourgB giumIr l ndUnited Kingdom
Extent and effect of taxation on incentives to work (1-7 scale) 3.73 15 / 30 SloveniaSlovak RepublicGr eceAustriaB lg umIt lyPortugalDen rkF nceSwedenFi l ndAustraliaCz ch RepublicSpainG rmanyIr landNetherlandsKorea, Rep.EstoniaNorw yI landU ite  KingdomJ anIsr elC nadaU ited StatesN w ZealandLuxemb urgS tz rSingap re
Extent and effect of taxation on incentives to invest (1-7 scale) 4.74 5 / 30 ItalyGreeceFranSlov niaAustriaPortugalDe m rkB lgiumA straliaSlov  RepublicSp inSwedenKo ea, Rep.NorwayG rmanyJap nFinl ndCz ch RepublicC adaIcel ndIsr elU ited StatesUnited KingdomEs oniaN therl ndsIr landN w ZealandSwitz rlandLuxemb urgSingapore
Total tax revenue (% GDP) 23.82 11 / 30 EstoniaSwitzerlandJapanUnit d StatesGerm yC adaSpainCzech RepublicSing poreKore , Rep.Slov k RepublicSloveniaFinla dNe h rlandsAustraliaP tug lFranceI r lItalyI lNorwayGreeceU ited KingdomIcel ndLux mbourgB lgiumSwedenAustriaN w ZealandDenmark
Synthetic measure tax progressivity 9.95 1 / 30 SingaporeNetherlandsEstoniGerm yCz ch RepublicAust iaKore , Rep.Unit  StatesS ovak RepublicJ p nD nmarkIt lyGr ecN w Z alandSp inPortugalNorw yL x mbourgF anceIc l ndSwitzerlandS ov niC na aB lgi mSwedenF landU t  KingdomA straliaIsr elIreland
Total tax wedge (% of labor cost) 12.59 1 / 30 BelgiumGermanyAustriaF anceFinl dItalyNetherlandsEstoniSlovak RepublicSwedenSlove iaGre ceSp iCz ch RepublicNorwayLux mbo rgIcelandAu traliaUni ed KingdomSi gaporeDenmarkUnited StatesC n daPortu alJapanIsr elSwitzerlandore , Rep.N w ZealandI l nd
Tax on goods and services (% of total tax revenue) 32.43 18 / 30 Slovak RepublicSpainEstoniaSwedenFinlandJap nDe markIsr lIc landU ite  KingdomS oven aSwitzerlanIrela dG e eLuxembourgPortu alCzech RepublicN w ZealandA striaN h rlandsKo ea, Rep.BelgiumN rw yAustraliaSing poreG nyIt lyF ceC nadaU it d States
Tax on property (% GDP) 2.27 14 / 28 EstoniaSlovak RepublicCzech epublicAustriaSloveniaGe manySwed nNorwaPortugalFi l dS itzerlandD markGre ceN w ZealandIr landSp inIceIt lyAustr liaJ panKo ea, Rep.I r elUnite  StatesLuxembourgC nadaB lgiumFranceUn ted Kingdom
Total tax on capital (% GDP) 0.66 6 / 29 United StatesSlovak RepublicEstoniaN w ZealandSl veniNeth rlandsCanadIc l ndCz ch RepublicNo waySw denDenmarkAustriaJ paGe manyGreeceSwitz rlandIsraelF nlandPortugalLuxembourgF an eSp iIr landUnited KingdomBelgiumAustraliaItalyKo ea, Rep.
Total tax on Inheritance (% GDP) 0.19 10 / 29 Slovak RepublicAustraliaCan dCzech RepublicN w ZealandEstoniaS edenP rtug lNorwayIsra lA striaSlove iaIta yGr e eIc landLuxembourgU t d StatesSwitzerlandGermanyIr landDenm rkUnited KingdomFi landSp iN th rlan sKo ea, Rep.J pF anceB lgium
Social Protection 5.48 8 / 30 GreeceSingaporeSlovak RepublicK rea, Rep.EstoniaUnited StatesJ anI lyCzech RepublicAustraliaUni d KingdomSloveniaSw d nI r elSpainPortugalIc a dNew ZealandC adaG rm nyFi l ndSwitzerlandIrelandL xembourgFr eNorw yN therlandsAustriaBe g umDe mark
Efficiency in public goods and services provision (1-7 scale) 4.59 19 / 30 GreeceItalySlovak RepublicCzech epublicSloveniaP rtug lKorea, Rep.IsraelSpainA striaUni ed StatesIrelandB lgiumEstoniaJapanA str liaUni ed KingdomC daDenm rkF anceIcel ndGermanyN w ZealandSwed nN th rlandsFinlandNorw ySwitzerlandLuxe bourgSi gap re
Social safety net protection (1-7 scale) 5.58 13 / 30 GreeceKorea, Rep.Slov k RepublicItalyEstoniaSingaporeSl veniaIsra lPortugalCz ch RepublicUnited StatesJ nUnit d KingdomC nadIc l ndSp inAus raliaIre andG m nyNew ZealandNe herl ndsS e enDenmarkAu triaB lg umSwitzerlandFinl ndLux mbourgFr ceNorway
Total spending on social protection (% GDP) 23.72 13 / 30 SingaporeKorea, Rep.IsraelAustraliaSwitzerlandIcel ndCana aS v k RepublicU ited StatesEs oniaCz ch RepublicN w ZealandJap nSlov niaNether sNorw yLux mbourgIr l ndGr ceUnited KingdomPortugalS ainG rma yIt lyA st iaFi l dBelgiumSwe enDen arkFr nce
Coverage of old-age pensions (% above retirement age) 90.50 19 / 30 SingaporeIsraelSp inGreeceKorea, Rep.Slov niaJapaItalyAustraliaB lgiumLuxe bourgIrel ndUnited StatesSlovak RepublicCanadaN w ZealandEst niDenm rkUnit d KingdomFrancNo w yPor ugaCzech RepublicN therlandsFinla dIcel nSwe nSwitzerlandG rmanyAustria
Coverage of unemployment insurance (% of unemployed) 85.40 3 / 29 Slovak RepublicGreeceCz h RepublicJapanUnit d StatesEs oniaSwed nI landIsr lS oveniaNew Z alandC dPortugalL xembourgKor , Rep.Sp inA straliaI lyFr ncFi landNorwayNetherlandsSwitzerlandU ited KingdomDenm rkB lgiumI lanG manyAustria
Progressivity of pensions (0 to 100 scale) 100.00 1 / 29 SwedenPortugalItalyNetherlandsFinlandSlovak RepublicIcel ndLuxembourgSpaiG r anyEstoniaAustriFra ceGr eceU t d StatesN rwayJ panSloveniDenm rkB lgiumCzech RepublicSwitzerlandKorea, Rep.A s raliaIsra lUnited KingdomC n daNew ZealandI land
Estimate of health coverage (% of population) 100.00 1 / 30 United StatesEs oniaSlovak RepublicLuxembourgNetherlandsBelgiumSpainAustriaFra ceGe anyGr ceIc landI lIsr lIt lyCzech RepublicKorea, Rep.DenmarkAustr liaNew Z alandNo w yPortugalSing oreFinl ndSloveniaC adSwe nSwitz rlandUnite  KingdomJ p
Coverage in case of employment injury (% of labor force) 71.80 20 / 30 GreeceSpainGermanyB lgiumCz ch RepublicSlovak RepublicFinl ndSwitzerlandUnited KingdomCanadaIrelandAustr liaIt lySi gaporeI r elF ceEstoniaL xembourgP rtugalAustriS veniaSw denUn ted StatesJ panKor a, Rep.D nmarkNorw yIcelandNetherlandsNew Zealand
Net pension replacement rate (% of pre-retirement earnings) 42.20 27 / 29 United KingdomJapanIrel dN w ZealandUnited StatesKor a, Rep.Switzerl ndCanadGerm yAust liaSwe enSlov iaEs o iNorw yB g umFi landCzech RepublicIsr elDenmarkFranceGreeceIc l ndItalyS ovak RepublicLuxembourgPort galSpainAustriaNe h rlands
Net unemployment benefit replacement rate (% previous earnings) 48.60 25 / 29 United KingdomAustraliaNew ZealandGreecIr l ndEstoniaAustriK re , Rep.G manySwe enU ited StatesSlovak RepublicC adaCz ch R publicNorw yFr ncJ p nFi landSwitz rlandIt lN herlandsPortug lIc landSp inL xembourgDe arkSloveniaB lgiumIsrael
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Data Presentation 
In order to facilitate peer-group comparisons for countries, 
the results are grouped into the four broad categories of 
countries based on a combination of the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index methodology and the 
World Bank’s income classifications that were available at the 
time the last Report was drafted: advanced, upper-middle, 
lower-middle and low income.1 This classification also reflects 
somewhat different available data sets and policy challenges 
for each group. The income thresholds presented in the table 
below are based on GDP per capita in current US dollars. 
Results are displayed by pillar as well as by country (scorecards). 
The former is intended to enable the reader to benchmark 
a given score against a peer group of countries in a given 
policy domain and across other policy domains. The latter is 
intended to provide a comprehensive picture of a country’s 
performance and enabling environment conditions across the 
full spectrum of policy domains covered by the Benchmarking 
Framework. In addition to numerical values, a five-color 
system of color shading is applied to ease interpretation of 
the data and comparisons across countries and indicators, 
with darkest green representing the best performance in a 
pillar, shades of yellow standing for average performance, and 
deepest red displaying the poorest performance. The same 
color palette has been used for the icons on the country  
profiles showing the individual country performances as 
well as in the aggregated pillar result tables for each income 
group. This allows both an internal comparison for individual 
countries (by showing in which pillars they perform more or 
less well) as well as a cross-country comparison (how the 
countries compare to their peers in the various pillars and 
sub-pillars).
It is important to note that in order to facilitate the comparison 
of countries with their peers - those with similar resources at 
their disposal - the color palette has been based on results 
by income group. Thus, caution must be taken in comparing 
color results across income groups, as they are not directly 
comparable. Specifically, the range of colors shown for 
advanced, upper-middle and lower middle income economies 
are each based on the results of the specific income group 
and only comparable to the countries within their group. For 
the low-income countries, a single color calibration has been 
If quantitative data presents outliers, data thresholds are 
introduced to reduce the bias in the distribution of the data. 
The same thresholds are applied across the full sample of 
countries where data is available to allow for some degree of 
comparability (at indicator level and across some sub-pillars).
The computation is based on successive aggregations of 
scores from the indicator level to the sub-pillar and pillar level. 
Unless noted otherwise, an arithmetic mean is used to  
aggregate individual indicators within a category. For  
quantitative data, to make aggregation possible, indicators 
are converted to a 1-to-7 scale (worst to best) in order to  
align them with the Survey results. A linear min-max  
transformation is applied, which preserves the order of, and 
the relative distance between, country scores. 
a. Formally, for a category [i]i[i] composed of [i]K[i] indicators,
there is:
b. Formally, the equation is:
The [i]sample minimum[i] and [i]sample maximum[i] are, 
respectively, the lowest and highest country scores in the 
sample of economies covered by the benchmarking tool. 
In some instances, adjustments were made to account for 
extreme outliers. For those indicators for which a higher value 
indicates a worse outcome, the transformation formula takes 
the following form, thus ensuring that 1 and 7 still correspond 
to the worst and best possible outcomes, respectively:
1 Stage 3 has been used for advanced economies and Stage 2 has been divided 
into two distinct groups (including those in transition) at the midpoint to obtain 
the upper and lower-middle income groups, respectively.   
The Concept
The approach of the Benchmarking Framework and Key 
Performance Indicators presented in this Report is intended 
to be normative and primarily aimed at stimulating discussion 
on policy priorities, actions that could be taken by the private 
sector (alone or in concert with government), and further 
research endeavors. As outlined above, there is widespread 
agreement that the growth process must yield inclusive 
outcomes, and research on the factors that determine such 
outcomes is still going on and remains at a formative stage. 
Many determinants are thought to influence growth outcomes 
and the way in which they are distributed. The selection  
of the pillars therefore represents a key assumption of the 
Framework. It is based on available research and best 
judgment based on historical experience. However, these 
domains have not yet been empirically proven to have a 
direct, causal link to increased growth or social equity, either 
individually or collectively.  
For practical reasons, the Policy and Institutional Indicator 
(PII) Framework separates the policy domains into seven 
distinct pillars, though the policy areas are interdependent 
and interconnected. They tend to reinforce each other, and a 
weakness in one area often has a negative impact on others. 
No single determinant can ensure inclusive growth, which  
can only be achieved through a combination of factors.  
For example, employment can only contribute to equitable 
growth if education is widely accessible and transmits skills  
of relevance to the labor market. Private-sector investment 
will be higher and more efficient if government and business 
activity is transparent and ethical. Likewise, education is also 
linked to health outcomes - in advanced economies, those 
with the highest education can expect to live six years longer 
than their poorly educated peers. 
The appropriate mix of policies and institutions will depend on 
country circumstances and preferences. The Framework  
does not intend to suggest that there is an ideal policy or 
institutional mix for the pursuit of inclusive growth and  
development that will apply to all countries. For the same 
reason, the Benchmarking Framework and the Inclusive  
Development Index do not assign different weights to the  
pillars and sub-pillars. Given the data limitations, the  
complexity of the topic, and the need for further research,  
the individual indicators should be interpreted as simple  
proxies for prevailing conditions and the extent to which 
countries are fully using their policy space. A weak or strong 
score in a specific domain relative to its peer group should 
thus be seen as a marker or signpost of where a country 
might explore policy changes or other actions.
It is important to note that in a number of instances, data had 
to be adjusted to take into account both equity and growth 
considerations. Although equity remains a principal focus 
when assigning rank direction, a cut-off has been applied  
at the point where these policies might dampen growth. 
These trade-offs are visible in the case of labor market and 
tax-related indicators, where a higher degree of protection  
or higher taxes can support social inclusion but also dampen 
growth. For example, a higher degree of collective bargaining 
supports redistribution of income toward employment, but it 
limits the ability of businesses to adjust wages to their needs. 
Along similar lines, while trade unions are key for protecting 
workers’ rights, a very high degree of unionization can  
create constraints on decisions critical for a company’s future 
economic viability. For the same conceptual reasons, some 
tax data were adjusted. Other adjustments were undertaken 
if the relationship between the indicator and inclusive growth 
is not linear. For example, paid maternity leave is beneficial 
to female inclusion until it begins to adversely affect wages 
and (re)integration into the labor market. Similarly, financial 
market indicators, such as domestic credit to the private 
sector or share turnover, can indicate instabilities in financial 
markets once a certain level is reached, as was so poignantly 
demonstrated during the financial crisis of the last decade. 
Specific adjustments were based upon available literature and 
the authors’ interpretation of the data.
Data and Aggregation Methods 
The Benchmarking Framework includes two types of data. 
The first category is quantitative data collected from leading 
international organizations and other respected sources.  
The second category of data is derived from the World 
Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey, which assesses 
the perspectives of more than 14,000 business leaders about 
their countries’ business and political environment (between 
February and June 2016). The questions from the survey are 
on a 1-to-7 scale, with 1 representing the worst case, and  
7 the best. 
Methodology of the Benchmarking Framework  
on Inclusive Growth and Development
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Strengthening the World Economic Forum’s Framework 
for Inclusive Growth
Some key concepts that are important for inclusive growth 
could not be captured due to gaps in available data – for 
example, discrimination against the disabled, migrants, and 
ethnic minorities. Data is especially scarce for low income 
countries and capturing the distribution of outcomes by 
income groups. Going forward, in order to make progress in 
this area, countries and international organizations will need 
to regularly collect better data in these critical areas especially 
through the use of household surveys. It is very hard to fix 
what you cannot measure. 
It bears mention that measures of social mobility and real 
economy investment, or productive uses of capital, are a 
relatively underexplored area with important implications for 
inclusive growth. For this pillar, comparable data for a large 
number of countries is limited, necessitating the use of  
several different variables or proxies in order to capture this 
complex concept. For example, it is difficult to capture net  
equity issuance (taking into account share buybacks) in a  
single measure due to poor country coverage; these  
indicators could not be combined and have been presented 
separately in this Report. Likewise, private investment in 
infrastructure data is only available for developing countries 
as data for many advanced economies also includes public 
investment. The Forum’s goal is to provide a more complete 
breakdown of this concept in the next Report. 
This Report should be seen as marking the start of an  
ongoing process. Empirical research on the topic of inclusive 
growth is still emerging. As it evolves, the Forum intends to 
use it to explore the relationships and relative importance of 
the different pillars. A ‘Build Your Own Index’ tool is also  
available online, which features alternative weightings of the 
IDI sub-components (with the default reflecting equal  
weightings). It intends to stimulate discussion around different 
ways of measuring and tracking progress. Work will also be 
done to incorporate new countries and indicators into the 
analysis and to test the robustness of the Framework. This 
work on further refining and upgrading the methodology will 
inform the next edition of the Report. 
performed based on the range in scores of the lower-middle 
income countries. This has been done to highlight the still 
significant room for improvement even for the best performers 
within the low income group.2 
Country Coverage
The Report covers 109 countries representing all regions. 
Country coverage has mainly been driven by data availability 
- all but 12 countries have full coverage on all pillars, and no 
countries have more than a third of missing data in a given  
pillar. Likewise, all but 2 countries have sufficient data to calculate 
the IDI scores for the most recent year and 6 countries 
are missing IDI scores in 2011 (used to calculate 5-year 
trends). In most cases, missing values do not exceed 25%. 
If the overall results of more than two pillars could not be 
properly calculated, the country has not been included. The 
Forum will strive to expand coverage as more comparable 
data becomes available, especially for low income countries. 
For this reason, for some variables two distinct data sets 
have been used (one for advanced and upper-middle income 
economies and another for lower-middle income and low 
income economies) in order to capture a wide array of 
concepts and to use the best data available for a large range 
of countries. For example, for advanced and upper-middle 
income countries, data from the OECD’s PISA assessment 
has been included, while for lower-middle income and low 
income countries UNESCO’s WIDE Database on Educational 
Inequality has been used due to the lack of comparable data 
by income quintile across the whole sample. This is also the 
case for a few other indicators that are available for higher 
income economies but not available for some of the other 
country groupings. As a result, pillar level scores are not 
strictly comparable between income groups. The table below 
indicates the specific variables that are available only for 
certain income groups. 
2 This is particularly important given the small sample size of the low income 
group, and thus the very small and generally low range of results. This decision 
was also taken based upon the distribution of incomes with many countries 
clustered around the lower-middle income/low income threshold— with the 
vast majority in the lower-middle income group below $4,000 GDP per capita.  
Table 17: Income Thresholds
 
 Advanced (30)
 Australia 
 Austria
  Belgium
 Canada
 Czech Republic
 Denmark
 Estonia
 Finland
 France
 Germany
 Greece
 Iceland
 Ireland
 Israel
 Italy
 Japan
 Korea, Rep.
 Luxembourg
 Netherlands
 New Zealand
 Norway
 Portugal
 Singapore 
 Slovak Republic
 Slovenia
 Spain
 Sweden
 Switzerland
 United Kingdom
 United States
 
 Upper-Middle (26)
 Argentina
 Azerbaijan
 Brazil
 Bulgaria
 Chile
 China
 Colombia
 Costa Rica
 Croatia
 Hungary
 Kazakhstan
 Latvia
 Lithuania
 Malaysia
 Mexico
 Namibia
 Panama
 Peru
 Poland
 Romania
 Russian Federation
 Serbia
 South Africa
 Turkey
 Uruguay
 Venezuela
 
 Lower-Middle (37)
 Albania
 Algeria
 Armenia
 Bolivia
 Cameroon
 Dominican Republic
 Egypt
 El Salvador
 Georgia
 Ghana
 Guatemala
 Honduras
 India
 Indonesia
 Iran, Islamic Rep.
 Jordan
 Kyrgyz Republic
 Lao PDR
 Lesotho
 Macedonia, FYR
 Mauritania
 Moldova
 Mongolia
 Morocco
 Nicaragua
 Nigeria
 Pakistan
 Paraguay
 Philippines
 Senegal
 Sri Lanka
 Thailand
 Tunisia
 Ukraine
 Vietnam
 Yemen
 Zambia
 
 Low Income (16)
 Bangladesh
 Burundi
 Cambodia
 Chad
 Kenya
 Madagascar
 Malawi
 Mali
 Mozambique
 Nepal
 Rwanda
 Sierra Leone
 Tajikistan
 Tanzania
 Uganda
 Zimbabwe
 Advanced  Upper-Middle Income Lower-Middle Income Low Income
 Economies Economies Economies Economies  
 
 >17,000 GDP per capita 6,000-16,999 GDP per capita 1,320-5,999 GDP per capita <1,320 GDP per capita
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Description of Framework Pillars (PII)
This section describes the types of indicators contained  
in each pillar and their importance for delivering inclusive  
outcomes from growth. A full description of indicators  
and sources can be found in the Technical Notes and 
Sources section. 
Labor is the primary, and in most cases, exclusive, source of 
income for citizens of rich and poor countries alike. Strong 
and rising labor productivity across different sectors and 
geographies is therefore an important cornerstone of any 
strategy to strengthen broad-based progress in living  
standards and reduce social marginalization. This is all the 
more important in the presence of rapid technological change 
that is automating, dis-intermediating, and enabling remote 
performance of many functions. Such change both disrupts 
existing jobs and creates new opportunities for labor income 
at every stage of economic development, in both cases  
favoring workers who are able to acquire and adapt skills.  
The challenge to societies is to create an enabling environment 
for widespread access to, and steady improvement in, skills 
acquisition.  
As such, the Framework includes indicators that gauge the 
breadth of enrollment in early, basic, vocational, and tertiary 
education as well as the availability of training services  
(Access Sub-pillar). It includes measures of educational 
system quality such as the proficiency of secondary students, 
pupil-teacher ratio, internet access, public expenditure levels, 
and employer perceptions (Quality Sub-pillar). It also  
incorporates information on preprimary, primary, and secondary 
completion rates, basic reading and math proficiency by 
quintile of parental income, as well as other measures of the 
equity of educational opportunity in a society, reflecting a view 
that education is the main vehicle for disrupting the  
transmission of inequality in life chances from one generation 
to the next (Equity Sub-pillar).
Table 18: Indicators per Group (cont’d.)
Pillar 6: Employment and Labor Compensation 
Strictness of employment protection Advanced economies
Underemployment (involuntary part-time employment) Advanced economies
Availability of formal childcare  Advanced economies
Cost of childcare  Advanced economies
Active Labour Market Spending (% of GDP) Advanced economies
Pillar 7: Fiscal Transfers 
Tax on inheritance Advanced economies
Tax on capital Advanced economies
Tax on property Advanced economies
Unemployment insurance (NRR) Advanced economies
Pensions: Net replacement rate  Advanced economies
Progressivity of pensions Advanced economies
Adequacy of social assistance  Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
Adequacy of social insurance Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
Benefit-to-cost ratio Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
 
 
Table 18: Indicators per Group
Pillar 1: Education and Skills Applicable Income Group
Pupils-to-teacher ratio  Lower-middle income and low income only
PISA reading score  Advanced economies and upper-middle income economies
PISA Math Score Advanced and upper-middle income
Learned basics in reading (PASEC/SACMEQ/PIRLS) Lower-middle and low income only
Learned basics in mathematics (PASEC/SACMEQ/TIMSS) Lower-middle and low income only
Resilient students, % (PISA) Advanced and upper-middle income 
Social Inclusion (PISA) Advanced and upper-middle income
PISA math score by quartile (q1/q4)  Advanced and upper-middle income 
PISA reading score by quartile (q1/q4) Advanced and upper-middle income
Basics in reading comprehension (q1/q5) Lower-middle and low income only
Basics in mathematics (q1/q5) Lower-middle and low income only
Mean years of schooling by quintile (q1/q5) Lower-middle and low income only
Primary completion rate by quintile (q1/q5) Lower-middle and low income only
Lower secondary completion rate by quintile (q1/q5) Lower-middle and low income only
Upper secondary completion rate by quintile (q1/q5) Lower-middle and low income only
Pillar 2: Basic Services and Infrastructure 
Transportation infrastructure  Advanced economies
Dwellings without basic facilities Advanced economies
Access to electricity %  Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
Slum population, urban % Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
Access to drinking water (%)  Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
Access to sanitation (%) Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
Nutrition; undernourishment % of population Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
Indoor Air Pollution Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
Pillar 3: Corruption and Rents 
Regulatory protection of incumbents (PMR) Advanced economies
Pillar 4: Financial Intermediation of Real Economy Investment 
Private investment in infrastructure  Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
Bank lending to non-financial corporations Advanced economies
Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% GDP) Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) Upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income only
Share turnover ratio (as a share of market cap) Advanced economies
Share buyback (as a share of GDP) Advanced economies
Follow-on issuances (% GDP) Advanced economies
Pillar 5: Asset Building and Entrepreneurship 
Employee stock ownership Advanced economies
Profit sharing Advanced economies
Pillar 1: Education and Skills Development
a) Access
b) Quality
c) Equity
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Another important factor that influences employment and 
wage levels is the extent to which a country’s financial system 
efficiently intermediates the flow of private savings to  
profitable business investment opportunities, as opposed 
to financial assets or real estate which result in little net new 
capital formation. Such real economy business investment 
typically requires a medium- to long-term investment horizon 
to support investment in infrastructure, equipment, workforce 
skills, and innovation, which are crucial for firm competi-
tiveness and growth.  Accordingly, this sub-pillar includes 
indicators illustrating the extent to which the financial system 
is geared toward non-residential private investment and 
business capital formation. These include the extent of local 
equity market access, venture capital availability, domestic 
credit to firms by banks, private investment in infrastructure, 
non-residential private investment, private R&D expenditures, 
share turnover, bank lending to non-financial corporations, 
IPO issuances for both small- and large-cap firms, follow-on 
equity issuances, and share buybacks in order to provide 
an integrated picture of the how well the financial system 
mobilizes risk capital (Intermediation of Business Investment 
Sub-pillar).
Access to credit is a key link between economic opportunity 
and outcomes. By empowering individuals to cultivate  
opportunity, financial inclusion can be a powerful agent for 
inclusive growth. This sub-pillar measures access and  
affordability of financial services with particular emphasis on 
banking for the poorest and most marginalized (the bottom 
40%). An account at a formal financial institution generally  
reduces the cost of engaging in financial transactions,  
provides a ready vehicle for savings and access to funds, and 
serves as a reference for individuals wishing to obtain credit 
for small business development. With improved financial 
access, families can smooth out consumption and increase 
investment, including in education and health. They can 
also insure against unfavorable events, and therefore avoid 
falling deeper into poverty. Indicators are also included on 
prevalence of accounts used for business purposes, ease of 
access to credit, and depth of credit information (Financial 
Inclusion Sub-pillar).
Corruption has a chilling effect on personal initiative and 
entrepreneurship, and hence, on investment, job creation, 
and purchasing power. Its effects, both direct and indirect, are 
borne most heavily by ordinary citizens. It is corrosive, even 
antithetical, to social inclusion and economic growth, as it 
represents the exploitation of power by the haves against the 
have-nots. This sub-pillar gauges perceptions of the ethical 
behavior of firms, efficacy of measures to combat corruption 
and bribery, diversion of public funds, irregular payments in 
tax collection, and public trust in politicians (Business and 
Political Ethics Sub-pillar). Undue concentration of wealth  
and market power and high barriers to entry discourage 
entrepreneurial initiative and the recycling of resources toward 
uses that have the most potential to contribute to productivity 
gains. As such, they also suppress economic growth and 
progress in living standards. This sub-pillar includes indicators 
measuring perceptions of the extent of market dominance, 
intensity of local competition, regulatory protection of  
incumbents as well as the concentration of land ownership, 
and banking-sector assets (Concentration of Rents  
Sub-pillar).
The common availability of basic services and infrastructure 
underpins equality of economic opportunity. For example, a 
well-developed transport infrastructure network is a prerequisite 
for less-developed communities to access core economic 
activities and services. Investment in the provision of health 
services, clean water, and sanitation is critical economically 
as well as morally. A healthy workforce is vital to a country’s 
competitiveness, productivity, and inclusivity, as workers 
who are ill cannot function to their full potential. Exclusion 
from physical networks (water, power, telecommunications, 
transportation, logistics, solid waste disposal, etc.) constrains 
productivity and keeps people poor. Markets often do not 
naturally extend these networks to encompass the entire 
population, as it may not be cost-effective to connect poor 
people because the fixed costs cannot be recouped. The 
Basic and Digital Infrastructure Sub-pillar includes indicators 
that gauge the quality of overall infrastructure and domestic 
transport network, transport infrastructure investment as a 
proportion of GDP, overall access to electricity, inequality in 
access to electricity, proportion of urban population living  
in slums, pollution, dwellings without basic facilities, and  
a number of measures of access to and affordability of  
information and communications technology (ICT). The 
Health-related Services and Infrastructure Sub-pillar gauges 
perceptions of the quality and accessibility of healthcare 
services, extent of out-of-pocket health expenses, access to 
improved drinking water and sanitation, undernourishment, 
particulate matter concentration, inequality-adjusted life  
expectancy and gender-gap health measures like sex ratio  
at birth and female healthy-life expectancy as compared  
to male. 
Pillar 2: Basic Services and Infrastructure
a) Basic and Digital Infrastructure
b) Health-related Services and Infrastructure
•  To what extent does a country provide its citizens 
with a core, common endowment of infrastructure 
and other basic services that enable productive 
engagement in the economy and provide often 
budget-relieving and quality-of-life-enhancing 
contributions to their standard of living?  
Pillar 3: Corruption and Rents
a) Business and Political Ethics
b) Concentration of Rents
• To what extent do the country’s policies and  
institutions foster broad-based economic  
opportunity and efficient allocation of resources 
through zero tolerance of bribery and corruption, 
low barriers to entry, and fair competition in  
product and capital markets?
 
Pillar 4: Financial Intermediation of  
Real Economy Investment
a) Financial System Inclusion
b) Intermediation of Business Investment
• To what extent are private savings being  
channelled to productive purposes and generating 
new capital formation in the real economy?
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risks associated with ill health, disability, work-related injuries, 
and old age. Social assistance and welfare schemes such as 
cash or in-kind transfers are intended for the most vulnerable 
groups that have no other means of adequate support. 
This sub-pillar includes indicators that comparatively assess: 
the total social expenditures as a proportion of GDP;  
coverage, adequacy and progressivity of public pensions; 
coverage and adequacy of unemployment benefits;  
coverage of disability and health benefits; perceived  
effectiveness of government in reducing poverty and inequality; 
perceived wastefulness of government spending; and  
adequacy of social assistance and insurance (Social  
Protection Sub-pillar). 
A nation’s fiscal policy - the way governments collect and 
spend public resources - can play a major role in reducing 
poverty and inequality. Taxation is an important source of 
revenue to fund social protection programs and provides a 
means of directly redressing market inequalities. However, 
taxes must be designed well to minimize loopholes and 
ensure progressivity (that they are levied more strongly on 
those best able to afford them) without dampening incentives 
to work, save, and invest. This sub-pillar includes indicators 
measuring total tax revenue, total tax wedge as a percentage 
of labor costs, the incidence of taxes on capital, property, 
inheritance, and consumption, as well as the overall  
progressivity of the tax system and perceptions of its impact 
on incentives to work and invest (Tax Code Sub-pillar).  
Social safety nets of various sorts can help societies mitigate 
the effects of external and transitory livelihood shocks as well 
as to meet the minimum needs of the chronically poor so that 
they too can participate in and benefit from growth. These 
include policies and programs to reduce the risks of  
unemployment, underemployment, or low wages resulting 
from inappropriate skills or poorly functioning labor markets. 
Other social insurance programs are designed to cushion 
This pillar continues the theme that productive employment 
is central to achieving inclusive growth. It includes indicators 
measuring the extent of labor force participation (including  
for women) and unemployment (including for youth);  
underemployment and vulnerable, temporary, and informal 
sector employment; employer perceptions of the ease of 
retaining skilled employees; measures of social mobility; and 
strictness of employment protection. Other indicators capture 
the quality of working conditions through indicators like  
excessive working hours (Employment Sub-pillar). 
Pillar 6 also measures enabling environment factors that can 
influence the pace and distribution of wage and non-wage la-
bor compensation (Wage and Non-wage Labor Compensation 
Sub-pillar). For example, it includes indicators measuring 
wage dispersion (ratio of median to minimum wages), low 
pay (below two-thirds of the median), trade union density, 
collective bargaining coverage, cooperation in labor-employer 
relations, gender pay gap, and violations of worker’s rights. 
Finally, it incorporates measures of key aspects of non-wage 
compensation such as child care costs and maternal and 
parental leave.
Small business entrepreneurship and home ownership are 
typically the first means by which working families accumulate 
wealth beyond savings from wages and pension contributions. 
For many, they provide the primary ladder to the middle class 
and beyond. This pillar includes a range of indicators  
assessing the ease of starting and running a business with  
respect to regulatory and cultural factors, which is an  
important enabler of business and hence employment  
creation. These include density of new business registrations 
and patent applications; attitudes toward entrepreneurial 
failure; cost of and time required to start a business, resolve 
insolvency, and enforce a contract; and the time required to 
prepare and pay taxes (Small Business Sub-pillar). Several 
additional indicators measure levels of and enabling  
environmental conditions relating to home ownership and 
private savings. These include the perceived strength of  
property rights protection, home ownership rate, house  
price-to-income ratio, housing loan penetration and, for  
advanced countries, employee stock ownership, profit  
sharing, and private pension asset accumulation (Home and 
Financial Asset Ownership Sub-pillar).
Pillar 6:  Employment and Labor Compensation
a) Productive Employment
b) Wage and Non-wage Labor Compensation
• To what extent is the country succeeding in  
fostering widespread economic opportunity in 
the form of robust job creation, broad labor force 
participation and decent working conditions?
• How well does its enabling environment support  
a close correlation between growth in the  
productivity and compensation of labor, helping to 
ensure that a rising tide lifts all boats?
Pillar 7: Fiscal Transfers
a) Tax Code
b) Social Protection
• To what extent does a country’s tax system 
countervail income inequality without undermining 
economic growth? How much of its tax burden 
falls on labor, capital, and consumption relative to 
its peers?  
• To what extent are a country’s public social  
protection systems engaged in mitigating poverty, 
vulnerability, and marginalization?
Pillar 5: Asset Building and Entrepreneurship
a) Small Business Ownership
b) Home and Financial Asset Ownership 
• To what extent is the enabling environment 
 conducive to broad-based asset accumulation 
and employment- and productivity-enhancing 
entrepreneurship?
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III) Intergenerational Equity & Sustainability
0.09  Adjusted Net Savings, Excluding Carbon Damage 
(% of GNI) | 2014 or most recent 
 Natural Capital Accounts measure the total stocks and 
utilization of natural resources in a given ecosystem, 
clarifying the real difference between production and 
consumption by capturing depreciation of fixed capital, 
depletion of natural resources, and damage from  
pollution. It is expressed as a percentage of Gross  
National Income (GNI). Adjusted net savings are equal 
to net national savings plus expenditure on education 
and minus depletion of energy, minerals, and forests, 
and damage by particulate emissions. Carbon damage 
has been excluded from the calculation. By accounting 
for fixed and natural capital depletion, adjusted net  
national income better measures the income available 
for consumption and for investment to increase a  
country’s future consumption. The trend is based on 
the absolute difference in Adjusted Net Savings  
(minus carbon damage) between 2010 and 2014 or 
most recent year.
 Source: World Development Indicators Online,  
World Bank. 
0.10  Carbon Intensity of GDP | 2014 or most recent
 Carbon intensity is a measure of how much carbon 
economies emit for every dollar of GDP they produce. 
It is expressed in Kilotonnes of CO2/$billion (in 2005 
US$). International data for carbon dioxide emissions 
from the consumption of energy includes emissions 
due to the consumption of petroleum, natural gas, and 
coal, and also from natural gas flaring. The five-year 
trend is based on the change in the carbon intensity of 
GDP between 2010 and 2014 or most recent year.
 Sources: US Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
Historical Statistics for 1980-2013; World Development 
Indicators, World Bank; The Shift Project Data Portal. 
0.06  Poverty Rate | 2014 or most recent 
 For advanced economies, relative income poverty 
is defined as less than half of the respective median 
national income (after taxes and transfers, and adjusted 
for size of household). For low- and middle-income 
countries, it is defined as the percentage of the  
population living on less than $3.10 a day at 2011 
international prices. The five-year trend is based on the 
absolute difference in the poverty rates between 2010 
and 2014 or the most recent year.
 Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD); World Development Indicators 
Online, World Bank. 
0.07  Wealth Gini | 2016 
 This indicator measures the differences in the distribution 
of wealth – higher Gini coefficients signify greater 
inequality in wealth distribution, with 1 signaling  
complete inequality and 0, complete equality. The  
five-year trend is based on the absolute difference in 
wealth Gini between 2012 and 2016.
 Source: Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook 2016. 
0.08  Median Income | 2012 or most recent
 This is the median of daily per capita income/consumption 
expenditure in 2011 USD PPP. The data are drawn 
from nationally-representative household surveys, which 
are conducted by national statistical offices or by  
private agencies under the supervision of government 
or international agencies and obtained from government 
statistical offices and World Bank Group country 
departments. The per capita income/consumption 
used in PovcalNet is household income/consumption 
expenditure divided by the household size. The author 
has converted the data from monthly to daily median 
income. The trend, median income growth, is based 
on the absolute difference in median income between 
2008 and 2012 or the most recent year and represents 
the total growth over the period, which in the majority 
of cases covered a 5 year span (+ or - 1 year).  
In a few cases, historical data is lacking and the trend  
is displayed as “n/a”.
 Source: PovcalNet, World Bank
0.03  Healthy Life Expectancy | 2015
 Average number of years that a person can expect to 
live in “full health” by taking into account years lived in 
less than full health due to disease and/or injury. The 
five-year trend is based on the change in the number of 
years of life expectancy between 2010 and 2015.
 Source: The Global Burden of Disease Database,  
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation.
0.04  Employment | 2014
 Employment-to-population ratio is the proportion of a 
country’s population that is employed. Ages 15 and 
older are generally considered the working-age  
population. The five-year trend is based on the absolute 
difference in the employment rates in 2010 and 2014.
 Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank; 
Key Indicators of the Labour Market database,  
International Labour Organization (ILO).
II) Inclusion
0.05  Net-Income Gini | 2014 or most recent 
 This indicator measures the extent to which the net 
distribution of income (that is, post-tax, post-transfers), 
among individuals or households within an economy 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index 
of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 
implies perfect inequality. The five-year trend is based 
on the absolute difference in net-income Gini over the 
last five most recent years available.
 Source: F. Solt, 2016, “The Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database,” Social Science Quarterly 97. 
SWIID Version 5.1, July 2016.
Full indicator list and descriptions
The data in this Report represent the best available estimates 
from various national authorities, international agencies, and 
private sources at the time the Report was prepared. It is 
possible that some data would have been revised or updated 
by the sources after publication of this Report. 
 “N/a” denotes that a value is not available or that the available 
data are unreasonably outdated or not from a reliable source.
Dashboard of National Key Performance Indicators
I) Growth and Development
0.01  GDP per capita | 2015 
 Gross domestic product per capita in constant 2010 
dollars (2015) is used for value. The trend is the 
annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita. 
Aggregates are based on constant 2005 US dollars. 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by 
mid-year population. GDP at purchaser’s price is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. The 
five-year average is based on the authors’ calculations 
between 2011 and 2015 or most recent year. 
 Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
0.02  Labor Productivity | 2014
 This refers to the output per unit of labor input. GDP 
per person employed is GDP divided by total  
employment in the economy. Purchasing power parity 
(PPP) GDP is GDP converted to 1990 constant  
international dollars using PPP rates. The five-year trend 
is based on the average annual percentage growth rate 
of labor productivity, per person employed, percentage 
change between 2010 and 2014.
 Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Technical Notes and Sources
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b) Quality
1.09  Quality of Education System | 2015-2016 weighted 
average
 How well the education system in a country meets the 
needs of a competitive economy is measured on a 
scale of 1-7 (1 = not well at all; 7 = extremely well). 
 
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
1.10  Internet Access in Schools | 2015-2016 weighted 
average
 The extent to which the Internet is used in schools for 
learning purposes is assessed on a scale of 1 to 7  
(1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent).
 
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum.
1.11  Public Expenditure on Education (% of GDP) | 2014 
or most recent 
 The total general (local, regional, and central)  
government expenditure on education (current, capital, 
and transfers) is expressed as a percentage of GDP.  
It includes expenditure funded by transfers from  
international sources to government.
 Source: Data Centre, Institute for Statistics, UNESCO.
1.12  Pupils-to-Teacher Ratio, Primary | 2014 or  
most recent
 The pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pupils enrolled 
in primary school divided by the number of primary 
school teachers.
 Source: Data Centre, Institute for Statistics, UNESCO. 
1.13  PISA Reading Score | 2015
 The OECD’s Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) is an average standardized test of 
the performance of 15-year-old students that aims to 
measure their capacity to understand, use, and reflect 
on written texts in order to achieve their goals and  
potential, develop knowledge, and participate in society. 
It is available for 65 economies.
 Source: OECD. 
1.06  Vocational Enrollment (upper-secondary, %) | 2015 
or most recent
 This refers to the total number of students enrolled in 
vocational programs at upper-secondary level,  
expressed as a percentage of the total number of  
students enrolled in all programs (vocational and  
general) at that level.
 Vocational education is education that is designed  
for learners to acquire the knowledge, skills, and  
competencies specific to a particular occupation, trade, 
or class of occupations or trades. Vocational education 
may have work-based components. Successful  
completion of such programs leads to labor market-
relevant vocational qualifications acknowledged as 
occupationally-oriented by the relevant national  
authorities and/or the labor market.
 Source: Data Centre, Institute for Statistics, UNESCO. 
1.07  Availability of High-Quality Training Services | 2015-
2016 weighted average
 The availability of high-quality, professional training 
services in a given country is measured on a scale of 
1-7 (1 = not available at all; 7 = widely available). 
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
1.08  Gender Gap in Education | 2015 or most recent
 The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap  
in Education sub-index is based on the following  
indicators:
 Ratio of female literacy rate to male literacy rate
 Ratio of female net primary enrollment rate to male value 
 Ratio of female net secondary enrollment rate to male value
 Ratio of female gross tertiary enrollment ratio to male value
 Source: Education indicators, database 2015 or latest 
data available, Institute for Statistics, UNESCO; UNDP 
Human Development Report 2009, most recent year 
available between 1997 and 2007. 
1.02  Gross Preprimary Enrollment | 2015 or most recent
 This denotes the total enrollment in preprimary  
education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage 
of the total population in the official preprimary  
education age-bracket. Gross enrollment rate (GER) 
can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of overage and 
underage students because of early or late school 
entrance and grade repetition.
 
 Source: Data Centre, Institute for Statistics,  
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural  
Organization (UNESCO). 
1.03  Net Primary Enrollment | 2015 or most recent
 This indicates the total enrollment in primary education, 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the 
population officially in the primary education age-bracket.
 Source: Data Centre, Institute for Statistics, UNESCO. 
1.04  Gross Secondary Enrollment | 2015 or most recent
 The reported value refers to the ratio of total secondary 
enrollment, regardless of age, to the population in the 
age group that officially corresponds to the secondary 
education level. Secondary education (International 
Standard Classification of Education levels 2 and 3) 
completes the provision of basic education that begins 
at the primary level, and aims to lay the foundation for 
lifelong learning and human development by offering 
more subjects or skills-oriented instruction using  
specialized teachers.
 Sources: Data Centre, Institute for Statistics, UNESCO. 
1.05  Gross Tertiary Enrollment | 2015 or most recent
 This is the ratio of total tertiary enrollment, regardless 
of age, to the population of the age group that officially 
corresponds to the tertiary education level. Tertiary  
education (ISCED levels 5 and 6), whether or not  
leading to an advanced research qualification, normally 
requires the successful completion of education at the 
secondary level as a minimum condition for admission.
 Sources: Data Centre, Institute for Statistics, UNESCO.
0.11 Public Debt (as a share of GDP) | 2015 
 Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment 
of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor 
at a date or several dates in the future. This includes 
debt liabilities in the form of special drawing rights,  
currency and deposits, debt securities, loans,  
insurance, pensions, standardized guarantee schemes, 
and other accounts payable. Thus, all liabilities in the 
Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 2001 
system are debt, except for equity and investment 
fund shares, financial derivatives, and employee stock 
options. For Australia, Belgium, Canada, Iceland, New 
Zealand, and Sweden, government debt coverage 
also includes insurance technical reserves, following 
the GFSM 2001 definition. The trend is based on the 
absolute difference in public debt as a share of GDP 
between 2011 and 2015 or most recent.
 Sources: World Economic Outlook Database,  
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (April 2014 edition); 
Public Information Notices (IMF, various issues);  
African Development Bank; OECD; United Nations  
Development Programme (UNDP); African Economic 
Outlook 2014; national sources. 
0.12  Dependency ratio | 2014 
 Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents –  
people younger than 15 or older than 64 – to the 
working-age population – those aged 15-64. Data 
are shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 
working-age people. The five-year trend is the absolute 
difference in the dependency ratios for 2010 and 2014.
 Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Framework of Policy and Institutional Indicators
1st Pillar: Education and Skills Development
a) Access
1.01  Mean Years of Schooling | 2013
 This refers to the average number of years of education 
received by people aged five-years and older, con-
verted from education attainment levels using official 
durations of each level.
 Source: Human Development Index, UNDP.
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1.26 Upper-Secondary Completion Rate (by quintile) | 
2014 or most recent
This is a measure of the proportion of (i) young people 
aged 3-5 years above upper secondary school  
graduation age, and (ii) people aged 20-29 years,  
who have completed upper secondary school. It is 
expressed as a ratio, Q1/Q5, to capture the  
difference in secondary education completion between 
the bottom quintile (Q1) and the top quintile (Q5).  
A value of 0 reflects perfect inequality and a value of 1 
reflects perfect equality.
Source: WIDE, http://www.education-inequalities.org/.
1.27 Basics in Reading Comprehension (by quintile) | 
2013 or most recent
Various assessments such as PISA, PIRLS, SACMEQ, 
and PASEC are used to calculate the proportion of 
children who have achieved a minimum internationally-
recognized standard of reading ability. The ratio Q1/Q5 
captures the difference in learning outcomes between 
the bottom (quintile 1) and the top (quintile 5) students. 
A value of 0 reflects perfect inequality and a value of 1 
reflects perfect equality.
Sources: OECD; WIDE, http://www.education-inequali-
ties.org/.
1.28 Basics in Mathematics (by quintile) | 2013 or most 
recent 
Assessments such as PISA, TIMSS, PASEC, and 
SCAMEQ yield the proportion of children who have 
achieved an internationally-recognized minimum 
standard of learning in mathematics. The ratio Q1/Q5 
captures the difference in learning outcomes between 
the bottom (quintile 1) and the top (quintile 5). A value 
of 0 reflects perfect inequality and a value of 1 reflects 
perfect equality.
Sources: OECD; WIDE, http://www.education-inequali-
ties.org/.
1.22  PISA Mathematics Score (by quartile) | 2015
This is a measure of the PISA mathematics scores 
attained, expressed as a ratio of the bottom to the top 
quarter. A value of 0 reflects perfect inequality and a 
value of 1 reflects perfect equality.
Source: OECD. 
1.23  Mean Years of Schooling (by quintile) | 2014 or most 
recent 
This is a measure of the average number of years of 
schooling attained by the 20-24 years age-group, 
expressed as the ratio Q1/Q5 to capture the difference 
in attainment between the bottom and top quintile 
(Q1 and Q5, respectively). A value of 0 reflects perfect 
inequality and a value of 1 reflects perfect equality.
Source: WIDE, http://www.education-inequalities.org/.
1.24  Primary Completion Rate (by quintile) | 2014 or 
most recent
This refers to the proportion of children aged 3-7 years 
above primary school graduation age and young 
people aged 15-24 years who have completed primary 
school. Expressed as a ratio, Q1/Q5, it captures the 
difference in primary education completion between 
the bottom (quintile 1) and the top (quintile 5). A value 
of 0 reflects perfect inequality and a value of 1 reflects 
perfect equality.
Source: WIDE, http://www.education-inequalities.org/. 
1.25  Lower-Secondary Completion Rate (by quintile) | 
2014 or most recent
This measures the proportion of (i) young people aged 
3-5 years above lower-secondary school graduation
age, and (ii) young people aged 15-24 years, who have
completed lower secondary school. Expressed as a
ratio, Q1/Q5, it captures the difference in secondary
education completion between the bottom (quintile
1) and the top (quintile 5). A value of 0 reflects perfect
inequality and a value of 1 reflects perfect equality.
Source: WIDE, http://www.education-inequalities.org/.
1.18 Quality of Vocational Training | 2015–2016 weighted 
average
The quality of vocational training in each country is  
assessed on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 extremely poor – 
among the worst in the world; 7 = excellent – among 
the best in the world).
Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum.
c) Equity
1.19 Resilient Students (socioeconomically  
disadvantaged scoring in top quarter, %) | 2015
This is measured as the percentage of resilient  
individuals among disadvantaged students. A student  
is classified as resilient if he or she is in the bottom 
quarter of the PISA index of economic, social, and  
cultural status (ESCS) in the country/economy of  
assessment and performs in the top quarter of  
students from all countries/economies after accounting 
for socioeconomic status. 
Source: OECD. 
1.20 Social Inclusion (percentage of variation in  
socioeconomic status between schools) | 2015
This is measured as the percentage of variation in 
socioeconomic status between schools. The index of 
social inclusion is calculated as 100*(1-rho), where  
rho stands for the intra-class correlation of  
socioeconomic status, i.e. the between-school  
variation in the PISA index of social, economic, and 
cultural status of students, divided by the sum of the 
between-school variation in students’ socioeconomic 
status and the within-school variation in students’ 
socioeconomic status. 
Source: OECD.
1.21  PISA Reading Score (by quartile) | 2015
This is a measure of the PISA reading scores attained, 
expressed as a ratio of the bottom to the top quarter. 
A value of 0 reflects perfect inequality and a value of 1 
reflects perfect equality.
Source: OECD. 
1.14  PISA Mathematics Score | 2015 
This average standardized test assesses the performance 
of 15-year-old students to capture their capacity to 
identify, understand, and engage in mathematics, and 
make well-founded judgments about the role that 
mathematics plays in the lives of constructive and 
engaged citizens. It is available for 65 economies. 
Source: OECD. 
1.15  Basics in Reading Comprehension | 2013 or most 
recent
Various tests are used to measure the percentage of 
children who have achieved a minimum internationally-
recognized learning standard in reading – the  
Progress in International Reading Literacy Study 
(PIRLS), Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium  
for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ),  
and Programme for the Analysis of Education  
Systems (PASEC).  
Sources: UNESCO; World Inequality Database on Edu-
cation (WIDE), http://www.education-inequalities.org/.
1.16  Basics in Mathematics | 2013 or most recent 
Various international assessments – Trends in  
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), 
SACMEQ, and PASEC – measure the percentage of 
children who have achieved an internationally-recognized 
minimum learning standard in mathematics. 
Sources: UNESCO; WIDE, http://www.education-
inequalities.org/.
1.17  Ease of Finding Skilled Employees | 2015-2016 
weighted average
The extent to which companies in each country can 
find people with the skills required to fill their vacancies 
is rated on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 = not at all; 7 = to a 
great extent).
Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum.
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b) Health-related Services and Infrastructure 
2.12  Quality of Healthcare Services | 2015-16 weighted 
average
 Survey respondents rate the quality of healthcare – 
public and private – provided to ordinary citizens in 
their country on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = extremely poor 
– among the worst in the world; 7 = excellent – among 
the best in the world).  
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum.
2.13  Accessibility of Healthcare Services | 2015-16 
weighted average
 Survey participants rate the accessibility of healthcare in 
their country on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = limited – only the 
privileged have access; 7 = universal – all citizens have 
access to healthcare).  
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
2.14  Particulate Matter (2.5) Concentration | 2014
 This refers to the annual mean concentration of 
particulate matter of less than 2.5 microns in diameter 
(PM2.5).
 Although invisible to the naked human eye as individual 
particles, elevated levels of PM2.5 can reduce visibility, 
cause the air to appear hazy, and adversely affect  
human health. 
 Source: Global Health Observatory data repository, 
World Health Organization (WHO). 
2.15  Out-of-Pocket Health Expenses | 2014 
 This is a measure of household direct payments to 
public and private providers of healthcare services and 
non-reimbursable cost-sharing, such as deductibles, 
co-payments, and fees for services, expressed as a 
percentage of total health expenditure.
 Source: Global Health Expenditure Database, WHO. 
2.10  Mobile Cellular Tariffs, PPP$ | 2014 or most recent
 The World Economic Forum Global Information  
Technology Report 2016 constructs this measure by 
first taking the average per-minute cost of a local call 
to another mobile cellular phone on the same network 
(on-Net) and on another network (off-Net). This amount 
is then averaged with the per-minute cost of a local 
call to a fixed telephone line. All the tariffs are for calls 
placed during peak hours and based on a basic,  
representative mobile cellular pre-paid subscription 
service.
 In order to account for differences in costs of living, 
the dollar amounts are converted into international 
dollars by applying the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
conversion factor sourced from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (retrieved January 4, 2016).
 
 This indicator receives 1/2 weighting.
 
 Sources: World Economic Forum Global Information 
Technology Report, based on ITU World;  
Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database 2015,  
ITU; World Development Indicators, World Bank; 
national sources. 
2.11  Fixed Broadband Internet Tariffs, PPP$ | 2014 or 
most recent
 Any dedicated connection to the Internet at downstream 
speeds equal to, or greater than, 256 kilobits per 
second is considered fixed (wired) broadband. In order 
to account for differences in costs of living, the World 
Economic Forum “Global Information Technology  
Report 2016” converts the dollar amounts into  
international dollars by applying the purchasing-power 
parity (PPP) conversion factor from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.
 
 This indicator receives 1/2 weighting.
 Sources: World Economic Forum Global Information 
Technology Report, based on ITU World; Telecom-
munication/ICT Indicators Database 2015, ITU; World 
Development Indicators, World Bank; national sources. 
2.06  Dwellings without Basic Facilities | 2012 
 This indicator refers to the percentage of the population 
living in a dwelling without an indoor flushing toilet for 
the sole use of that household. Flushing toilets outside 
the dwelling are not considered, but flushing toilets in 
a room where there is also a shower unit or a bath are 
counted.  
 Sources: European Union Statistics on Income and  
Living Conditions (EU-SILC); OECD. 
2.07  Internet Users | 2014
 This refers to the percentage of individuals using the 
Internet. “Internet users” refers to the proportion of 
individuals who used the Internet in the previous 12 
months. Data are based on surveys generally carried 
out by national statistical offices or estimated based on 
the number of Internet subscriptions.
 
 Source: World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 
Database 2015, International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/pub-
lications/wtid.aspx. 
2.08  Fixed Broadband Internet Subscriptions | 2015
 This refers to the total fixed (wired) broadband internet 
subscriptions – that is, subscriptions to high-speed 
Internet, a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol(TCP/IP) connection – at downstream speeds 
equal to or greater than 256 kilobits per second (kbps) 
per 100 people. This indicator relates to the penetration 
and quality of the Internet and receives 1/2 weighting.
 Source: ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 
Database 2013, ITU.  
2.09  Active Mobile Broadband Subscriptions | 2015
 This is a measure of mobile broadband Internet  
subscriptions per 100 people. This indicator relates to 
the penetration and quality of the Internet and receives 
1/2 weighting.
 Source: ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 
Database 2013, ITU. 
2nd Pillar: Basic Services and Infrastructure  
a) Basic and Digital Infrastructure 
 
2.01  Quality of Overall Infrastructure | 2015-16 weighted 
average
 Survey participants rate the general state of infrastructure 
e.g. transport, communications, and energy) in  
their countries on a scale of 1-7 (1 = extremely  
underdeveloped – among the worst in the world; 7 = 
extensive and efficient – among the best in the world). 
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
2.02  Efficiency of Ground Transport | 2015-16 weighted 
average
 Participants rated on a scale of 1 to 7 the efficiency  
(i.e. frequency, punctuality, speed, price) of ground 
transportation in their respective countries (buses, 
subways, taxis) (1 = extremely inefficient – among the 
worst in the world; 7 = extremely efficient – among the 
best in the world).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
2.03 Access to Electricity | 2012
 This is an indicator of the percentage of a country’s 
population with access to electricity.
 Sources: Sustainable Energy for All Database, World 
Bank; Global Electrification Database. 
2.04  Transport Infrastructure | 2011
 This is an estimate of the total infrastructure investment 
and maintenance spending (on rail, road, seaways, and 
airports) as a percentage of GDP. 
 Source: OECD. 
2.05 Slum Population (Urban) | 2014 
 To calculate the proportion of urban population living 
in slums, a slum household is defined as a group of 
individuals living under the same roof lacking one or 
more of the following conditions: access to improved 
water, access to improved sanitation, sufficient living 
area, durability of housing, and security of tenure. 
 Source: United Nations Human Settlements  
Programme (UN-Habitat).
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3.07  Favoritism in Decisions of Government Officials | 
2015-16 weighted average
 The extent to which government officials show favoritism 
to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding 
upon policies and contracts is rated on a scale of 1 to 7 
(1 = show favoritism to a great extent; 7 = do not show 
favoritism at all).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
b) Concentration of Rents 
3.08  Regulatory Protection of Incumbents | 2013
 This indicates the scope of legal barriers to entry for 
new businesses (in 24 manufacturing and service  
industries), and the existence of antitrust exemptions for 
public enterprises or government-mandated behavior. 
 Source: OECD. 
3.09  Extent of Market Dominance | 2015-16 weighted 
average 
 Participants rate corporate activity on a scale of 1-7 
(1 = dominated by a few business groups; 7 = spread 
across many firms).  
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
 
3.10  Intensity of Competition | 2015-16 weighted average
 Respondents rate the intensity of competition in  
local markets on a scale of 1-7 (1 = not intense at all;  
7 = extremely intense).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
3.11  Land Inequality Gini | 2010 or most recent 
 This is a measure of the extent of inequality in land 
holdings in rural areas, among individuals or  
households. Zero represents perfect equality, while  
100 stands for perfect inequality. 
 Source: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). 
3.02  Diversion of Public Funds | 2015-16 weighted average
 Respondents opine on how common the illegal  
diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or 
groups is on a scale of 1-7 (1 = occurs very commonly; 
7 = never occurs).  
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
3.03  Irregular Payments in Tax Collection | 2015-16 
weighted average
 Respondents rate how common it is for companies to 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes in  
connection with tax payments on a scale of 1 to 7  
(1 = occurs very commonly; 7 = never occurs). 
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
3.04  Ethical Behavior of Firms | 2015-16 weighted average 
Respondents rate the corporate ethics of companies 
(ethical behavior in interactions with public officials, 
politicians, and other firms) on a scale of 1 to 7  
(1 = extremely poor – among the worst in the world;  
7 = excellent – among the best in the world).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
3.05  Public Trust in Politicians | 2015-16 weighted average 
The ethical standards of politicians are rated on a scale 
of 1 to 7 (1 = extremely low; 7 = extremely high).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
3.06  Irregular Payments in Public Contracts | 2015-16 
weighted average
 Respondents rate how common it is for companies to 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes in  
connection with awarding of public contracts and 
licenses on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = very common;  
7 = never occurs).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
2.20  Gender Gap in Health | 2016   
 The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap in 
Health sub-index is based on the following indicators:
 The sex ratio at birth (converted to female-over-male ratio) 
 
 The ratio of female healthy-life expectancy to male 
healthy-life expectancy
 Sources: The CIA World Factbook 2014, Central  
Intelligence Agency; Global Health Observatory  
database, WHO. 
2.21  Stringency of Environmental Regulations | 2015-16 
weighted average
 The stringency of each country’s environmental  
regulations is assessed on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = very lax 
– among the worst in the world; 7 = among the world’s 
most stringent).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
2.22  Indoor Air Pollution | 2013
 This measure refers to the percentage of the population 
using solid fuels as their primary cooking fuel. 
 Source: Environmental Performance Index, Yale. 
2.23  Reliability of Police Services | 2015-16 weighted 
average
 The extent to which police services in each country can 
be relied upon to enforce law and order is assessed on 
a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent).
Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic Forum.  
 
3rd Pillar: Corruption and Concentration of Rents
a) Business and Political Ethics 
 
3.01  Judicial Independence | 2015-16 weighted average
 The level of independence of the judicial system from 
influences of the government, individuals, or companies 
is rated on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = not independent at all; 
7 = entirely independent).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
2.16  Undernourishment | 2015
 The population below a minimum level of dietary energy 
consumption is measured as a percentage of the 
population whose food intake is insufficient to meet 
dietary energy requirements continuously. “2.5” signifies 
prevalence of undernourishment below 2.5% of the 
population.
 Source: The State of Food Insecurity in the World, FAO,
 http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4646e.pdf. 
2.17  Inequality-adjusted Life Expectancy | 2013
 The UNDP’s Inequality-adjusted Life Expectancy Index 
is the HDI life expectancy index adjusted for inequality 
in distribution of expected length of life. 
 Source: Human Development Index, UNDP. 
2.18  Access to Improved Drinking Water | 2015
 This refers to the percentage of the population that 
uses an improved drinking-water source. WHO/UNICEF 
define an “improved drinking-water source” as one  
that, by nature of its construction or through active 
intervention, is protected from outside contamination, 
in particular from contamination with fecal matter. This 
includes piped water on premises (piped household 
water connection located inside the user’s dwell-
ing, plot, or yard), and other improved drinking water 
sources (public taps or standpipes, tube wells or 
boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and 
rainwater collection).
 Source: WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme 
(JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation, wssinfo.org.
2.19  Access to Improved Sanitation | 2015
 The share of the population with at least adequate 
access to excreta-disposal facilities that can effectively 
prevent human, animal, and insect contact with excreta 
depends on access to improved facilities ranging from 
simple but protected pit latrines to flush toilets with a 
sewerage connection. To be effective, facilities must be 
correctly constructed and properly maintained. They 
include flush/pour flush (piped sewer system, septic 
tank, or pit latrine), ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrine, 
pit latrine with slab, and composting toilet.
 Source: WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme 
(JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation, wssinfo.org.
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4.11  Private Investment in Infrastructure (total physical 
assets and payments as % of GDP) | 2013
 This is a measure of the total private investment  
commitments, including physical assets and  
payments to government, in sectors such as energy, 
telecommunications, transport, and water and  
sewerage. Figures are based on 10-year average 
spending, expressed in current US dollars (millions).
 Source: Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, 
World Bank. 
4.12 IPO Issuances (Small Cap) | 2011-2015
 This Report uses the GDP-weighted rankings of initial 
public offerings (IPOs) based on the number of IPOs 
(domestic listings) with a deal size below $50 million 
issued between 2009 and 2013 weighted per $100 
billion of GDP. IPOs issued by financial corporations 
and real estate are excluded from this calculation. This 
indicator is based on a five-year average.
 Sources: Weild & Co.; Grant Thornton LLP; Dealogic; 
World Bank; The CIA World Factbook. 
4.13  IPO Issuances (Large Cap) | 2011-2015
 This Report uses the GDP-weighted rankings of IPO 
production based on the number of IPOs (domestic 
listings) with a deal size above $50 million issued 
between 2009 and 2013 weighted per $100 billion of 
GDP. IPOs issued by financial corporations and real 
estate are excluded from this calculation. The indicator 
is based on a five-year average.
 Sources: Weild & Co.; Grant Thornton LLP; Dealogic; 
World Bank; The CIA World Factbook. 
4.14  Private R&D Expenditure | 2012
 This indicates business enterprise expenditure on 
research and development (BERD) as a percentage  
of GDP. Research and development (R&D) covers  
basic research, applied research, and experimental 
development.
 Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
b) Intermediation of Business Investment
4.07  Local Capital Market Access | 2015-16 weighted 
average 
 The extent to which companies can raise money by 
issuing shares and/or bonds on the capital market is 
assessed on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = not at all; 7 = to a 
great extent). 
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
4.08  Venture Capital Availability | 2015-16 weighted average
 The ease with which start-up entrepreneurs with  
innovative but risky projects can obtain equity funding  
is assessed on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = extremely difficult; 
7 = extremely easy).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
4.09  Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks (% of 
GDP) | 2015
 This refers to the financial resources provided to the 
private sector by banks and other depository  
corporations (except central banks) through, for  
instance, loans, purchases of non-equity securities, 
trade credits, and other accounts receivable, that  
establish a claim for repayment. For some countries 
these claims include credit to public enterprises.
 Sources: International Financial Statistics and data files, 
IMF; World Bank; OECD. 
4.10  Bank Lending to Non-Financial Corporations  
(% of GDP) | 2015
 The extent to which domestic banks provide credit to 
the private non-financial sector, which includes  
non-financial corporations (both private- and  
public-owned), households, and non-profit institutions 
serving households. 
 Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS),  
http://www.bis.org/statistics/credtopriv.htm.
4.03  Account at a Formal Financial Institution of  
Bottom 40% (%) | 2014
 This measure denotes the percentage of respondents 
aged 15 years and above in the bottom 40% income 
bracket who have an account (in own name or with 
someone else) at a bank, credit union, or other financial 
institution such as a cooperative, a microfinance  
institution, or the post office (if applicable). It includes 
those who own a debit card.  
 Source: Global Findex database, World Bank. 
4.04  Account Used for Business Purposes of Bottom 
40% (% among age 15+) | 2011
 This denotes the percentage of respondents (income in 
bottom 40%, aged 15 years and above) who reported 
using their accounts at a formal financial institution 
for business purposes only or for both business and 
personal purposes.
 Source: Global Findex database, World Bank. 
4.05  Ease of Access to Loans | 2015–2016 weighted  
average  
 The ease with which businesses can obtain a bank loan 
is ranked from 1 to 7 (1 = extremely difficult;  
7 = extremely easy). 
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum.
4.06  Financing of SMEs | 2015-2016 weighted average
 The extent to which small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) can access finance they need for their business 
operations through the financial sector is ranked on a 
scale from 1 to 7 (1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
3.12  Effectiveness of Antitrust Policy | 2015-16 weighted 
average
 The effectiveness of anti-monopoly policies at ensuring 
fair competition is rated on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = not 
effective at all; 7 = extremely effective).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
3.13  Concentration of Banking-Sector Assets | 2012
 This is a measure of the assets of the five largest banks 
as a share of total commercial banking assets. Total 
assets include total earning assets, cash and dues from 
banks, foreclosed real estate, fixed assets, goodwill, 
other intangibles, current tax assets, deferred tax, 
discontinued operations, and other assets.
 Source: Raw data are from Bankscope: 
(Sum(data2025) for five largest banks in Bankscope)/
(Sum(data2025) for all banks in Bankscope) – only 
reported if the number of banks in Bankscope is five 
or more, and calculated from underlying bank-by-bank 
unconsolidated data from Bankscope
4th Pillar: Financial Intermediation of Real Economy
Investment
a) Financial System Inclusion 
4.01  Affordability of Financial Services | 2015-2016 
weighted average
 The extent to which the cost of financial services  
(e.g. insurance, loans, trade finance) impedes business 
activity is rated on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = impedes  
business to a great extent; 7 = not at all).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
4.02 Gender Gap in Financial Access | 2014
 This measure denotes the percentage of respondents 
above 15 years of age who report having an account 
(by themselves or together with someone else) at a 
bank or another type of financial institution. The gender 
gap is arrived at by dividing the female value by the 
male value. 
 Source: Global Findex database, World Bank. 
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5.07  Cost of Resolving Insolvency | 2015
 The average cost of bankruptcy proceedings is  
recorded as a percentage of the estate’s value.  
This indicator pertaining to the burden of resolving 
insolvency receives 1/2 weighting in the pillar 
aggregation. 
 Source: Doing Business project, World Bank,  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
5.08  Cost of Enforcing a Contract | 2015
 The cost in court and attorney fees, where the use of 
attorneys is mandatory or common, is expressed  
as a percentage of the debt value. This indicator  
pertaining to the burden of enforcing a contract  
receives 1/2 weighting in the pillar aggregation. 
 Source: Doing Business project, World Bank,  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
5.09  Time Required to Enforce a Contract | 2015
 This consists of the number of calendar days from the 
filing of a lawsuit in court until the final determination 
and, in appropriate cases, payment. This indicator 
receives 1/2 weighting in the pillar aggregation. 
 Source: Doing Business project, World Bank, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
5.10  Time Required to Prepare and Pay Taxes  
(in hours) | 2015
 The time needed to prepare and pay taxes is the time, 
in hours per year, it takes to prepare, file, and pay (or 
withhold) three major types of taxes: corporate income 
tax, value added or sales tax, and labor taxes, including 
payroll taxes and social security contributions. 
 Source: Doing Business project, World Bank, 
 http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
5.03  PCT Patent Applications Filed (% of population) | 
2012–2013 average
 The number of applications filed by a country under the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) per million population 
is measured by priority date and inventor nationality, 
using a fractional count if an application is filed by  
multiple inventors. The average count of applications 
filed in 2012 and 2013 is divided by the population,  
using figures from the World Bank’s World  
Development Indicators Online. 
 Sources: World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) PCT Data, sourced from OECD Patent  
Database; World Bank World Development Indicators; 
World Economic Forum Global Information Technology 
Report calculations.
5.04  Time Required to Start a Business | 2015
 The time required to start a business is the number 
of calendar days needed to complete the procedures 
to legally operate a business. If a procedure can be 
speeded up at additional cost, the fastest procedure, 
independent of cost, is chosen. This indicator receives 
1/2 weighting in the pillar aggregation. 
 Source: Doing Business project, World Bank,  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
5.05  Cost of Starting a Business | 2015
 The cost of registering a business is normalized by 
presenting it as a percentage of gross national income 
(GNI) per capita. This indicator receives 1/2 weighting in 
the pillar aggregation. 
 Source: Doing Business project, World Bank,  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
5.06  Time Required to Resolve Insolvency | 2015
 The time it takes to resolve insolvency is the number of 
years from the filing for insolvency proceedings in court 
until the resolution of distressed assets. This indicator 
receives 1/2 weighting in the pillar aggregation. 
 Source: Doing Business project, World Bank,  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
4.19  Share Buyback | 2009-2013
 The estimated dollar share buyback volume is based on 
a five-year moving average (2009-2013) and represented 
as a share of total GDP (2009-2013). It is calculated 
by combining information from two data sources. The 
first, used for the majority of firm-year observations, is 
WorldScope data item WC04751 (common and  
preferred purchased, redeemed, and converted), 
which, according to WorldScope, represents funds 
used to decrease the outstanding shares of common 
and/or preferred stock. When WC04751 is missing, the 
ESG - Asset4 data item ECSLDP048 (share buyback 
amount) is used. It is defined as “The total monetary 
value of the shares repurchased by the company during 
the fiscal year.” 
 Source: Buybacks Around the World, WorldScope, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2330807.
5th Pillar: Asset Building and Entrepreneurship 
a) Small Business Ownership
5.01  New Businesses Registered | 2014 or most recent
 The number of new limited-liability corporations 
registered in a calendar year are expressed per 1,000 
working individuals (aged 15-64 years).
 Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
5.02  Attitudes toward Entrepreneurial Failure | 2015-
2016 weighted average 
 The extent to which people have an appetite for  
entrepreneurial risk (1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum.
4.15  Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Private Sector 
(% of GDP) | 2015
 This measures gross fixed capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP. Private investment covers gross 
outlays by the private sector (including private nonprofit 
agencies) on additions to its fixed domestic assets.
 Sources: World Bank national accounts data; OECD 
National Accounts data files.
4.16  Follow-on Issuances (% of GDP) | 2011-2015
 A follow-on offering, otherwise known as a subsequent 
offering, can be understood as a dilutive secondary 
offering that a company makes on the primary market. 
Follow-ons issued by financial corporations and real 
estate are excluded from this calculation. The indicator 
is based on a five-year average.
 Source: Dealogic. 
4.17  Corporate Bond Issuance (% of GDP) | 2011-2015
 
 The total corporate bond net issuance (domestic and 
international) to Non-Financial Corporations expressed 
as a share of GDP is a measure of market activity.  
Debt issued by financial corporations and real-estate 
companies is excluded from this calculation. The  
indicator is based on a five-year average.
 Source: Dealogic. 
4.18 Share Turnover Ratio (%) | 2015
 Turnover ratio is the value of domestic shares traded 
divided by their market capitalization. The value is  
annualized by multiplying the monthly average by 12.
 Source: World Federation of Exchanges database. 
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6.07  Social Mobility | 2015-2016 weighted average
 The extent to which individuals have the opportunity to 
improve their economic situation through their personal 
efforts regardless of the socioeconomic status of their 
parents is assessed on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = not at all; 
7 = to a great extent).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
6.08  Strictness of Employment Protection | 2015 or  
most recent
 This measures the strictness of regulations on dismissal 
and use of temporary contracts, incorporating three 
aspects of dismissal protection: (i) procedural barriers 
for employers starting the dismissal process, such  
as notification and consultation requirements; (ii) 
requirements regarding notice periods and severance 
pay, which typically vary by the tenure of the  
employment; and (iii) the difficulty of dismissal, as 
determined by the circumstances in which it is possible 
to dismiss workers, as well as the repercussions for the 
employer if a dismissal is found to be unfair (such as 
compensation and reinstatement).
 Source: OECD. 
6.09  Unusual Hours of Work | 2014
 This measures the average annual hours worked  
per worker.
 Source: OECD. 
6.10  Share in Temporary Employment | 2014
 This refers to the share of employed persons in  
temporary employment as a percentage. 
 Source: OECD. 
6.11  Underemployment Rate | 2015 
 This marks the share of the labor force that is involved 
in involuntary part-time employment arrangements 
(under 30 hours per week) but available for and seeking 
full-time employment.
 Source: OECD. 
6.03  Youth Unemployment Rate | 2014 or most recent
 This measure refers to the share of the labor force aged 
15-24 years without work but available for and seeking 
employment.
 Sources: KILM, ILO. 
6.04  Vulnerable Employment Rate | 2014 or most recent
 This measures the proportion of own-account and  
contributing family workers in total employment. 
Vulnerable employment refers to work by unpaid family 
workers and own-account workers. A contributing 
family worker is a person who is self-employed in a 
market-oriented establishment operated by a related 
person living in the same household, but who cannot 
be regarded as a partner because the degree of his or 
her commitment to the operation of the establishment, 
in terms of working time or other factors determined 
by national circumstances, is not at a level comparable 
with that of the head of the establishment.
 Source: World Development Indicators Online,  
World Bank. 
6.05  Extent of Informal Economy (undeclared or  
unregistered activity) | 2015-2016 weighted average
 The extent of economic activity estimated to be  
undeclared or unregistered is recorded on a scale  
of 1-7 (1 = most economic activity is undeclared or 
unregistered; 7 = most economic activity is declared  
or registered).  
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum.
6.06  Country Capacity to Retain Talent | 2015-2016 
weighted average
 The extent to which each country retains talented 
people is estimated on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = not at all 
– the best and brightest leave to pursue opportunities 
abroad; 7 = to a great extent – the best and brightest 
stay and pursue opportunities in the country).
 
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
 
5.15  Employee Stock Ownership | 2013
 This refers to the practice among private companies 
(with 10 or more employees) to offer employees’  
share ownership schemes (ESOS), which provide  
employees with an indirect share in the company’s 
results through receiving dividends and/or appreciation 
in the share value. 
 Source: European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS). 
5.16  Profit Sharing | 2013
 This indicates the practice among private companies 
(with 10 or more employees) of offering their employees 
profit-sharing schemes, whereby employees get a 
share of the profits or wealth created by the company in 
addition to their regular pay. The payments are explicitly 
and directly linked to the profits of the company, or 
some similar measurement of corporate performance in 
the form of cash bonuses, cash transfers to employees’ 
savings funds, or free equity shares.
 Source: EWCS. 
5.17  Private Pension Assets (% of GDP) | 2014
 A pension fund is any plan, fund or scheme that  
provides retirement income. Assets are defined as all 
forms of private investment with a value linked to a 
pension plan over which ownership rights are enforced 
by institutional units, individually or collectively. This 
indicator is measured as a ratio of assets of pension 
funds to GDP.
 Source: OECD. 
6th Pillar: Employment and Labor Compensation
a) Economic Participation and Opportunity 
6.01  Female Labor Force Participation | 2014 
 This is the ratio of female labor force participation to 
male labor force participation.
 Source: Key Indicators of the Labour Market, ILO.
6.02  Unemployment Rate | 2014 
 This refers to the share of the labor force that is without 
work but available for and seeking employment.
 Source: KILM, ILO.
b) Home and Financial Asset Ownership
5.11  Protection of Property Rights | 2015-2016 weighted 
average
 The extent to which property rights, including financial 
assets, are protected is assessed on a scale of 1 to 7 
(1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum.
5.12  Home Ownership Rate | 2015 or most recent
 This is the percentage of population living in an owner-
occupied dwelling (with or without a mortgage) as 
opposed to rented dwellings. Dwellings owned by the 
households that live in them are fixed assets that their 
owners use to produce housing services for their own 
consumption. Information on tenure status is more 
widely available on a cross-country basis and is a good 
proxy for home-ownership rates. 
 Sources: Housing Finance Information Network  
(HOFINET), http://www.hofinet.org/; Eurostat.
5.13  Housing Loan Penetration | 2011
 This indicates the percentage of adult population with 
an outstanding loan to purchase a home from any 
provider of housing loans, including regulated financial 
institutions and microfinance and informal sources. 
 Source: Global Findex database, World Bank.
5.14  House Price-to-Income Ratio | 2014
 This measures the housing affordability gap or the  
difference between the cost of an acceptable housing 
unit and what households can afford for housing using 
no more than 30% of their income. Data is limited to 
urban areas (2,500 cities) and is aggregated at the 
country level (weighted by population). 
 Source: McKinsey Global Institute. For more information, 
see A Blueprint for addressing the global affordable 
housing challenge, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/
urbanization/tackling_the_worlds_affordable_hous-
ing_challenge, p.180-183.
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6.25  Parental Leave | 2013
 Parental leave can be paid by the government, the  
employer, or both, and can even be unpaid as long 
as the government explicitly mandates some form of 
parental leave to be shared between the mother and 
father. Allowances for a fixed number of days per y 
ear to be applied toward family emergencies or  
child-related responsibilities are not considered parental 
leave. It is expressed as total number of days of paid or 
unpaid leave. This indicator receives 1/2 weighting in 
the pillar aggregation. 
 Source: “Women, Business and the Law 2014:  
Removing Restrictions to Enhance Gender Equality,” 
World Bank, http://wbl.worldbank.org/Reports. 
7th Pillar: Fiscal Transfers  
a) Tax Code
7.01  Extent and Effect of Taxation on Incentives to Work | 
2015-16 weighted average
 Survey respondents rate the extent to which taxes and 
social contributions reduce the incentive to work on a 
scale of 1 to 7 (1 = significantly reduce the incentive to 
work; 7 = do not reduce incentive to work at all).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
  
7.02  Extent and Effect of Taxation on Incentives to 
Invest | 2015-2016 weighted average
 Respondents rate the extent to which taxes reduce the 
incentive to invest on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = significantly 
reduce the incentive to invest; 7 = do not reduce the 
incentive to invest at all). 
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
6.20  Cooperation in Labor-Employer Relations | 2015-
2016 weighted average
 Labor-employer relations in a given country are rated  
on a scale of 1-7 (1 = generally confrontational;  
7 = generally cooperative).  
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
6.21  Workers’ Rights | 2015
 This measure uses qualitative information from the 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)’s Survey 
of violations of Trade Union Rights (survey.ituc-csi.org). 
The survey covers violations of the rights to freedom of 
association, collective bargaining and strike. It assesses 
the extent to which national legislation complies with 
international standards and highlights practices through 
examples of violations.
 Source: Global Rights Index, ITUC. 
 
6.22  Availability of Formal Child Care | 2013
 This is a measure of the average enrollment rate of 
children under three years of age in formal child care. 
 Source: OECD. 
6.23  Cost of Child Care | 2012
 Child care fees per two-year-old attending accredited 
early-years care and education services are expressed 
as a percentage of the average wage. 
 Source: OECD. 
6.24  Maternity Leave | 2013
 This refers to the mandatory minimum length of paid 
maternity leave (in calendar days) that must be paid by 
the government, the employer, or both, or its full-rate 
equivalent. The full-rate equivalent is calculated as the 
duration of leave in weeks multiplied by the payment 
(as a percentage of the average worker’s earnings) 
received by the claimant. Maternity leave is available 
only to the mother. This indicator receives 1/2 weighting 
in the pillar aggregation.
 Source: “Women, Business and the Law 2014:  
Removing Restrictions to Enhance Gender Equality,” 
World Bank, http://wbl.worldbank.org/Reports. 
6.17  Wage Dispersion | 2015
 Viewing minimum wage relative to the median provides 
a better basis for international comparisons of wage 
dispersion as it accounts for differences in earnings  
dispersion across countries. However, while full-time 
workers’ median basic earnings (excluding overtime 
and bonus payments) are, ideally, the preferred measure 
of average wages for international comparisons 
of minimum-to-median earnings, they are not available 
for a large number of non-OECD countries. 
 Data are reported in national currency units, at current 
prices. For developing countries, due to lack of  
data availability, median wages have been replaced with 
mean wages for the purpose of this Report. 
 Source: OECD. 
6.18  Trade Union Density | 2013 or most recent
 This measures the proportion of paid workers who are 
union members. Trade union density expresses union 
membership as a proportion of the eligible workforce 
and can be used as an indicator of the degree to which 
workers are organized. For the purpose of this indicator, 
a trade union is defined as an “independent association 
of workers, constituted for the purposes of furthering 
and defending workers’ interests.”
 Source: ILOSTAT, ILO. 
6.19  Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate | 2013 or  
most recent
 This rate conveys the number of workers covered by 
one or more collective agreements as a percentage of 
the total number of persons in employment. 
 Collective bargaining coverage refers to the number of 
workers in employment whose pay and/or conditions  
of employment are determined by one or more collective 
agreements which spell out, in writing, the terms 
reached at by an employer, a group of employers, or 
one or more employers or their organizations on the 
one hand, and one or more workers’ representatives or 
organizations on the other. 
 The employed are all persons of working age who, during 
a specified period, were in one of the following categories: 
a) paid employment (whether at work or with a job but 
not at work); or b) self-employment (whether at work or 
with an enterprise but not at work). 
 
 Source: ILOSTAT, ILO. 
6.12  Active Labour-Market Expenditure (% of GDP) | 
2014
 This measures the amount of public expenditure on 
active labor-market policy measures as a percentage  
of GDP.
 Source: OECD. 
b)  Wage and Non-Wage Compensation 
6.13  Low Pay Rate | 2015 or most recent  
 This measure of earnings dispersion refers to the  
proportion of employees whose hourly earnings at all 
jobs are less than two-thirds of the median.
 Source: ILOSTAT, ILO. 
6.14  Gender Gap in Estimated Earned Income | 2016
 The World Economic Forum Gender Gap Report  
calculates the ratio of female estimated earned income 
to male estimated earned income.
 Sources: World Economic Forum calculations based 
on the United Nations Development Programme 
methodology (refer to Human Development Report 
2007/2008). 
6.15  Working Poor | 2013
 This refers to the proportion of employed persons in 
a household whose members are living below the $2 
threshold.
 Source: KILM 2012, ILO. 
6.16  Pay Linked to Productivity | 2015-2016 weighted 
average
 The extent to which pay is related to worker productivity 
is rated on a scale of 1-7 (1 = not related to worker 
productivity; 7 = strongly related to worker productivity).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum.
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7.13  Adequacy of Social Insurance | 2014 or most recent  
The total transfer amount received by all beneficiaries in 
a quintile is represented as a share of the total welfare 
beneficiaries in that quintile. The indicator is estimated 
by program type (pensions and social security) for the 
entire population and by quintiles of both post- and  
pre-transfer welfare distribution. Specifically, the 
adequacy of benefits is estimated from the amount 
of transfers received by a quintile divided by the total 
income or consumption of beneficiaries in that quintile.
 Source: ASPIRE Database, World Bank,  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTEC-
TION/Resources/280558-1353009461419/ASPIRE_
Programs_Classification.pdf.
7.14  Adequacy of Social Assistance | 2014 or most recent  
This represents the total transfer amount received by all 
beneficiaries in a quintile as a share of the total welfare 
beneficiaries in that quintile. The indicator is estimated 
by program type (cash or in-kind transfers) for the entire 
population, and by quintiles of both the post- and  
pre-transfer welfare distribution. Specifically, the 
adequacy of benefits is calculated as: the amount of 
transfers received by a quintile divided by the total 
income or consumption of beneficiaries in that quintile.
 Source: ASPIRE Database, World Bank,  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTEC-
TION/Resources/280558-1353009461419/ASPIRE_
Programs_Classification.pdf.
7.09  Tax on Inheritance (% of GDP) | 2014 
 Estate, gift, and inheritance tax revenue is expressed as 
a percentage of GDP.
 Source: OECD. 
b) Social Protection 
7.10  Efficiency in Public Goods and Services Provision | 
2015-2016 weighted average
 The government’s efficiency in providing public goods 
and services is rated on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = extremely 
inefficient; 7 = extremely efficient).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum.
7.11 Social Safety Net Protection | 2015-2016 weighted 
average
 The extent to which a formal social safety net provides 
protection to the general population from economic  
insecurity in the event of job loss or disability is  
assessed on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = not at all; 7 = full 
protection).
 Source: Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic 
Forum. 
7.12   Benefit-to-Cost Ratio (poorest quintile) | 2014 or 
most recent
 This measures the reduction in poverty obtained for 
each dollar spent on social protection and labor (SPL) 
programs. The indicator is estimated for the entire 
population and by program type. Specifically, the 
benefit-cost ratio is estimated as: (poverty gap before 
transfer – poverty gap after transfer) / total transfer 
amount.
 Programs are categorized as social assistance, social 
insurance, and labor market, according to ASPIRE 
classification. 
 Source: ASPIRE Database, World Bank,  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTEC-
TION/Resources/280558-1353009461419/ASPIRE_
Programs_Classification.pdf.
 Sources: ETH data. See P. Egger and N. Strecker, “A 
Tour of Income Tax in the World, 1980-2012,” mimeo, 
2015; “Taxing Wages,” OECD, http://www.oecd.org/
tax/taxing-wages-20725124.htm; ETH Zurich. 
7.05  Total Tax Wedge (% of labor costs) | 2013 
 This indicator reflects the tax wedge for an average 
country-specific industrial worker in 2012, and is 
defined as the difference between the salary costs of 
a single “average worker” to their employer and the 
amount of net income (take-home pay) that the worker 
receives. The taxes covered are personal income 
taxes, compulsory social-security contributions paid by 
employees and employers, and payroll taxes for the few 
countries that have them. The amount of these taxes is 
expressed as a percentage of the total labor costs for 
firms, i.e. the sum of gross earnings, employers’ social 
security contributions, and payroll taxes. 
 Source: ETH data from P. Egger and N. Strecker,  
“A Tour of Income Tax in the World, 1980-2012,” 
mimeo, 2015. 
7.06  Tax on Consumption (goods and services, % of 
revenue) | 2014 or most recent
 This includes taxes on production, sale, transfer, 
leasing, and delivery of goods, as well as rendering of 
services, including: general taxes; value-added taxes; 
sales taxes; and other general taxes on goods and 
services. It is expressed as a percentage of total tax 
revenue. 
 Source: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF. 
7.07  Tax on Property (% of GDP) | 2014 
 Property taxes include: recurrent taxes on immovable 
property; recurrent taxes on net wealth (individual and 
corporate); estate, inheritance, and gift taxes; taxes  
on financial and capital transactions; and other  
non-recurrent taxes on property. Tax revenue is  
expressed as a percentage of GDP.
 Source: OECD.
  
7.08  Tax on Capital (% of GDP) | 2014 
 Taxes on financial and capital transactions are  
expressed as a percentage of GDP.
 Source: OECD. 
7.03  Total Tax Revenue | 2014 or most recent
 Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the  
central government for public purposes. Certain  
compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and most 
social security contributions are excluded. Refunds 
and corrections of erroneously-collected tax revenue 
are treated as negative revenue. Total tax revenue is 
represented as a percentage of GDP. 
 Sources: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and 
data files, IMF; World Bank and OECD GDP estimates. 
7.04  Progressivity Index | 2012
 This index is based on average (and marginal) personal 
income-tax rates and tax wedges for different family 
types and earnings levels, taking into account statutory 
tax provisions (i.e. the personal income-tax rate 
schedule, basic and other tax allowances, tax credits, 
deductions, employee and employer social security 
contributions, payroll taxes (if any), and certain cash 
benefits). Using Taxing Wages models, the average tax 
rates and tax wedges are calculated for a wide range 
of incomes (from 50% to 500% of the average wage, 
which represents the gross earnings a worker in the 
private sector earns on average in a particular year 
and country). The income range is divided into various 
intervals (e.g. 50%-67% of the average worker income 
interval). Using information on the average tax rate/
wedge for the income at the beginning and end level 
of each income interval, a calculation is made of how 
the average tax rate/wedge increases over that income 
interval (i.e. by subtracting the tax rate/wedge at the  
bottom income level from the tax burden at the top  
income level, and by dividing the difference by the 
length of the income interval). This number indicates 
how the tax burden increases per percentage point 
increase in income levels (expressed as a multiple of 
the average wage) over an income interval. These 
calculations are made for all income intervals, yielding 
a measure of the progressivity of the tax system within 
each income interval, as well as how the progressivity 
changes over the income intervals. The overall  
progressivity of the tax system is also calculated by 
comparing the tax burden at 500% of the average 
wage with the burden at 50% of the average wage. 
Please note that these are “structural” progressivity 
measures and do not take the actual income  
distribution into account.
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7.22  Unemployment Insurance | 2014
 Initial net replacement rate is an average of cases of a 
single person with no children with previous earnings in 
work 67% of average production worker (APW) level.
 NRR provides a more complete measure of work 
incentives and income maintenance, especially when 
compared over longer periods of unemployment. 
 Source: OECD.  
7.18  Progressivity of Pensions | 2013
 The progressivity index is designed to summarize the 
relationship between pension in retirement and earnings 
while working. The range varies from 100 through  
zero to negative results, indicating that the overall 
retirement-income system is regressive.
 Source: OECD. 
7.19  Coverage of Healthcare | 2012 or most recent
 This is a measure of the estimated social healthcare 
protection coverage as a percentage of the total 
population. Coverage includes affiliated members of a 
health insurance policy and the population enjoying free 
access to healthcare services provided by the state. 
 Source: Social Protection Platform, ILO, http://www.
social-protection.org/gimi/gess/ShowMainPage.
action?lang=EN.
7.20  Employment Injury Coverage (as % of the labor 
force) | 2012
 The extent of legal coverage of employment injury is 
expressed as a percentage of the economically active 
population. This includes employer-liability programs 
and voluntary and mandatory social assistance. 
 Source: Social Protection Platform, ILO, http://www.
social-protection.org/gimi/gess/ShowMainPage.
action?lang=EN.
7.21  Net Pension Replacement Rate | 2014
 The net replacement rate is defined as net pension 
entitlement divided by net pre-retirement earnings. It 
measures how effectively a pension system provides 
a retirement income to replace the main source of 
income before retirement. This indicator is measured as 
a percentage of pre-retirement earnings.  
 As values were provided separately for men and 
women, the average of the two was taken.
 Source: OECD. 
7.15  Total Social Public Expenditure (% of GDP) | 2011 or 
most recent
 This indicator shows the total public expenditure on 
social protection and health as a percentage of GDP. 
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